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This thesis challenges the orthodox view that the role of the infantry brigade command 
of the British Army during the First World War was unduly narrow. Instead, it is argued 
that the response of the brigadiers and their staff to the challenges of the Western 
Front secured their role as agents of organisational and tactical change. A series of 
case studies over the period 1916-1918 serve to demonstrate the significant 
contribution of brigade staff to the Army’s learning process. Much like that of the wider 
BEF however, this process was complex and uneven. As a consequence, the 
development and battlefield performance of the brigades varied in accordance with 
factors of an external and internal nature: of these, the influence of the corps or division 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
 
The infantry brigade of the British Army comprised a key component in the 
chain of command on the Western Front during the First World War. This role was 
subject to a progressive, but irregular, transformation as the Army responded to the 
difficulties imposed by trench warfare. This thesis explores the evolution of the brigade 
as an effective battlefield formation and the influence exercised by the brigade staff in 
their multi-functional role.  The introduction addresses five points: what the thesis sets 
out to demonstrate, how command and control is treated in the relevant literature, what 
factors defined the parameters in which brigade command operated, how the British 
Army’s capacity for learning has been evaluated and the justification for the selected 
case studies. 
 Two primary research questions were posed. First, to what degree was brigade 
command’s response to static warfare and the transition to mobile operations a 
reflection of the British army’s flexible approach to learning and innovation? It will be 
argued that the contribution by brigade staff to this process has been underestimated 
by historians. Second, to what extent was the organisational and tactical development 
of brigade command shaped by the corps and division under which it served?  It will 
be demonstrated that a brigade’s battlefield performance was significantly influenced 
by this factor. Both questions were designed to challenge the orthodox interpretation 
of the brigadier’s role as unduly narrow, a view expressed by Major-General Sir John 




his eyes’.1 Instead, it will be argued that the role of the brigadier was far broader and 
constituted a catalyst for organisational and tactical change. 
 Two avenues of research were adopted to reflect the many interrelated physical 
dimensions and conceptual planes upon which the conflict was fought. The first, at a 
macro level, included the geographical, economic and technological factors that 
shaped operations, those that continually evolved in ‘new and often unexpected 
directions under the influence of the others’.2 These broad factors comprised the 
parameters in which brigade operated. Second, at a micro level, the influence of the 
brigadier and his immediate staff was examined in relation to the challenges imposed 
by the irregularities and configuration of their brigade sectors. The thesis illustrates 
that by drawing upon their accumulated experience and knowledge, provided that 
specific operational pre-conditions were established, brigade staff could exercise a 
substantial degree of tactical influence at a pivotal level of learning. This focus upon 
the human factor serves to evaluate the multi-faceted role of the commander as a 
leader, administrator and facilitator of change, foreshadowing the establishment of a 
new generation of brigadiers.  
 The analysis of military history is based upon the distinction between strategy, 
operations and tactics. It is important to define these terms as used throughout this 
thesis. Whilst their meaning has altered through time and mask subtleties of 
interpretation, they provide a basis for identifying the respective roles of and 
responsibilities taken within the hierarchical structure of the British armies. The 
 
1 Australian War Memorial (AWM) 8040/1/(2) cited in P. Simkins, ‘” Building Blocks”: Aspects of Command and 
Control at Brigade Level in the BEF’s Offensive Operations, 1916-1918’ in G.D. Sheffield and D. Todman (eds.) 
Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2007 
[2004]), p.145.  
2 J. Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 




Commander-in-Chief of the BEF had prime responsibility for managing the political will 
of his governmental masters, directly or indirectly through his CIGS. On advice from 
the politicians an appropriate strategy was thus determined. Army commanders had 
responsibility for advising the C-in-C on questions of strategy. Corps commanders had 
responsibility for supervising plans for their subordinate commanders, marshalling 
appropriate resources and establishing a supportive infrastructure. Divisional 
commanders created the operational plans that gave effect to the agreed strategy. 
Brigade command devised and implemented the appropriate tactical measures to 
achieve the operational objectives set for their battalions. At all levels, commanders 
were assisted by their staffs who ‘stood at the apex of the command team and had a 
significant influence over the success of a formation’.3 In the view of Brigadier-General 
Hubert Foster, a leading military writer of the period, it was the duty of the staff officer 
to work out the details of the dispositions and movements of troops and embody the 
commander’s plans in concise orders to be transmitted with certainty and dispatch. 
Thus, as Foster contended, good staff officers ‘are the eyes, ears and hands to their 
Chief’.4 In this respect divisional, brigade and subordinate levels of command 
constituted pivotal levels of organisational and tactical learning.  
 Issues concerning command and control during the First World War have 
comprised part of the debate over the battlefield performance of the British Army since 
the war ended. The early literature, laid down during the inter-war years and the 
1960’s, subscribed to the view that the war was little more than ‘a murderous 
nightmare of misdirected heroism and pointless suffering’ and placed the blame firmly 
 
3 P. Harris, The Men Who Planned the War: A study of the Staff of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-
1918 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), p.2. 




on the shoulders of the military high command.5 This approach  has now been largely 
discredited,6 although still retaining a small number of supporters.7 Since the 1980’s, 
a ‘new era of scholarship’ has provided a more balanced approach to an assessment 
of the BEF.8  Building upon the work of historians such as John Terraine, Tim Travers, 
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, this scholarship has examined the BEF at operational 
and tactical levels.9  For example, the works of Simon Robbins, Gary Sheffield, Andy 
Simpson have demonstrated that by 1918 the BEF had developed into a sophisticated 
and formidable institution.10  
 The works that have emerged over the past two decades, in establishing the 
concept of a ‘learning curve’, have ‘been very helpful in moving us away from old static 
perceptions of the British army and towards a more dynamic and progressive view of 
its development’.11 However, while this concept has conveyed the belief that the British 
military command consistently analysed and acted upon its mistakes, most historians 
 
5 J. Bourne, ‘Goodbye to All That? Recent Writing on the Great War’, Twentieth Century British History, 1 
(1990), pp.87-8. See also B. Bond, The Unquiet Western Front: Britain’s Role in Literature and History 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002), especially chapter 3, pp.51-73. 
6 Notably, B. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918 (London: Faber and Faber, 1930); A. Clark, The Donkeys 
(London: Hutchinson, 1961) and A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated History (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1963). 
7 See for example, J. Mosier, The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War One (London: 
Profile Books, 2001). 
8 G.D. Sheffield and J. Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918 (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 2005), p.1. 
9J. Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier (London: Hutchinson, 1963); T. Travers, The Killing Ground: 
The British Army on the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern War 1900-1918 (Barnsley: Pen and 
Sword, 2003 [1987]); R. Price and T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry 
Rawlinson, 1914-1918 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2004 [1992]). 
10 S. Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918: Defeat into Victory (London: Frank Cass, 
2005); G.D. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Headline, 
2002[2001]); A. Simpson, Directing Operations: Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-1918 (Stroud: 
Spellmount, 2015); B. Bond et al, ‘Look to Your Front: Studies in the First World War by The British Commission 
for Military History (Stroud: Spellmount, 1999); P.E. Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the 
First World War (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015).    
11 Boff, Winning and Losing, p.248. Early advocates of the ‘learning curve’ include S. Bidwell and D. Graham, 
Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2004 
[1982]); P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-1918 (London: 




would now accept that there were in fact multiple learning curves being climbed 
simultaneously. Although, through a combination of its pre-war ethos and a pragmatic 
approach to problem solving, the British army has been shown to have been 
‘institutionally capable of learning and adapting both on and beyond the Western Front’ 
this process was complex and uneven.12 Different levels of command experienced 
variable rates of development. This thesis focuses upon the pace of development 
experienced by brigade command, the extent to which brigade staffs were able to 
capitalise upon the organisational and cultural flexibility of the British army and their 
contribution to the learning process. 
 The broad parameters in which the BEF operated were defined by three 
universal criteria: an obligation to the Anglo-French coalition, the British government’s 
unpreparedness for a large-scale continental conflict and the rate of technological 
innovation spurred by the need to address the challenges of static warfare. First, 
throughout the winter of 1914-1915, as a junior member of the coalition and despite 
Sir John French’s desire as Commander-in-Chief to pursue an independent strategy, 
there had been little choice other than to ‘comply with a strategy formulated in Joffre’s 
headquarters’.13 In pursuing this strategy, the British sector on the Western Front was 
extended northwards during January 1915 relieving the French IX Corps in the vicinity 
of Ypres. The localities of the BEF operations then became defined by the German 
occupation of the high ground and the predominance of their defensive systems. Thus, 
the position occupied by the British First Army, based upon the contention ‘that we 
cannot separate history from geography’, set the pattern for subsequent operations; 
 
12 A. Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), p.240. 
13 J. P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.111. For 
British-French strategy, see for example R.A. Prete, Strategy and Command: The Anglo-French Coalition on the 




the dominance of the defence over the assault.14 The basic elements of geography 
constitute fundamental factors in the conduct of battle, the physical advantage for one 
side imposing some degree of misfortune for the others. This factor cannot be 
underestimated in evaluating brigade command’s responses to the environment in 
which they operated.  
 The British government’s failure to prepare for a continental conflict was a 
second factor influencing the shape and direction of the war. This was initially reflected 
in manpower shortages. Shaped by financial expediency rather than strategical or 
operational factors, the British army’s regular establishment of six infantry and one 
cavalry division was rapidly eroded by the huge losses sustained during 1914.15 
Equally, Britain was slow to arm itself, exposing all the government’s pre-war plans. 
Whilst shell deliveries were enough to keep the BEF supplied with ammunition at the 
expected pre-war rate, the battlefield expenditure had been grossly underestimated. 
Industry ‘could not supply Sir John French and the New Armies [original emphasis]’ 
indefinitely.16 This shortfall determined the scale of the offensives conducted during 
1915-1916 and consequently the shape and course of brigade operations. 
 A third parameter governing the BEF’s operational capacity was the impact of 
artillery support in the achievement of tempo, or the ability of a force ‘to transition from 
 
14 R. J. Wilson, ‘Geography and Military History’ in Army Quarterly Vol. XII, No.2, January 1927, pp.394-397. For 
recent research on this theme, see for example P. Doyle, Disputed Earth: Geology and Trench Warfare on the 
Western Front 1914-1918 (London: Uniform Publishing, 2017). 
15 Statistics of the Military of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914-1918 (London: HMSO, 1922), p.364 
for recruiting figures September 1914-February 1915. For the British government’s response to this shortfall, 
see for example P. Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-1916 (Barnsley: Pen and 
Sword, 2007 [1988]). 
16 D. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905-1915 (London: Allan and Unwin, 1982), p.155. See 
also D.G. Morgan-Owen, The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics and Strategic Planning, 1880-1914 (Oxford: 




one operational posture to another’.17 To counter the effect of superior firepower and 
promote a tactical rate of advance, the artillery required not only an unprecedented 
quantity of munitions but the skills to ensure accurate delivery. As Spencer Jones has 
demonstrated ‘of all the combat arms in the British Army, the Royal Artillery faced the 
greatest challenge in the pre-First World War period, being forced to adapt to both 
new equipment and new tactics in a short space of time’. In effect however, in 1914 ‘it 
was a lack of numbers and an absence of uniform doctrine that hampered the 
gunners… rather than inherent tactical flaws’.18 On the one hand, commanders 
favoured rapid direct fire in close support of the infantry. For example, in chairing a 
debate on the infantry perspective of artillery support,  Brigadier-General L.E. Kiggell 
Director of Staff Duties at the War Office, concluded that the infantry would accept 
friendly-fire casualties from direct fire, but not indirect, as the sight of the guns on the 
battlefield boosted their self-belief.19 Conversely, other commanders prioritised 
indirect fire, precise ranging and concealment as their experiences in South Africa and 
the Russo-Japanese War had demonstrated.20 Such diversity of practice ‘implied a 
failure to imprint a common understanding of the basic tactical principles on the core 
operational units of the army’.21 By the middle of the decade, a greater number of 
artillerymen favoured a shift towards indirect fire and by 1914 the recommendation of 
pushing batteries up to a decisive range in close support during an attack had been 
 
17 Army Doctrine Publication Vol.1. (Operations Army Code 71565), prepared under the Direction of the Chief 
of the General Staff (1994), pp.3-19, quoted in Boff, Winning and Losing, p.6. 
18 S. Jones. From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914 (Norman, Oklahoma 
University Press, 2013), pp.157-8. 
19 Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXXV, 1908-1909, No.2, (Woolwich, Royal Artillery 
Institution), pp.49-56. Remarks made by the Chair, p.53. 
20  See for example, Brigadier-General J.P. Du Cane, ‘The Co-Operation of Field Artillery with Infantry in Attack’ 
in Army Review 1, (1911), pp.97-113; Major E.M. Molyneaux, ‘Artillery Support for Infantry’ in Journal of the 
Royal United Services Institute 53, No.2 (1909), pp.1454-70, 1607-71; Lieutenant- Colonel C.N.F. Broad, ‘The 
Development of Artillery Tactics 1914-1918’ in The Journal of the Royal Artillery, Vol. XLIX, 1922-23, pp.62-81. 
21 T. Bowman and M. Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training and Deploying the British Army, 




removed from the Field Service Regulations 1909.22 However, Field Artillery Training 
1914 offered a somewhat contradictory approach suggesting that ‘to support infantry 
and to enable it to effect its purpose the artillery must willingly sacrifice itself’ [original 
emphasis].23 In the absence of uniform fire plans, the success of the infantry during 
1914-1916 was often dependent upon the individual  experience and perception  of 
the officers in charge. This variable approach could create serious flaws when used 
across a wide battlefront.  
As Griffith has argued ‘the most effective set of new technologies in the Great 
War lay in the development of artillery’.24 A number of highly significant innovations 
were introduced building upon the pre-war developments in locating devices and 
surveying techniques.25 The greatly improved accuracy of the guns ‘matched by a 
corresponding increase in the complexity of the shells themselves’ gradually enhanced 
the effectiveness of combined artillery-infantry operations.26  Jonathan Bailey elevated 
Griffith’s research to another stage, by arguing for the arrival of a three-dimensional 
battlefield in 1916 where the quantity of ammunition available determined the scope 
of operations. This model allowed for effective indirect artillery fire in support of 
combined artillery-infantry tactics. Based upon the adoption of novel gunnery 
techniques and tactics ‘aircraft [were] increasingly used to inspect the effects of 
artillery fire’.27 Two criteria related to artillery support shaped the close cooperation 
 
22 Field Service Regulations Part 1, Operations, 1909, (Reprinted with Amendments 1914) (London: HMSO), 
chapter VII, 106, p.143. [henceforth FSR1] 
23 Field Artillery Training 1914, p.232. 
24 Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.65. 
25 See P. Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers: A History of British Survey and Mapping on the Western Front, 
1914-1918 (Lewes, Mapbooks, 1999), especially pp.3-12 for the historical background of surveying and pp.13-
16 for indirect fire and artillery surveying in 1914.   
26 Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.135 -138. 
27 J. Bailey, The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare, Occasional Paper No.22, 
(Camberley, 1996). See also J. Bailey ‘British Artillery in the Great War’ in P. Griffith (ed.), British Fighting 




between the infantry and artillery arms which perhaps, as Griffith maintained was ‘the 
most difficult [lesson] to put into practice’.28 First, the necessity ‘for artillery 
commanders ‘to help the infantry to maintain its mobility and offensive power’ as laid 
down in FSR1, was subject to individual interpretation.29 Second, the development of 
sophisticated combined operations, enhanced by the gradual refinement of predicted 
fire, provided a greater degree of flexibility for infantry attacks.      
 Whilst it would have been preferable for the British army to have perfected 
combined tactics on manoeuvres rather than on the Western Front, such was the state 
of communications on the battlefield it is not surprising that it struggled with close 
cooperation between arms. Attacks were dependent upon the establishment of a 
reliant system of communication: the failure to establish such a system looming large 
over the development of brigade operations. With an onus upon forward commanders 
to direct the tactical flow of the battle, any failure in communication deprived them of 
the means of gaining assistance or capitalising upon opportunities. Given the gravity 
of this subject, the literature on communication within the British army had until 
recently attracted little research. For example, whilst  Terraine had observed, that once 
the troops had passed out of their control, the generals ‘became quite impotent at the 
very moment when they would expect and be expected to display their greatest 
proficiency’, he did not develop his line of argument in depth.30 Prior and Wilson’s 
Command on the Western Front provided only a superficial reference to the limitations 
exerted by inadequate communications, while Bidwell and  Graham’s Fire-Power 
devoted only three pages to the subject. Tim Travers, whilst dealing with tactical and 
 
28 Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.65. 
29 FSR1, Chapter VII, 105 (3), pp.140-141. 





operational decision making in The Killing Ground, contributed little towards 
understanding the practicalities of communication within the BEF. Similarly, the 
complementary works of Martin van Creveld and Martin Samuels failed to provide a 
systematic analysis of communications.31 
  Whilst both Niall Barr and John Lee provided an insight into the role of 
communications within the BEF, Brian Hall’s analysis is the most significant work on 
the subject.32  Hall’s work examines the BEF’s capability for change and the enduring 
debate concerning the relationship between the British military command and the 
adoption of new technology. Through analysing the organisational, doctrinal and 
technical innovations adopted by the BEF, he demonstrates how communication 
helped shape the static nature of fighting between 1915 and 1917 and contributed 
towards overcoming the stalemate of trench warfare.33 Hall demonstrates that the 
evolution of brigade command is unequivocally aligned to the development of 
communications on the Western Front. These three factors defined the broad 
parameters in which the BEF operated. Thus, operational success was dictated by the 
terrain, the material weakness of the British armies and the progress of technological 
innovation. Having established this, some clarification of the British army’s command 
philosophy is required. 
 Recent historians have contended that the British army did not necessarily need 
a formal doctrine designed to ‘provide a simple, coherent, standardised structure both 
 
31 M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); M. Samuels, Command 
or Control? : Command, Training and Tactics in the British Armies 1888-1918 (London: Cass, 2003 [1995]). 
32  N. Barr, ‘Command in Transition from Mobile to Static Warfare’, pp.13-38; J. Lee ‘Command and Control in 
Battle: British Divisions on the Menin Road Ridge, 20 September 1917’, pp.119-139; both in Sheffield and 
Todman, Command and Control. 
33 B.N. Hall, Communications and British Operations on the Western Front 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge 




for strategic thought and for military institutions’.34  As Stephen Badsey has argued, in 
accordance with its role as a colonial police force ‘the definition and expectations of 
the British pre-war British army were contextually different during the Edwardian 
period’.35 This view was echoed by  Jones who considered that ‘standardised practices 
were never likely to be present in a regular army constrained by the need to remain 
flexible in order to engage with a large variety of potential foes’.36  Averse therefore to 
adopting a formal doctrine, FSR1 constituted the British army’s statement of principles. 
Whether in fact this composed a formal doctrine, or a loose, adaptable conceptual 
framework, has proved contentious within the relevant historiography. Christopher 
Pugsley, for example, maintained that FSR1 effectively turned the British army into a 
‘doctrinally based organisation with centralised intent and the means for decentralised 
execution’.37 In reality, he argued, the pre-war British army’s traditional concepts of 
manoeuvre and offensive action provided a basis for a semi-official doctrine. In a 
similar vein, Gary Sheffield argued that ‘in the absence of a formal doctrine in the 
modern sense’ the British army did incorporate a body of semi-formal doctrine in the 
form of FSR1 where Regular officers could bring their experience to bear.38 This thesis 
will demonstrate that the interpretation of the principles laid down in FSR1 remained 
central to tactical decision making at brigade level throughout 1916 -1918.  
 In theory, whilst not clearly defined, FSR1 stressed the concept of ‘the man on 
the spot’ in determining how orders were to be interpreted or amended ‘[based] upon 
 
34 J. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989 [1984], p.27. 
35 S. Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, 1880-1918 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 2-3. 
36 Jones, From Boer War, p.59. 
37 C. Pugsley, ‘We Have Been Here Before: The Evolution of Doctrine and of Decentralised Command in the 
British Army, 1905-1989’ (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Occasional Paper, No.9, 2011), p.5. 
38 www.defencesynergia.co.uk. Army Doctrine Publication, G.D. Sheffield, ‘Doctrine and Command in the 




some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order’.39 This 
principle, promoting the values of initiative and flexibility, was endorsed by the General 
Staff Officers’ conference of 1913. Here it was considered that 
there is no doubt as to the danger which, I think, all admit, of laying down too 
much detail in regulations… the problem of war cannot be solved by rules, but 
by judgement based upon a knowledge of general principles. To lay down rules 
would tend to cramp judgement but not to educate and strengthen it. For that 
reason, our manuals aim at giving principles but avoid laying down method’.40  
 
However, whilst these principles were designed to encourage initiative, the level at 
which subordinates could safely exercise command was left unclear, the difficulties of 
balancing independent action and control remaining unresolved. In effect, for 
subordinate commanders exposed to the intractable problems of communication, 
FSR1 proved a double-edged sword: whilst encouraging initiative, its vagueness 
resulted in a proliferation of different interpretations and tactical methods. As Simpson 
has demonstrated, whilst used in conjunction with the SS series of training pamphlets, 
FSR1 remained legitimately usable, it did not satisfactorily cater for the tactical 
problems of lower command.41 For example, it was laid down that ‘time [was] an 
essential consideration in deciding whether an opportunity [was] favourable or not for 
decisive action’. Thus ‘each commander may employ defensive or offensive action to 
suit his requirements’.42 This thesis demonstrates that the application of FSR1 at 
brigade level was subject to the broad preconditions for operational success and the 
 
39 FSRI, Chapter 2, 12, (13ii), p.32. The phrase ‘man on the spot’ or ‘Senior Infantry Officer on the spot’ was 
later embodied in SS135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action (General Staff: Army 
Printing and Stationery Services) December 1916. For a complete list of SS pamphlets issued from GHQ 
between 1915-1918 see P. Hodgkinson, S. Justice and T. Ball at www.birmingham.ac.uk/war/List-of-SS-
pamphlets.doc   
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value accorded to the brigadier’s interpretation of local circumstances. Given this onus 
of responsibility, it was incumbent upon the brigade staff to gather ‘timely information 
regarding the enemy’s dispositions and the topographical features of the theatre of 
operations’.43 By then having ‘acquainted [himself] with all ground over which they 
might have to act’ the brigadier was free to deploy his reserves as and when 
required.44 Given the multi-faceted role of the brigade staff, this thesis highlights the 
fundamental importance of the capture and interpretation of vital intelligence to assist 
in this procedure.  
   To evaluate the tactical influence of brigade command it is necessary to 
establish a definition of command and control.  Gary Sheffield contends that 
‘commanders at all levels should operate within an unambiguous concept of 
operations’ supported by a smooth flow of communications and with an adequate 
degree of flexibility.45 The extent to which these pre-conditions were realised shaped 
the direction of brigade operations and the brigadier’s capacity to sustain effective 
control. The degree of decentralisation experienced by brigadiers on the Western 
Front was influenced by the style of command practiced by the higher formation in 
which they served. The issue of command styles in the BEF is contentious. For 
example, Samuels argued that British command was driven by a traditional, 
hierarchical system of ‘restrictive control’, where orders prescribed to subordinates at 
a tactical level allowed little room for manoeuvre or flexibility. If an amendment to the 
plan was required, the subordinate commander had no recourse but to consult with 
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his superior.46 Millett and Murray concluded that ‘any tactical system that stressed set-
piece battles, rigid schedules for reaching objectives and tight control do not create 
the conditions necessary for timely exploitation’.47  
 In contrast, other scholars have argued that the BEF embraced a flexible style 
of command that promoted initiative, independent action and rapid movement at a 
tactical level, which was able to exploit fleeting advantages into battlefield success. 
This style reflects that adopted by the modern British Army, one of ‘mission command’. 
Based upon a philosophy of centralised intent and decentralised execution, its basic 
tenets encompass ‘timely decision making, the importance of understanding a superior 
commander’s intention and by applying this to one’s own actions, a clear responsibility 
to fulfil that intention’.48  In relation to this approach, Richard Bryson has argued that 
British commanders undoubtably understood the central elements of  this command 
philosophy ‘but would take time to bring the wartime volunteers and conscripts up to 
the level of ability required to implement it on the battlefield’.49  
  The consensus amongst historians has been that the BEF favoured a 
restrictive style of command characterised by inflexibility, conformity and a reliance 
upon exact orders.50 Recent research, however, has challenged these views. 
Simpson, for example, has analysed the different command styles that existed at army 
level in relation to their influence upon corps command, comparing for example the 
relatively hands-off approach promoted by Rawlinson’s Fourth Army and the more 
assertive style exercised within Gough’s Fifth Army. Simpson concluded that ‘as 
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resources and especially artillery became more plentiful, so it was possible for corps, 
when appropriate, to decentralise back down to divisions as the principles of FSR1 
required’.51   
 Peter Simkins has similar views on evaluating the battlefield performance on 
the Somme. At least in some divisions, he argues, ‘the trend towards a more devolved 
command style gathered pace in 1917 as brigadier-generals were allowed and seized 
increasing opportunities to exercise a greater degree of control of operations at a local 
level’.52 Whilst he acknowledged that the parameters of brigade command were 
comparatively narrow, he considered that ‘a more flexible and innovative command 
system came to determine planning and the conduct of operations’ at brigade level.53 
Simpson’s and Simkins’ respective work upon corps and brigade command have 
provided a platform for this thesis. A similar ‘top down’ approach has been applied in 
this thesis in order to evaluate battlefield performance relative to the command style 
adopted by the Army, Corps and Divisional commanders under which a brigade 
served. 
 The thesis will argue that the role of the brigadier was multi-faceted. It is 
therefore necessary to clarify the distinction between interrelated concepts of 
command and leadership: whilst command is a managerial function; leadership is 
principally concerned with inspiration and motivation. Thus, leadership is designed to 
‘create and sustain unit cohesion and to ensure that the goals of the group are 
congruent with those of the larger organisation’.54 The literature appertaining to the 
theory of leadership is extensive, Bernard Bass for example suggesting that efficient 
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leaders employed different methods at different times in accordance with 
circumstances.55 James MacGregor Burns, in a later study, proposed that two forms 
of leadership exist; the transformational and the transactional. The first relies upon a 
force of personality and intellectual inspiration in shaping organisational structures, 
whilst the latter prospers through inducing cooperation.56 More recently, Keith Grint 
has suggested that four criteria contribute towards effective leadership; identity, 
strategic vision, organisational tactics and personal communication.57 Of these four 
criteria, where an inability to influence operational and tactical planning was limited, it 
was in the areas of administration, unit cohesion and the maintenance of morale that 
commanders could make a difference. In accordance with Grint’s argument, this thesis 
demonstrates the crucial influence of the brigadier in unit administration, training and 
the reconstitution of units. As Millett and Murray contended ‘a tactical system that does 
not deliberately consider these and other important military variables will cause serious 
problems.58   
 In respect of the brigadier’s responsibilities, John Bourne considered that the 
role equated to that of a battalion commander but on a larger scale: that of leader, co-
ordinator and supervisor.59 Upon leaving 36th (Ulster) Division to assume command of 
40th Division’s 119 Brigade, Brigadier-General F.C. Crozier was advised by Major-
General O.S.W. Nugent ‘to treat [his] new brigade like a big battalion’.60  Trevor 
Harvey, in his study of a cohort of brigadiers from Third Army and the Canadian Corps, 
has demonstrated the ‘scale and complexity of the role’ in adjusting to the various 
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demands of the battlefield.61  Essentially, the role of the CO in providing leadership 
and maintaining the morale and fighting capability of his battalion was not dissimilar.  
Both brigadier and battalion commanders were expected to set an example through 
confidence and courage. Where the responsibilities differed was that those of the 
brigadier were far more extensive.  Harvey’s work has also provided a foundation for 
research, but this thesis examines operations over a broader time span and across 
three armies to allow for an exploration of the variable degrees of consistency that 
shaped brigade development. This approach serves to supplement and enhance the 
literature on brigade command in the British armies on the Western Front. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that the influence of the brigadier and his staff stretched 
far beyond the roles of administration and organisation. As a prolific advocate for its 
contribution to the BEF’s success, Simkins considered the brigade as ‘the building 
blocks’ of the command structure.62 Whilst this analogy suggests stability and 
inflexibility, it will be demonstrated that brigade command was also a dynamic and 
receptive force that contributed to the BEF’s process of learning and adaptation.            
 A whole series of factors produced a style of leadership and officer-man 
relationships in the divisions of the New Army and the Territorial Force (henceforth TF) 
which were different from those of the Regular army. Leadership and command 
relationships ultimately rested upon the nature of the pre-war Regular army and the 
singular expectations of the civilian soldier. Gary Sheffield has written at length on this 
theme focusing upon a series of factors that produced a style of officer-man relations 
‘in the vast majority of officers, Regular, Territorial or temporary [who] shared a 
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common belief in the need for paternal care of their men’.63 These relationships, 
encountered in moulding civilian soldiers into regular-style brigades, were explored by 
Helen McCartney in relation to 1/6 King’s (Liverpool) 55th (West Lancashire) Division 
and highlight the mechanics of command and consent at brigade level.64  
 The focus of this thesis is on the extent to which brigade command was able to 
learn from and adapt to the rigours of trench warfare. Contrary to the views of Travers 
et al, some scholars have argued that the enduring ethos of the pre-war officer corps 
was fundamental to the British army’s capability for learning and adaptation. Albert 
Palazzo contended that in the absence of a formal doctrine, it was the traditional 
values of the Regular army, codified in the principles of FSR1, that provided the means 
to ‘interpret the problems of combat and [test] the feasibility of solutions’.65 Aimee 
Fox’s analysis of the British armies responses to the changing conduct of the war 
expanded this argument. Her research demonstrates how the social and intellectual 
influence of the pre-war army provided flexibility and a conducive environment for 
learning. Consisting of institutional and individual practices, systematic and incidental, 
disseminated in different ways and at different times, the British army was ‘able to 
recalibrate its approach to learning and its response to its increasingly civilian 
composition’.66 
 As Fox has demonstrated, one of the clearest shortcomings of the learning 
process has been the simplistic linkage between the army’s ability to learn and 
battlefield performance. This binary approach has consequently masked the reality of 
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how the army learned. As seductive as the notion that learning improves combat 
power is, ‘it must be acknowledged that myriad other concerns - terrain, weather, 
supply, morale, the enemy - all complicate the association between the two’.67 The 
effect of these factors upon the development of brigade command will become evident 
as this thesis evolves. 
 Where and how innovation takes place can be broken down into three 
approaches. The first, a top-down approach, generally focuses upon innovation in 
peacetime, arguing that only civilians or senior military leaders can implement 
innovation. This thesis however concentrates upon the bottom-up and horizontal 
approaches. Of these two measures, the less formal bottom-up process focuses upon 
the role of the practitioner in change and adaptation. This approach, as the thesis 
demonstrates, was evident at brigade level. The second approach, that of horizontal 
learning, was defined by E.A. Cohen as the rapid exchange of ideas and experiences 
at an informal level.68 In identifying the extent to which these methods were nurtured 
and practiced at brigade level, their success was dependent upon the adoption of a 
consultative approach of command at divisional level and above which encouraged an 
environment of learning at subordinate levels.69  
 This thesis will demonstrate the level of tacit learning, often opportunistic, which 
emerged from activities at brigade level. It will be argued that whilst formal or 
institutionalised learning lent itself to the hierarchical nature of the British army, a 
process of robust analysis and adaptation was present at brigade level. Although far 
from uniform, a net-worked model of learning and beneficial command relationships 
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facilitated the capture and codification of knowledge and its assimilation at lower 
levels. In this respect, the level of learning and adaptation experienced at brigade level 
reflects the meritocratic rise of a new generation of staff and their status as facilitators 
of change.     
 In adopting a qualitative approach to the thesis, the bulk of the research was 
taken from brigade diaries held within the WO 95 series at the National Archives, Kew. 
These were supplemented by GHQ, army, corps, division, battalion and support 
papers to corroborate the brigade records and to add greater detail. The post-war 
official history correspondence, incorporated within the CAB series, provided the 
personal accounts of former officers. Although the brigade diaries proved generally 
more reliable than the correspondence, they varied significantly in clarity and quality. 
At one extreme, some were meticulously written with full copies of orders received and 
sent, maps, details of training and coherent after-action reports. At the other extreme, 
the diaries were clearly composed under adverse conditions and lacked detail or 
operational analysis. This introduced a systematic bias towards the more-self analytic, 
and arguably more progressive, formations which could not be avoided. Overall, 
however they provided ample evidence to demonstrate that robust analysis and 
observation was taking place at all levels of command. Further personal papers were 
consulted at the Imperial War Museum, the Liddell Hart Military Archives, Churchill 
College Archives, Cambridge, the Liddle Collection, and the British Library. Overall, 
the primary reference material available at regimental museums proved disappointing 
in content. However, the private papers of Brigadier-General P.V.P. Stone, held at the 
Norfolk Regimental Museum, Norwich, proved worthy of reference. I was also 
fortunate in being given personal access to the papers of Brigadier-General H. Pelham 




FSR1, reference to the series of training manuals issued by GHQ and printed by the 
Army Printing and Stationary Service of the BEF proved invaluable. For the purpose 
of the case studies, the nomenclature and chronology for operations were as defined 
by E.A. James.70 Some quantitative research was entailed in creating a profile of 
brigadiers and tracing the evolution of a new generation of commanders. The 
reference works consulted included, A.F. Becke’s Order of Battle of Divisions, The 
Quarterly Army Lists, 1914-1919 and the Monthly Army List for August 1914.71 
 Of the few memoirs written by brigadiers, that of Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier 
reflects his reputation as an aggressive, courageous, if irascible, leader. There are few 
references to the broader mechanics of command and control, or criticism of higher 
authority and Crozier’s sanguine style should be treated with caution.72 Brigadier-
General H.R. Cumming’s memoirs, in contrast, were critical of the circumstances of 
91 Brigade’s experiences prior to the Battle of Arras.73 The few brigade histories 
proved more useful, particularly those of 89 and 54 Brigades, which provided a more 
personal perspective.74 The memoirs of Earl Stanhope was useful in providing 
information upon the staff arrangements of Fifth Army’s II and V Corps’ and John 
Terraine’s edited diary of Brigadier-General J.L. Jack for the experiences of a brigadier 
during the Hundred Days.75   
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The scope of the thesis restricted the selection of case studies to brigade 
operations conducted by Second, Fourth and Fifth Armies. This choice reflected 
Second Army’s reputation for meticulous preparation and the contrast in command 
styles exercised by Fourth and Fifth Armies. To compare the degrees of consistency 
in the organisational and tactical development of brigade command, the case studies 
were drawn from various corps from all three armies and across a broad time span. 
The case studies were selected to evaluate whether brigade operational performance 
was influenced by the style of command exercised by the corps under which it served. 
Consideration was given to various factors, including the number of attacks 
undertaken by the relative corps. The focus of the research remained upon offensive 
operations and although reference is made to brigade defensive arrangements, the 
scope of the thesis precludes the analysis of defensive operations. The operations 
chosen offer a meaningful and broadly representative cross-section of Regular, TF 
and New Army brigades serving on the Western Front. 
The thesis takes a qualitative approach and is structured chronologically in line 
with the radical improvements in the doctrinal, tactical and technological best practice 
within the BEF. The aim of Chapter 1 is threefold. First, to establish the foundation for 
the succeeding chapters by outlining the identity, structure and principal roles of 
brigade staff. Second, to examine the process of renewal which addressed the 
increased demand for experienced and tactically proficient brigadiers. It will be shown 
that the reasons behind this were varied, deliberate and otherwise. Third, to identify 
the universal and internal factors that influenced the shape of operations during 1915 





Four chapters focus upon brigade operations conducted in 1916-1917 during a 
period of robust, analytical debate upon the nature of modern warfare. Chapter 2 
examines Fourth Army’s operations on the Somme during 1916. First, the brigade 
operations of XIII Corps were chosen to illustrate the dramatic difference in the attack 
delivered on 1 July and of those undertaken between 15 July-3 September. Having 
held the line since March 1916, providing a continuity of command in the same sector, 
from a total of 29 attacks the corps achieved a success rate of 44.82%: 30th Division 
alone suffered more casualties than any other division on the Somme. The second 
case study focuses upon Lieutenant-General Earl of Cavan’s XIV Corps and 
operations conducted at Flers-Courcelette in September. This offensive, in relation to 
brigade operations, highlights the difficulties imposed by irregular brigade frontages 
and the implementation of coordinated infantry-artillery tactics. From a total of 26 
attacks on the Somme, XIV Corps achieved a 61.53% success rate. 
 Chapter 3 compares the operations of Fifth Army’s II and V Corps during the 
Battle of the Ancre. Whilst II Corps experienced a success rate of 68.25% from 63 
attacks, that of V Corps was significantly lower.76 The reasons behind this disparity 
highlight the benefits conducive to brigade success and the impact of inadequate 
preparation and micro-management that deprived brigades of sufficient tactical 
influence. The second case study evaluated the extent to which the lessons of the 
Somme were embraced during the minor brigade actions undertaken by the corps’ 
during the spring of 1917. Chapter 4 examines the brigade operations conducted by 
X and IX Corps at Messines under the less authoritative style of command of General 
Herbert Plumer’s Second Army. The corps’ operations conducted at the Menin Road 
 




and Polygon Wood, which reflected ‘the growing experience of staff officers at all 
levels of command’, provides a basis for the second case study.77  
   Chapter 5 compares the operations of Fifth Army’s II and XIV Corps on 31 
July 1917 and those of II and XIV Corps on 16 August 1917, during Third Ypres. These 
two phases of the offensive differed significantly in their operational and logistical 
arrangements. An analysis of these operations was aimed at establishing the degree 
of influence imposed upon brigade operations by this variable approach. Chapter 6 
evaluates the extent to which the lessons of 1916-1917 were applied in brigade 
operations conducted during the semi-open and open warfare of the Hundred Days 
(August-November 1918). The first case study focused on Fourth Army’s II and IX 
Corps at Amiens, Albert and the advance upon the Hindenburg Line, and the second 





Brigade Command: Identity, Structure and Function, and  




This chapter lays the foundation for examining the development of infantry 
brigade command on the Western Front during 1916-1918. Its aim is three-fold.  First, 
to determine the identity, structure and function of the pre-war brigade command. 
 




Second, to explore the profile of a new generation of brigade staff that reflected the 
changes wrought by retirement, promotion, exhaustion or death and the onset of merit-
based promotion. Third, to examine the universal factors that shaped brigade 
operations during 1915 as the BEF adjusted to the challenges of static warfare. 
 
1.2: Social status 
With few exceptions the pre-war British Army’s officer corps shared the 
conventional upbringing and education of the privileged Victorian gentleman.78 
Officers were expected to abide by a code of behaviour based upon ‘morality, manners 
and honesty’.79 Characterised by social and financial exclusiveness, the possession 
of a ‘gentlemanly ethos’ was a prerequisite for membership into the military 
hierarchy.80 The parentage of cadets entering the Royal Military College (RMC) in April 
1891 show that out of 378 entrants, 45% were from a military background, 13.4% from 
a professional background and only 6% the sons of merchants and manufactures.81 
Figures for 1910 indicate that whilst entrants from a military background remained 
consistent, an increase to 33% from commercial backgrounds reflected the rise of 
cadets from the middle classes.82 The family origins of brigadiers from eight infantry 
divisions serving in 1914 reinforces the existence of a social elite. From a sample of 
27 brigadiers, 12 (44%) followed in the family tradition of pursuing a military career. Of 
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the remainder, two were drawn from a titled family, three from wealthy landowner 
families and four from a clerical background with a leavening from political, medical 
and legal origins.83  
To sustain social and financial exclusiveness regiments restricted their areas 
of recruitment to a narrow band of elite public schools whose syllabi embraced a range 
of militaristic and imperialist ideas. Of 36 brigadiers serving on the Western Front in 
1914, 41% attended one of the nine Clarendon schools, with nine from Eton, two from 
Harrow and one each from Wellington College, Marlborough, Winchester and 
Rugby.84 From 20 officers assuming the post of brigadier in 1915, 14 (70%) attended 
the same six educational establishments. Of these officers, four (20%) were promoted 
to divisional command within twelve months.85 Despite the heavy losses of officers 
during 1914, the rapid promotion of these commanders ensured that the traditional 
values of a public-school education were sustained. The power and influence of this 
phenomena was stressed by Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish who claimed that 
those who have been fortunate enough to have received a public-school 
education received our first lesson in esprit de corps in our public school and 
passing to one or other of the universities and afterwards to various professions 
we learned more of its magic meaning.86 
 
The institutionalisation of the ethos was strengthened by the creation of the Officers 
Training Corps (OTC) in 1908, under the direct control of the War Office. By 1914, 
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80% of public schools had an OTC ensuring, as Gary Sheffield has demonstrated, that 
the average Edwardian public schoolboy ‘would have been strong willed indeed to 
resist the range of militaristic cultural influences that existed around him’.87 As 
Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier commented when assessing the qualities of the officers 
of 119 Brigade ‘they were of good blood… not only of good families [but] well-
schooled’.88 The moral benefits of this education and training were summarised by 
Major-General T.D. Pilcher in advice to his newly commissioned son, in that ‘you who 
have been to Public School, the ordeal ought not to be so trying as to another who has 
not had this advantage… [providing] that you are modest in your behaviour and err on 
the side of diffidence rather than self-assertion’.89 
1.3: The Royal Military College, Sandhurst 
Most brigadiers serving on the Western Front attended the RMC which trained 
officers for all branches of the army, except the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery 
who attended the RMC Woolwich. Prior to the South African War of 1899, the college 
had been found wanting in its academic provision and military instruction. During this 
period, the syllabus consisted of drill, gymnastics, equitation and an admixture of 
engineering, topography and tactical exercises, although cadets were found to have 
had ‘absolutely no inducement to work’.90 Lieutenant-Colonel T. Montgomery-
Cuninghame, as a former cadet, considered that he had been taught little that would 
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prepare him for ‘the far-reaching changes just ahead of us which had revolutionised 
soldiering’.91 
In response and drawing upon the British army’s conduct during the South 
African War, the Elgin Commission of 1903 served to address the institutional failings 
of Sandhurst.92 Amongst the measures recommended, it was suggested that ‘all 
officers and men [should] be trained to accept greater responsibility and demonstrate 
more initiative’.93 This goal was reinforced at the 1906 General Staff Conference where 
it was stated that the aim of training was to develop the individual initiative of every 
officer, non-commissioned officer and man.94 Brigadier-General H.H. Wilson, lecturing 
in 1911, echoed these sentiments in that the fostering of initiative was ‘essential to the 
efficiency of the modern army [provided] it was tempered by a spirit of self-
subordination… and playing the game for the side’.95 As Spencer Jones has 
demonstrated with reference to Brigadier-General C. Fitzclarence V.C., ‘reformers of 
the era had often spoken of their desire to create a spirit of initiative within the British 
Army’, a quality demonstrated during the Battle of Ypres, 1914.96 The rapid promotion 
of brigadiers during 1914-1915 meant that those imbued with initiative and courage 
were able to perpetuate those values at divisional and brigade levels accordingly 
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1.4: Staff College 
The 1914 Army List registered a total of 447 graduates designated psc (passed 
staff college), a sufficient number of trained staff officers to fill the posts available.97 
However, the expansion of the British army exposed a shortage of qualified staff 
through the army’s ‘neglect of the operational aspects of modern war’.98 This shortfall 
was exemplified ‘by Kitchener’s bold stroke in snatching the 500 officers on leave from 
India’.99 In procuring brigade majors and staff captains from the Meerut Division it was 
noted however that ‘psc officers were getting short’, the dearth of qualified officers 
being acutely felt at brigade level.100 Of 21 brigadiers from eight divisions on active 
service on 1 January 1915, only 19% were designated psc. In November 1915, only 
27 (26%) brigade majors from 105 brigades were designated psc and by July 1916, 
this number had fallen to seven (4%) out of 133 brigade majors. Subject also to a 
steep attrition rate, 51 brigade staff were killed in 1914 and a further 34 in 1915.101 
Consequently a shortage of qualified brigade staff, in relation to the scale of the 
conflict, proved ‘a situation for which no precedent existed’.102 To stem the loss, 
officers were discouraged from seeking promotion, a measure Colonel Charles 
Bonham-Carter, GSO1, 7th Division, considered as GHQ becoming ‘afraid of coming 
to the end of the trained Staff Officers’.103 Inevitably, as staff were moved between 
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formations, command relationships between staff were compromised through a lack 
of mutual trust and inconsistent procedure.   
Initially, the vacuum of trained staff also placed a disproportionate burden of 
responsibility upon divisional command in fulfilling the role of brigade staff. Brigadier-
General Sir James Edmonds noted that ‘several divisional commanders told [him] that 
they had to do their own staff work and then go round the infantry brigades to tell them 
what to do’.104 Inevitably, this led to less decentralisation as divisional commanders 
‘often thought it less trouble to do the work themselves’.105 Similarly, Brigadier-General 
R.G. Jelf, GOC 73 Brigade, 24th Division found that ‘all Brigade Staff were ignorant of 
the rudiments of what to do… or how communications etc. were established’.106 By 
the spring of 1915, the effects of promotion and attrition having dramatically reduced 
the number of psc officers available, the army was forced to train new staff whilst 
simultaneously fighting the war. The progress of the conflict would thus demonstrate 
the capability of brigade staff in adapting to the enormous changes in organisation and 
personnel for which ‘the Staff College had provided scarcely any preparation’.107    
1.5: Regimental origin 
The social exclusiveness of the officer corps was also sustained by a strict 
allegiance to regimental tradition. The sentiments of patriotism, loyalty and 
determination nurtured at school and at Sandhurst and Woolwich translated 
seamlessly into a devotion to one’s regiment. Drawing upon Field-Marshal Lord 
Wolseley’s doctrine promoting the virtues of an inherited sense of duty, Kentish 
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attributed the successful implementation of mutual trust at brigade level to three 
factors: the degree of confidence invested in the brigadier, the stability of the brigade 
staff and the extent to which battalions fought side-by-side. These preconditions 
ensured that regimental ethos and the promotion of esprit de brigade were 
sustained.108  
 The British Army’s regimental system was also subject to its own social 
hierarchy. The notion that some regiments were of a higher status than others and 
that officers of elite regiments were more likely to gain promotion was, as David French 
has argued, commonplace. To establish a regiment’s status, French calculated the 
number of officers serving with each regiment at a given time (1890, 1910, 1930 and 
1951) and whether it attracted a royal patron as Colonel-in-Chief.  This method was 
based upon the assumption that the more titled officers and the higher the willingness 
of royalty to patronise a regiment, the higher was its status. The results of this analysis 
placed the Household Brigade, King’s Royal Rifle Corps and Rifle Brigade at the apex 
of the regimental tree (classified as A), followed in rank by eight line regiments, five of 
them Highland units (B). The next group consisted of one Highland, three Scottish 
Lowland, five English county regiments and the Royal Irish Fusiliers (C). A fourth 
classification comprised eight English regiments, two Welsh, two Irish and the Royal 
Scots (D). The final groups consisted of the remaining 35 English and Irish county 
regiments (E).109 
Applying the same hierarchical grouping to 113 infantry brigadiers serving on 
the Western Front between 4 August 1914 and 1 July 1916, the evidence indicates 
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that the heavy losses sustained by the officers of the elite regiments during 1914-15 
accounted for a significant change in the regimental origin of brigadiers, 60 members 
of the peerage alone being lost in 1914 from the top six elite infantry regiments and 
the Royal Artillery.110 Equally, the rapid turnover amongst the original 21 brigadiers of 
seven Regular divisions dented the dominance of the elite regiments. While the 
‘middle ranking’ regiments (B,C and D) remained well represented, the number of 
brigadiers from the elite regiments (A) fell by 22.7% between 1914 and 1916 and those 
from the least fashionable regiments (E)  rose by 44.4%. The numbers of Lowland and 
Highland officers remained relatively static reflecting the high prestige of their 
regiments. The process of renewal was accelerated by a significant loss of brigade 
staff, which combined with the growth of the New Armies accelerated the promotion 
of experienced and tactically proficient battalion commanders from less fashionable 
regiments. By the summer of 1916, 51.6% of brigade commanders originated from the 
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Classification       A       B          C       D        E 
4 August 
1914 
        8      2          3        2        5 
       36.6%   9.0%       13.6%     9.0%    22.7%  
Loos 
1915 
       12       4           5        4        12      
        30.7%    10.2%       12.8%      10.2%      30.7% 
Somme 
1916 
          4      8          6       7       16 
         12.9%   25.8%       19.3%       22.5%      51.6% 
 
Table 1.1: Regimental origins 
 
1.6: Pre-war colonial experience  
The profile of the pre-war army officer corps was also defined by their extensive 
colonial warfare experience. Commenting upon the British Army exercise of 1914, the 
Military Correspondent of the Journal des Debates wrote that the British Army officer 
‘displayed a maturity of intellect which is acquired by long voyages and campaigns in 
the Colonies and a general culture far above that of many continental officers’.111 For 
example, Brigadier-General C.R. Ballard’s rich war experience from 1891 to 1904 
 




included service in Burma, the North-West Frontier, South Africa and East Africa. His 
service as DAGQ and DAAQG in Ceylon from 1905-1906 then culminated in his 
command of the 1/Norfolks. In November 1914 he assumed command of 7 Brigade, 
3rd Division, this coming as no surprise as ‘Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had told [him] 
that he intended to give him a brigade’.112 Ballard subsequently commanded 95 
Brigade, 32nd Division and 14 Brigade, 5th Division between 1915 and 1917. The true 
value of the military experience gathered from counterinsurgency campaigns has 
nevertheless been a matter of debate. John Bourne has suggested that the conflicts 
provided few opportunities in large-scale operations and ‘did little to prepare officers 
for high command’.113 However, as Spencer Jones has argued, the influence of the 
Boer War was ‘felt more keenly at brigade level and below’ where tactical experiences 
of combat were put into practice.114 Similarly, in relation to battalion commanders, 
Peter Hodgkinson has contended that the experiences gained by junior officers during 
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Campaign Duration Officers 
Afghan War 1879      2 
Burma 1891-1897      3 
Crete 1897-1899      1 
Egypt 1882      4 
Nile Expedition 1898      4 
North West Frontier 1894-1898      4 
South Africa 1899-1902     14 
Sudan 1894-87 and 1898      5  
Tirah 1897-1898      3 
 
Table 1.2: The pre-war campaign experiences of 21 brigadiers of the Regular 
Divisions serving on the Western Front, 1 January 1915 
 
1.7: Military ethos 
Officers within the British Army were expected to conduct themselves in 
accordance with an implicit code of conduct based upon ‘morality, manners and 
honesty, qualities we have been taught to regard as sacrosanct’.116 These qualities, 
considered by Albert Palazzo as ‘a viable, sustainable and dynamic ethos’, provided 
 





an intellectual framework for interpreting, developing and modifying the method of 
waging war.117 This ethos was underpinned by several factors. First, despite a 
broadening of the demographic basis of the officer corps, the domination of Regular 
officers ensured that the army’s ethos was disseminated within and below their level 
of command. As Fox has argued ‘in this respect ethos remained the golden thread 
running through the entire organisation’.118 Second, the ethos was sustained through 
FSRI 1909 which, instead of promoting an authoritative doctrine, stressed that ‘skill 
cannot compensate for courage, energy and determination’, the very qualities of the 
gentleman-officer.119 In accordance with the British Army’s traditional role in varied 
theatres of war, the principles of FSR1 remained flexible and applicable to the scale 
of the engagement. As the General Staff Officers’s Conference concluded in 1913 ‘the 
problems of war [could not] be solved by rules, but by judgement based on a 
knowledge of general principles’.120 These principles provided a bedrock for tactical 
decision making and were later supplemented by other publications in the form of SS 
pamphlets. However, as Brigadier-General H.C. Rees considered  
although FSR Part 1 [was] a brilliant work on war… never [laying] down the law 
but often advice… there remained no military book from which an answer may 
be obtained as to what to do under any given circumstances. It is your common 
sense aided by your consideration of the various factors of the ground, forces, 
weapons, light, weather which must solve the problem. Applied common sense 
in fact.121 
 
This perspective constituted the essential nature of the brigadier’s tactical role based 
upon the value given to the initiative of ‘the man on the spot’: thus, a capability to 
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interpret the factors influencing the shape of operations at a local level and where 
opportunities were favourable to respond accordingly.   
In summary, the profiles of the infantry brigadiers serving in the six Regular 
divisions were defined by the beneficial qualities distilled from the ethos of the pre-war 
Edwardian army. These qualities of loyalty, self-confidence, courage and moral virtue 
were nurtured within and below brigade level. Combined with the guidance laid down 
in FSRI they provided the framework for decision making and the exercise of initiative. 
Flexible and dynamic in equal measure, the ethos provided the means to re-evaluate 
the operational and tactical challenges of the Western Front. The evolution of brigade 
command was orientated to the direction of this process and the capability of its staff 
to adapt to the challenges of modern warfare. 
1.8: Brigade staff roles       
Infantry brigade command was the lowest formation level within the British army 
with its own formal staff structure. From 1914 the war establishment of the standard 
British infantry division was comprised of three brigades. Each brigade comprised four 
battalions totalling an establishment of 4,416, of whom 125 were officers and 3,391 
other ranks (OR).122 From February 1918, through the cumulative effect of heavy 
casualties and shortage of manpower, the infantry divisions were reduced to nine 
battalions, with brigade strength cut to three.  Between 1915 and 1917 the total of 
brigade personnel increased by 200 with the formation of a Machine Gun Company 
(MGC) and a Trench Mortar Battery (TLM). Normally, during an attack a proportion of 
each battalion would be left behind to form the reconstitution of the brigade in the event 
of large casualties. Thus, in most large attacks the fighting strength of a brigade would 
 




total some 3,000 officers and men, a number ‘substantial enough to test the mettle of 
any officer charged with the command and control of the formation in question’.123  
Defining the brigade commander’s role is difficult as no specific job description 
existed. His responsibilities were identified in King’s Regulations as ‘Officer 
Commanding a Brigade: A colonel, graded as a brigadier-general, is appointed to 
command a brigade of cavalry or infantry and will perform duties analogous to those 
laid down for a divisional commander’.124 Upon this basis, an inter-changeability of 
roles between major-generals and brigadier-generals is suggested, with the former 
expected to pass on their knowledge and skills to their brigadiers. This, as Harvey 
contended, made clarity elusive ‘as the effect of King’s Regulations in making clear 
who was intended to be responsible for what, is diminished by the evidence that they 
were the product of pre-war thinking’.125  The principles laid down in FSR Part II 1909 
provided some semblance of clarity, laying down that ‘subject to such instructions as 
he may receive from a superior officer, a subordinate commander is responsible for 
the efficiency of his command and for the control and direction of the duties allotted to 
him’.126  
 Despite the value placed upon devolved command by the British army, a 
brigadier’s sphere of responsibility was strictly defined: where their influence in areas 
of unit administration was unrestricted, their tactical influence was modest. For 
example, Brigadier-General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, 11 Brigade, 4th Division perceived 
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his principal role as one of administration and training based upon the principles laid 
down in FSR1 Part II.127 With regard to tactical influence, he drew upon the pre-war 
principles embodied in FSR1  which stressed the importance of ensuring that brigade 
sectors remained defensively sound and that battalions were deployed at the correct 
time and location to intervene with ‘an immediate counter-attack’ when opportunities 
arose.128 
 Throughout the Victorian era, training in the British Army lacked uniformity with 
‘training at brigade level and above [being] a rare occurrence’.129 In the aftermath of 
the Boer War, evidence presented before the Elgin Commission called for a change 
in the ethos of the army to encourage high levels of initiative. In this process of reform, 
manoeuvres, exercises, war games and staff rides played their part alongside combat 
experience drawn from imperial conflicts.  Brigadiers were increasingly tasked with 
providing a systematic approach to instructional procedure and encouraging initiative 
amongst their subordinate officers. However, a report on army manoeuvres in 1908 
noted that ‘there is not yet sufficient uniformity of system either in adherence to 
authorised principles or in the methods by which the principles are put into practice’.130 
For example, failures were identified in exercises undertaken by 3 Brigade, 1st Division 
and 4 (Guards) and 5 Brigades of 2nd Division where there was considered to be ‘a 
systematic failure of preparation… and disparity in brigade command instructions’. 
Ignorance as to the roles of neighbouring units and a lack of clarity in the transmission 
of orders was identified as significant operational failings, with ‘3 Brigade separated 
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from its 1st Division staff but neither under the orders of GOC 2nd Division’.131  Upon 
the outbreak of war, concerted efforts were made to address the lack of uniformity by 
affirming the values of FSR1. For example, before returning from its posting in Malta, 
the officers of 1/London Brigade received a lecture from their brigade major stressing 
that all methods of attack must conform to the principles laid down in FSR1. Any other 
method it was contended ‘would cramp the initiative and be a hindrance to the effective 
training of officers and men to meet the varying circumstances of war’.132 Efforts 
continued throughout 1915 as evident in 39th Division where ‘since being Brigaded, 
Brigade Commanders [continued to find difficulty] in systematising the training of their 
units owing to their divergent standards… the aim being to obtain uniformity’.133  
 In February 1915 Sir John French reinforced the necessity of upholding the 
principles of offensive action in that ‘the soul of the defence… and the counter-attack 
[are] the most effectual means of defence’.134 Similarly, Brigadier-General J.P. Du 
Cane concurred that the British army should pursue ‘a relentless offensive spirit… with 
dogged determination’.135 These principles, while constituting the framework in which 
brigadiers were expected to operate,  raised a fundamental contradiction of leadership 
common to all levels of command. This dilemma stemmed from the fact that the men 
whose welfare was entrusted to him; a commander would one day send into battle.  
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To counter this effect the establishment of good officer-man relations and enlightened 
leadership was essential, the qualities of ‘personal and expert power’ rather than a 
regime of coercive and institutional power being required.136 These qualities, 
transposed from some parts of wider Edwardian society, assisted in nourishing mutual 
trust and loyalty. Thus, the hallmark of the successful brigadier was his capability to 
sustain the welfare and morale of the brigade while upholding the principles of the 
offensive spirit. 
 Clearly, there were officers totally unsuitable for positions of command. Basil 
Liddell Hart, in an allusion to 21st Division, commented upon ‘one brigadier who was a 
man not without ability, but harsh, overbearing and unjust in the extreme… [with] a BM 
[Brigade Major] who was a disgrace to the Army’. Consequently ‘the Division fared 
badly and lost heavily… a regular Division under Congreve saving the day’.137 For 
some officers, an initial forging of relationships did not come easily. Brigadier-General 
Lord Loch, GOC 110 Brigade, 21st Division, faced considerable self-doubt in efforts to 
engage with his battalions which had suffered ‘a loss of cohesion, disintegration and 
bad morale’ during operations on 3 May 1917. Comprised of four Service battalions of 
the Leicestershire Regiment, Loch  considered that ‘they had no life and… [did not 
jump] at what he wanted… being dirty and slovenly and [having] no interest in what 
they were doing’.138 Mustering only two other Regular officers, the brigade major and 
staff captain, the remainder of the brigade’s junior officers were of a temporary rank 
and under the age of thirty, a fact that Loch considered was the reason for the 
breakdown in discipline and morale. While he conceded that ‘some were better men 
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than the Regulars’ nevertheless ‘they failed to check small irregularities by instinct… 
and small things gradually developed into big ones’.139 His failure to establish a fruitful 
working relationship with his junior officers and NCOs is evident in his perspective on 
training procedures where he admitted he was  
being very bad at making clear to people [sic]. For instance, I laid down that all 
instructions should consist of explanation, demonstration and execution. They 
[the instructors] all leave out the first two and keep on trying to make men do 
things that they can’t understand.140   
 
From Loch’s experiences, it would be reasonable to assume that he found difficulty in 
establishing a working relationship with his men. This could have been attributable to 
his difficulty in reconciling the ethos of the pre-war officer class with the attitude of 
newly commissioned officers, NCOs and citizen-soldiers. Conversely, it may have 
simply been attributable to a lack of man-management skills.    
The highly charged atmosphere of brigade HQ also proved exacting. Brigadier-
General E. Craig-Brown, 56 Brigade, 19th (Western) Division was disciplined by his 
divisional commander for ‘not enjoying the confidence of his subordinates’ considering 
that he would be better accommodated in ‘a responsible administrative capacity where 
rapid decisions are not required’. To an extent, Craig-Brown, formerly CO 1/Cameron 
Highlanders, agreed ‘having realised from the start that he had very few ideas in 
common with his staff and often wished to be back amongst [his] own countrymen… 
in a Scots or Highland brigade [original emphasis]’.141  
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Lord Loch’s experiences speak volumes of the problems inherent in officer-man 
relationships where commanders struggled to instil the methods and discipline of the 
Regular army into citizen-soldiers. It should be borne in mind that Loch’s criticism of 
his junior officers may have reflected a social incompatibility or as Beckett and 
Simpson contended ‘the professional reaction of the regular [officer] against the 
amateur’.142 In the case of Craig-Brown, imbued with the regimental ethos of a Scottish 
Regular battalion, it may be safely assumed that a lack of affinity with officers of the 
three Lancashire regiments under his command contributed towards his poor 
performance as a brigadier.  
Efficient brigade administration depended upon the qualities and personalities 
of its staff. Foremost of these was the brigade major. His responsibilities were defined 
by the multiple demands of the modern army, a far cry from his traditional role where 
‘brigade majors were in a limbo between regimental officers and the headquarters 
staff’.143  Formerly his duties, in accordance with the Quartermaster-General’s 
department, encompassed ‘surveying, sketching, map making, the sifting of 
intelligence and the movement and quartering of the Army’.144 With the expansion of 
the brigade staff, the responsibilities of the ‘Q’ and ‘A’ staff work being undertaken by 
the  staff captain, the brigade major’s role turned increasingly to the ‘G’ function of staff 
work and the handling of reconnaissance and intelligence in the field.145 Having then 
digested the context of corps and divisional schemes of attack, his responsibility was 
to interpret and translate them into precise battalion orders. In addition, he was tasked 
 
142 Beckett and Simpson, A Nation in Arms, p.75. 
143 Bond, The Victorian Army, p.78, fn.6. 
144 S.G.P. Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), p.37. 
145 The three branches of the General Staff consisted of the ‘G’ branch responsible for Operations and 
Intelligence, the ‘A’ branch which handled personal matters and the ‘Q’ branch that managed supplies, 




with organising the establishment of liaison with adjacent units and relevant artillery 
support, all constituting what Simkins referred to as ‘the minor tactical planning of the 
battle’.146 
The collective observations of former brigade majors endorse the peculiar 
status of brigade staff where the forging of inter-personal links with subordinate officers 
and Other Ranks provided opportunities for practical and moral support. For example, 
Brigadier-General G.R. Roupell V.C. claimed that it was 
the best staff job to hold in the war [as] one was very largely responsible for 
three, sometimes four battalions in the brigade and for the brigade HQ. The 
brigadier was of course in command of the brigade and the brigade major and 
the staff captain carried out his instructions and looked after the battalions to 
the best of their ability. This entailed frequent visits, almost daily, to the 
battalions in the line or in the rest billets.147 
 
In contrast, having been posted as GSO2 at divisional HQ, Roupell found the work 
less inviting as the presence of a larger staff meant that his role as a junior officer left 
him with ‘no full responsibility for any particular job or work’.148 Brigade Major Walter 
Guinness, 74 Brigade, 25th Division echoed Roupell’s sentiments insisting ‘that there 
[was] no doubt that a Brigade Major’s job was the most attractive to his taste’.149 
Anthony Eden, a brigade major at the age of 20, believed that ‘the brigade and its staff 
seemed exactly the right size and scope for individual efforts to be rewarding, while 
contact with units was close enough to have a human interest’.150  
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 Working in close cooperation with the brigadier and his brigade major, the staff 
captain’s duties were laid down in the Staff Manual (1912). These stated that he should 
‘assist a commander in the supervision of his duties and control of the operations and 
requirements of the troops and transmit orders and instructions [and] secondly… to 
give the troops every assistance in his power in carrying out the instructions issued to 
them.151 The duties were diverse, as Colonel Sir Eric Gore-Brown attached to 140 
Brigade, 47th (2nd London) Division observed after writing his first operation order. This 
task involved ‘collecting and collating all intelligence from the brigade front in 24 hours, 
consolidating it and sending it typewritten to the Division with all movement, artillery 
activity, trench mortars etc. having to be reported and all work by us detailed’.152 A 
year later he considered that his work far exceeded that of his brigade major as 
all arrangements, billets, commissions, baths, clothing, bombs, classes, stores, 
promotions and a hundred and one etcetaras [sic] are in his department. It is 
not difficult work but wants concentration and energy… 12 hours a day is not 
always enough.153 
 
 The nature of tactical command at brigade level was dependent upon the 
smooth transmission of information down the chain of command and laterally between 
brigades. This was reflected in the expansion of the Brigade Signal Service and the 
challenging role of the Brigade Signalling Officer (BSO) responsible for the supervision 
and coordination of all communications in the brigade and battalion areas and between 
neighbouring formation headquarters. James Scrivenor, having served as a BSO, 
recalled that his role called for an allegiance with both the brigadier and his battalion 
counterparts who were not under his direct control with all parties encouraged ‘to pull 
together amicably... the chief desiderata being to induce battalion signalling officers to 
 
151 TNA, WO 279/862, Staff Manual 1912 (London: HMSO,1912), p.7. 
152 IWM, Brigadier-General E. Gore-Brown Papers, 256, 88/52/1, 12 April 1916. 




do what you wanted them to do without friction’.154 The work was physically and 
mentally demanding, as Captain G. McGowan, a BSO in 30th Division attested, being 
responsible for ‘the largest brigade sector on the British Front’. Handling an average 
of 10-12,000 messages a day, McGowan considered himself  
virtually his own boss with a self-contained unit of 26, including two sergeants, 
two corporals and two lance -corporals… and sixteen runners [receiving his] 
copy of Brigade Operations Orders as and when issued to Battalion 
Commanders and making [his] disposition accordingly… the only contact with 
Divisional Signals being for the requisition of stores or the replacement of 
personnel. 155 
 
As the history of the 48th Divisional Signal Company illustrates, with reference to 
operations on the Somme, as the Company, Battalion and Brigade Signallers 
advanced with the troops, the ‘casualties were heavy, some Divisions reporting fifty 
percent of their Signallers put out of action in a single day’.156 
 The evolution of brigade command between 1914-1918 reflected the changing 
nature of warfare and the rapid expansion of the BEF. In response to the new 
challenges imposed by trench warfare, the roles and responsibilities of brigade staff 
officers were transformed. While carrying out their principal administrative and 
managerial responsibilities, the eventual transition to semi-mobile operations 
necessitated brigade officers acting upon their own initiative. This required three pre-
conditions on the part of brigade staff: a thorough knowledge of the brigade sector, 
staff going forward to ascertain the local situation and subject to the provision of secure 
communications, the capability to exercise their tactical influence. All these factors 
were dependent upon the establishment of a professional and proficient staff. This 
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proved a lengthy and irregular process subject to a large scale and rapid turnover of 
personnel driven by a growing merit-based approach to promotion as opposed to 
seniority. 
1.9: Renewal of command staff 
The organisational and tactical development of brigade command 
corresponded with the transformation of brigade staff. This process was driven by the 
losses of 1914 which had exhausted the supply of trained officers. The profile and 
composition of brigade commanders throughout 1915 reflected these changes. First, 
the expansion of the BEF necessitated the rapid promotion of the few experienced 
brigadiers available for divisional command. This in turn accelerated the promotion of 
suitable battalion commanders and laid the foundation for a fresh generation of 
operationally experienced brigadiers. Second, the hardships of trench warfare 
exposed the shortcomings of ‘dug-out’ officers employed to fill the vacuum of 
vacancies.157 Third, some newly promoted brigadiers found difficulty in handling large 
formations and adjusting to the unprecedented conditions of static warfare. The 
process of renewal continued unabated and was dominated from late 1916 to 1918 by 
the establishment of a merit-based approach for promotion open to debate and able 
to adapt to the challenges of modern warfare.  
To understand this process of renewal, we need to consider what the patterns 
of turnover tell us about the demands placed on the army and the difficulties entailed 
in the creation of a stable and efficient staff.  Retaining the services of tactically 
proficient and experienced brigadiers was challenging. For example, of the 57 
brigades of 19 divisions deployed on the Western Front in 1915, 76% were subject to 
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at least one change of command during the year: all the brigades of 7th and 8th 
Divisions experienced a complete change. Overall, amongst the brigadiers employed 
at Second Ypres and Loos, a 74.5% attrition rate was experienced, with all three 
brigadiers of 20th (Light) Division replaced.158 Therefore, opportunities for rapid 
advancement abounded. One of eight brigadiers promoted to divisional command, 
Brigadier-General R.J. Pinney, GOC 23 Brigade, 8th Division, was appointed GOC 35th 
Division after 241 days, his rapid promotion attributed to his outstanding leadership 
qualities.159 At the Neuve Chapelle offensive, for example, he was instrumental in 
coordinating both infantry and artillery to sustain the progress of the attack. Two days 
later, during a period of confusion and delay, he was placed in command of 23 and 24 
Brigades in a concerted effort to promote a further attack.160 Similarly, in recognition 
of his leadership, Brigadier-General G.H. Thesiger, GOC 2 Brigade, 1st Division 
achieved promotion after 169 days and Brigadier-General G.M. Harper, GOC 17 
Brigade, 6th Division after 221 days ‘where he lost no time in instructing officers and 
men in a form of attack which at the time was employed by no other Division’.161 
Similar opportunities abounded at battalion level, where in some cases majors 
were ‘getting commands of Brigades as a matter of course’.162 After the Battle of Loos 
in September 1915, where 45 brigades were deployed, 31% experienced a change of 
command. For example, Field-Marshal Sir C.J. Deverall succeeded to the command 
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of 7th Division’s 20 Brigade after the death of Brigadier-General J.H.F.S. Trefusis. 
Deverell had started the war as brigade major of 85 Brigade, 28th Division and his 
promotion cemented a rapid rise from substantive major to temporary major-general 
in about a year.163  Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel A.B.E. Cator, 2/Scots Guards, having 
acted as temporary commander of 20 Brigade in 1914 and overseen a lengthy period 
of brigade reconstruction, was promoted to GOC 37 Brigade, 12th Division. He had 
risen from captain to brigadier-general within fifteen months. Considered as ‘the best 
soldier, greatest sportsman and finest type of English Gentleman one could meet’ he 
personified the pre-war qualities traditionally perceived as requirements for the 
officer’s role.164 His capability to transfer the methods, routines and procedures that 
he had developed as a Regular officer was critical to the development of his New Army 
brigade. Equally, Cator provided personal standards of performance and expectations 
which served as models for his officers and men. When in the line, he shared the same 
privations that his men experienced. Thus, ‘I am writing this in a funk hole, a very good 
dugout, but simply crowded out with rats who as far as I can gather, hold a meeting 
most nights on my bed’.165 The confidence he was able to inspire through his presence 
was critical to the way in which 37 Brigade operated and to their favourable 
reputation.as a New Army brigade.  
Where a consistent flow of personnel, experienced officers and NCOs was 
experienced, the establishment of a stable brigade staff was more difficult as Major-
General Sir F.I. Maxse, GOC 18th (Eastern) Division discovered. Having undergone a 
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year of intensive training, his division suffered the loss of his ‘two best Infantry 
Brigadiers, best BM, best RFA Brigade CO, first rate RFA Brigade Major… all being 
promoted to higher appointments’. The division then received ‘a Brigade Major who 
could not write any sort of report and apparently [could] not learn any routine work’ 
which Maxse considered was living under ‘a regime of robbing Peter to pay Paul’.166  
Determined to secure the best staff, Maxse appealed directly to Brigadier-General 
H.C. Lowther, Sir John French’s Military Secretary, who suggested that the loss of 
staff should be perceived as ‘the penalty to be paid for achieving such a high standard’ 
but that a suitable replacement brigade major would be found.167 This resolution, 
bolstered by Maxse’s close relationship with Lowther as former 1(Guards) Brigade 
commanders, resonates with what Peter Hodgkinson considered was the emergence 
of ‘talent spotting on the Western Front for promotable officers… a process that 
became more supple as the war went on’.168 The career path taken by other brigadiers 
were more diverse, in some instances channelling their talents away from the Western 
Front. Brigadier-General G.F.S. Maude, 14 Brigade, 5th Division for example, after 
receiving hospital treatment for his injuries, was appointed GOC 33rd Division and 
promptly posted to Gallipoli. Similarly, the managerial skills of Brigadier-General Sir 
L.G. Bols were channelled into his appointment as BGGS, XII Corps and ultimately 
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Loos Somme Third Ypres   Average of days in 
post  
Regular Brigades 439 550 362  450  
New Army Brigades 380 406 431  405 
TF Brigades 592 692 424 569 
 
Table 1.3: Average days in post experienced by brigadiers serving in major 
offensives 1915-1917169 
In respect of the average tenure of brigadiers serving on the first day of three 
major offensives, those commanding Regular brigades averaged 450 days as 
opposed to 405 days for the New Army brigades. The lower average experienced by 
the New Army brigades was attributable to the 74.5% churn after the Battle of Loos 
and changes precipitated by preparations for the Somme. The brigadiers of TF 
brigades meanwhile averaged 569 days across three offensives. While far from 
conclusive, it may be assumed that the disparity between the TF brigades and those 
of the Regular and New Armies may have been attributable to preserving the cultural 
characteristics of the former to achieve satisfactory military ends. The process of 
moulding civilian soldiers into the style of a pre-war brigade was challenging, the 
response to the initial deployment of TF divisions to France having been mixed. 
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Indeed, Major-General Sir Charles Bonham Carter was moved to suggest that ‘they 
must be carefully nursed when they first come out’.170 Therefore, for a command 
relationship to work effectively, a degree of loyalty had to be displayed on both sides. 
This relationship was crucial to the sustaining of morale when the notion of 
‘uncontrollability, isolation and empowerment constituted a uniquely frightening, 
depressing and stressful experience’.171 The readiness of the successive brigadiers of 
152 Brigade, 51st (Highland) Division, to address the needs of the civilian soldier was 
symptomatic of the mechanics of a paternalistic-deferential exchange. 
Brigadier-General W.C. Ross, (GOC 152 Brigade November 1914-July 1916), 
as local secretary of the Territorial Force Association, had been ‘intimately known in 
peace time to many officers, NCOs and men… and their parents, families, homes and 
employers’. His interest in the Highland soldier was noted and he possessed ‘a great 
knowledge and understanding of him…[being] a familiar figure to them all’.172 Ross 
was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Pelham Burn, a Regular officer with the 8/10 
Gordon Highlanders and at 34 years of age the youngest brigadier in the British Army. 
As a commander, Pelham Burn brought ‘an abundant experience of warfare in the 
front line and ‘spent every moment of the day and much of the night in thinking how 
he could increase the efficiency of his command’.173 As Sheffield has demonstrated 
with reference to officer-man relations ‘the British army, dominated by pre-war Regular 
officers took no chances with the welfare of its lower ranks’.174 Pelham Burn was no 
exception. He ensured that the command relationship of the Regular army, based 
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upon a structured, paternalistic hierarchy, was transposed upon to the brigade. This 
he achieved by ensuring that Scottish Territorial Force characteristics were 
perpetuated, and the welfare of his men served. Based upon this model, obedience 
was given in return for a leader providing a courageous example and attending to the 
needs of his men before his own. For example, Pelham Burn’s response to the 
privations of a newly transferred unit were reflected in correspondence written in 1916 
stating that he had 
a Trench Mortar Brigade here of 46 men who never get any presents and they 
are an odd lot composed of 4 or 5 different regiments and nobody’s children. I 
wonder if you have any socks, tobacco or such goods which you could spare 
them. They are a good lot and I would like to keep them along.175 
 
A soldier’s respect for an officer was determined by the way that the officer behaved 
towards him. Through such acts of benevolence, as demonstrated by Pelham Burn, 
the paternalistic bond between officer and man was strengthened.  
 The extent of the brigadier’s influence upon the brigade’s preparation, planning 
and training depended upon the length of time he was granted prior to the opening of 
an offensive. After the losses sustained in early 1915 newly promoted brigadiers were 
afforded little time to acclimatise, with those of the Regular divisions averaging 56 days 
before the Battle of Loos. For the opening of the Somme on 1 July 1916, the Regular 
brigadiers experienced 204 days on average in post and the New Army commanders 
133. While 21, or 38% of the brigadiers were appointed between March and June 
1916, there were extreme exceptions. Ten brigadiers experienced less than 90 days 
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in command, two of 19th (Western) Division being appointed only two weeks before 
the offensive, one of whom fell sick after three weeks.176  
Overall, from 54 brigades of 18 divisions deployed on 1 July 1916, 51.6% 
experienced a relatively rapid change of command. From a total of 132 brigades 
deployed throughout the Somme campaign, 63 experienced a change of command 
which, excluding temporary commanders, equated to a 47% churn.177 Of these, 32% 
were promoted to command a division. However, for some, as the expectations upon 
brigadiers grew, proved ‘convenient scapegoats if things went wrong’.178 Not all cases 
however resulted in permanent demotion. Brigadier-General G.D. Jeffreys’, 57 
Brigade, 19th (Western) Division, was considered to have made ‘3 elementary errors’ 
during his brigade’s attack on the Grandcourt Line in November 1916 but was 
transferred to acting GOC 1(Guards) Brigade after ‘the weight of the Army 
Commander’s displeasure [fell instead] upon his divisional commander’. Jeffreys was 
subsequently appointed GOC of 19th (Western) Division. As Major-General H.R. 
Davies observed, ‘it was [lucky] for him that he was a Grenadier Guardsman’.179 
 By the opening of the Third Battle of Ypres in July 1917, while the tenure of 
Regular brigade commanders remained relatively constant, those of the New Army 
brigades almost doubled from 133 to 254 days.180 This was attributable to three 
factors: an element of divisional reorganisation, an endeavour to sustain stable 
command structures and an effort by GHQ to ensure that newly appointed 
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commanders were ‘up to date with the various peculiarities of [the] war’.181 Throughout 
the offensive the turnover increased with a 37.7% churn of brigadiers from the 123 
brigades deployed. Many of these would have taken advantage of the ‘six-month 
ruling’ introduced in June 1917, that allowed for an extended leave and was introduced 
to mitigate some of the effects of prolonged exposure to offensive action.182 
Discussions at the War Office also resulted in a proposal to ‘send home tired 
Regimental officers… their appointments being filled by fresh officers from England’. 
These proposals remained subject to the proviso that those chosen ‘were not to be 
limited in number but sent home as recommended… and care taken that only war-
worn officers are selected’.183  
 Loos Somme Third Ypres 
Regular Brigades 56 222 233 
New Army Brigades 214 133 254 
TF Brigades 229 257 246 
Overall average in 
days 
166 204 244 
 
Table 1.4: The average days in post experienced by brigadiers prior to major 
offensives 1915-1917 
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Despite possessing the traditional values of the pre-war officer corps, many 
brigadiers lacked the stamina or skill for effective leadership and were sent home 
finding themselves ‘out of touch with current weapons… and tactical thought’.184 They 
also bore the stress caused by the physical rigours of the trenches and the heavy 
burden of responsibility that could in extreme cases manifest itself in mental 
breakdown. Any attempt to identify and classify the extent to which a breakdown 
contributed to an officer’s removal is complicated as few officers’ medical records 
survive. Officers were more likely to be considered as suffering from neurasthenia than 
the more hysterical systems of ‘paralyses, trembling and shaking… seizures and gait 
disorders’ which were confined to privates and non-commissioned officers’.185 
Accordingly, all reference to the ‘[breakdown] mentally’ of Brigadier-General W.A. 
Oswald, 72 Brigade, 24th Division on 25 September 1915 was excised from the original 
draft of the Official History. This followed the intervention of Brigadier-General H.R. 
Davies, 3 Brigade, 1st Division who objected to Edmond’s use of the word ‘mentally’ 
suggesting that ‘it would be enough to say simply invalided’.186 Similarly, Brigadier-
General F. Wintour, 84 Brigade, 28th Division having been removed from his post due 
to ‘insufficient resolution’ during operations on 20-21 February, was ‘admitted to No. 3 
Clearing Station Hospital suffering from neurasthenia’.187  
A brigadier’s role was essentially consisted of face-to-face relationships with 
his subordinates. These placed him and his staff in consistent danger, as in response 
to an increased tempo of operations and ever-present communication problems, 
command decisions increasingly had to be taken increasingly near the front line. 
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Consequently, a total of 30 brigadiers were killed on the Western Front, of which eight 
died of wounds and nine were gassed. The number of wounded between 1915 and 
1918 rose incrementally to 65, peaking in 1918 with 36 casualties, of which the 
German Spring Offensives accounted for 12.188 The extent to which brigade staff were 
exposed to injury or induced stress, depended upon the length of time a division spent 
on the Western Front and the frequency with which it was deployed. As Griffith 
observed, ‘the unavoidable conclusion is that the high command observed an informal 
“pecking order” of divisions’ where the most reputably trustworthy were chosen for the 
most difficult tasks.189 This is borne out by the fact that five of the Regular divisions 
were deployed in excess of 30 times, 2nd Division being especially favoured with 44 
operations to its name. Of the first tranche of New Army divisions, 19th (Western) 
Division experienced 44 days of action, while in comparison 16th (Irish) Division was 
deployed on 12 occasions. The second tranche of twelve New Army divisions 
averaged 15 large engagements. Whilst Griffith conceded that any pecking order was 
surely based upon ‘little more than prejudice, hearsay and the cut of the divisional 
commander’s jaw’, the Western Front nevertheless remained a place where 
operational success was likely to lead to further employment in major offensives.190     
The profile of brigade commanders during 1915 also reflected the replacement 
of older commanders by younger men. For example, Brigadier-General E.G. Grogan, 
26 Brigade, 9th (Scottish) Division, aged 64, was replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. 
Ritchie aged 46. Similarly, two brigadiers of 15th (Scottish) Division who had ‘shot their 
bolt’ on the grounds of invalidity were replaced.191 However, despite concerted moves 
 
188 F. Davies and F. Maddocks, Bloody Red Tabs; General Officer Casualties of the Great War 1914-1918 
(Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1995). 
189 Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.82. 
190 Ibid. 




to the contrary, inexperienced brigadiers were being appointed as late as July 1915. 
Pelham Burn was surprised to discover that Brigadier-General E. St. G. Pratt, 76 
Brigade, 3rd Division, aged 51, had no experience of warfare with the BEF having been 
at the War Office since 1913 where it was still thought ‘that age was a qualification for 
command of a brigade’.192 Despite his lack of experience and having been gassed at 
St. Eloi in February 1916, Pratt replaced Brigadier-General H.F. Jenkins, 75 Brigade, 
25th Division in July 1916 and served throughout the Somme offensive.   It seems that 
an upper age limit of 56 years for brigade was introduced in May 1915.193 By 1918, 
the average age had fallen to 42.1 years, of whom 120 brigadiers were under 40 years 
of age, with 49 under 42.194 Of these, Brigadier-General Roland ‘Boys’ Bradford VC, 
was promoted to GOC 186 Brigade at the age of 25, to be killed at Cambrai 20 days 
later.195 
Some newly promoted brigadiers’s introduction to offensive action was ill-
starred. In February 1915 Major-General E.S. Bulfin, GOC 28th Division commented 
that Brigadier-General A.J. Chapman of 85 Brigade had failed to ‘get straight with his 
Brigade Staff… all being new to each other and [having] been thrust into a series of 
very critical situations’.196 Chapman’s standing as a capable brigadier had been 
compromised by the conduct of men of the 1/East Surrey and 3/Royal Fusiliers during 
an enemy attack on 14 February where they had allegedly ‘vacated their trenches’.197 
While Bulfin believed that he ‘possessed the makings of a capable commander’ 
Chapman later broke down under the strain. In a further blow to brigade cohesion, two 
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other brigadiers of 28th Division succumbed to sickness.198 It says much for the 
challenges faced by brigadiers that Bulfin considered that ‘commanders had to buy 
their experience… [regretting] the cost that had to be paid’.199    
The difficulties in establishing a stable and efficient brigade command staff were 
evident in the experiences of 7th Division. Between August 1914 and December 1915 
nine brigadiers were attached to the division, of which three were subsequently 
appointed to divisional command, one was killed and one wounded. A total of eight 
brigade majors were employed, of which one was appointed CO 2/Scots Guards and 
ultimately given his own brigade, one returned to the Indian Army and one was killed. 
The churn amongst staff captains totalled 13, with one promoted to brigade major, one 
killed and one wounded.200 With a premium placed upon able officers, demand for 
their services was high. For example, Brigadier-General F.J. Heyworth, 20 Brigade 
received a request to release Major C.E. Corkran, CO 1/Grenadier Guards to assist in 
the ‘instruction and guidance of a newly arrived Territorial battalion in order that the 
best may be made of his good material’.201 In response, Heyworth wrote that ‘I very 
much regret but it is extremely inconvenient to release Major Corkran’. Eventually he 
was released to 154 Brigade, 51st (Highland) Division whose own brigadier was 
considered ‘nebulous and doubtful about his place in the attack [and in need of] 
assistance in formulating his plans properly’.202 Having served as brigade major in 1 
Brigade, 1st Division, Corkran assumed command of 5 Brigade, 2nd Division in July 
1915, a rise from CO to brigadier in five months. 
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The establishment of a cohesive command structure and beneficial  command 
relationships were also handicapped by the shifting of brigades ‘between division to 
division and from corps to corps… commanders remaining strangers to each other’.203 
This was evident in 7th Division which served under six corps in total with their 
difficulties compounded by the consistent reconstitution of brigades ‘for a third, in 
some cases a fourth time… as each successive offensive swept away more of the few 
really trained officers’.204 After Loos, the three brigades acquired eight new battalion 
commanders and numerous junior ranks, the 2/Gordons alone receiving ‘3 captains… 
2 lieutenants and 11 2nd lieutenants… together with drafts amounting to over 450’.205 
Whilst assimilating these drafts, 21 Brigade staff was also focused upon the impending 
exchange with 91 Brigade, 30th Division designed to acclimatise new recruits to the 
conditions of trench warfare. While for some brigades this measure was on a 
temporary basis, for 21 Brigade the exchange was permanent.  
A formation’s operational performance depended upon efficient staff, and so 
from 1915 ineffective brigade commanders were replaced by experienced and 
proficient battalion commanders. Simultaneously, experienced brigade commanders 
were promoted to divisional command. This pattern of renewal escalated as officers 
with managerial and tactical skills benefited from a meritocratic process of promotion. 
These skills were honed during successive operations conducted during 1915, where 
present and future brigade officers experienced the conditions that shaped operations 
on the Western Front during 1916-1917.  
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1.10: Brigade operations 1915 
The accepted story of the Western Front in 1915 is one of ‘repeated attempts 
to achieve a breakthrough that failed and degenerated into attrition’.206  The context in 
which the BEF operated were defined by two broad criteria. First, as a junior member 
of the Anglo-French coalition, despite Sir John French’s desire for an independent 
strategy, there was little choice other than to pursue ‘a strategy formulated in Joffre’s 
headquarters’.207 Thus the British line was extended northwards during January-
February 1915 relieving the French IX Corps in the Ypres sector. The BEF’s 
operations were shaped by the presence of German defences on higher ground, which 
enhanced the advantages of the defence over the assault. The British government’s 
unpreparedness for total war was a second factor. Shaped by financial expediency, 
rather than military factors, the British army’s peacetime establishment of six infantry 
and one cavalry division was rapidly eroded by the huge losses sustained during 1914. 
Equally, a shortfall in the pre-war production of artillery and munitions could not be 
made up quickly. These broad factors defined the shape of brigade operations in 1915.  
 The fundamental causes of operational failure were clear in the aftermath of 
Neuve Chapelle, the BEF’s first offensive under conditions of true positional warfare. 
The BEF’s leaders recognised  that success depended upon the correct and efficient 
employment of artillery, and it was organised with a degree of sophistication that 
proved ‘positively precocious’.208 A total of 340 guns of varying calibre were assembled 
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providing a thirty-five minute preliminary bombardment.209 Similar meticulous attention 
was given to the establishment of communications with a direct telephone line 
established between brigade headquarters and their respective artillery batteries.210 
In preparation, the three brigades of IV Corps detailed to carry out the assault, 23 and 
25 Brigades, 8th Division and the Garwhal Brigade, Indian Corps, were withdrawn on 
2 March ‘to rehearse the first phase of the operations in every detail’. 211 
 Despite these arrangements, brigadiers were instructed ‘that they should not 
make unnecessary demands on the artillery’.212 Because of this shortage of munitions, 
IV Corps’ frontage was reduced to 5,000 yards accommodating the battalions of two 
divisions in depth. The restrictions imposed upon the assembly of the battalions was 
evident in 23 Brigade where it was considered that ‘one to one and half Battalions 
could be “crammed” into the fire trenches… in addition to the trench garrison of 700’.213 
Moreover, consisting as they did of a salient jutting into the British lines, the German 
defensive positions were ideal for concentrating enfilade fire into the brigade lines. The 
enemy’s domination of the British lines therefore influenced the work of brigade staff 
in securing the safe assembly of battalions and in the planning of suitable formations 
for attack.   
 The subsequent loss of impetus by 23 Brigade during the first phase of the 
assault, caused by a lack of artillery support, exposed the difficulties encountered by 
departing from the operational timetable. This was evident in the decision taken by 
Brigadier-General A.W.G. Lowry Cole that in the absence of mutual support from 23 
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Brigade ‘no further advance was practicable’ for 25 Brigade, despite a request from 
Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Stephens, 2/Rifle Brigade.214 Ultimately, Lowry Cole’s 
decision raised questions at GHQ in clarifying the action to be taken in the event of a 
loss of cohesion. In its endorsement of devolved decision making, a First Army 
memorandum laid down that ‘if a certain body of infantry fails to gain its objectives 
there is no reason why troops on either flank should be held up’.215 However, FSR1 
stated that the decision to attack depended upon ‘the conditions which affect the 
question of the frontage… [which] vary with circumstances’.216 Consequently, a 
brigadier’s capability and willingness to attack was determined by his interpretation of 
accurate intelligence and information related to the circumstances affecting the 
brigade frontage.  
 FSR1 was clear: ‘the first requisite is information’.217 Therefore, the necessity 
for thorough reconnaissance, figured highly in brigade reports. For example, IV Corps 
HQ issued a memorandum advising that before committing their troops to an attack 
‘Brigadiers and OCs should endeavour to find out something of the ground’.218 
Additionally, brigadiers were ordered to submit regular reports regarding their progress 
during attacks, every endeavour having been made to check the accuracy of 
information. If a report was considered inaccurate, it was ‘retained for future 
verification of forwarded with a caution as to [its] necessity’. As an extra precaution 
‘sketches of a brigade’s disposition at the close of fighting were forwarded’ as 
appropriate.219 These measures demonstrate that brigade staff were actively engaged 
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in the systematic capture and interpretation of relevant information as an element of 
the learning process as early as spring 1915.   
 The level of information acquired and the degree of influence to which it was 
acted upon depended initially upon the position of brigade headquarters (BHQ). In the 
light of Neuve Chapelle, it was generally considered that staff should remain well 
forward to respond ‘to the changing nature of the fight’.220 It had been demonstrated 
that despite the disruption encountered by 7th and 8th Divisions, the direct intervention 
of brigadiers had ameliorated some of the difficulties. Twice Lowry Cole had been able 
to make a balanced decision upon the feasibility of an attack based upon first-hand 
intelligence.221 While the advanced position taken up by the brigade commander was 
beneficial, it also proved perilous. Lowry Cole was subsequently killed during 
operations at Aubers Ridge (May 1915) when, all communications having been 
severed, he moved forward to reorganise his battalions.222  
 The optimum position for BHQ proved perplexing, whilst the benefits of adjacent 
command headquarters were quickly realised. At Aubers Ridge those of 1st Division’s 
2 and 3 Brigades were situated 3,000 yards behind the front line, ‘their proximity to 
each other greatly [facilitating] command and exchange of news’.223 Conversely, 
Brigadier-General R. Wanless O’Gowan’s 13 Brigade, 5th Division considered that 
during operations at St. Julien in April 1915  
the wanderings of the Brigade HQ… [were] of interest… [in showing] how 
difficult it was to command a brigade under existing circumstances and what a 
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great strain it put on the Signal Service. It also showed how unavoidable it is to 
place Brigade HQ too close to the firing line.224 
 
Similar circumstances occurred at Loos, where Brigadier-General C.D. Bruce, 27 
Brigade, 9th (Scottish) Division having advanced forward, to steady his men and 
establish touch with the flank brigade of 7th Division, found his headquarters isolated 
and overrun. As the divisional report stated ‘Brigade HQ should be as far forward as 
possible and once fixed never move… [but] while 26 and 28 Brigades remained in 
their battle stations… and never lost touch… 27 Brigade… were never in touch’.225   
In relation to the optimum position for BHQ and in the light of lessons drawn 
from operations at Loos, guidance was laid down by Brigadier-General A.A. 
Montgomery, Chief of Staff at IV Corps. This advice recommended ‘that brigadiers and 
brigade majors should not occupy an advanced position’ simultaneously. As far as the 
tactical influence of the brigadier was concerned, it was considered that ‘the golden 
rule to remember is that the only way in modern battle on which a commander can 
influence the action… is by the handling of reserves and of the artillery’.226 The debate 
on the ideal position for brigade headquarters would continue throughout 1916, the 
growing consensus being that a tendency had developed ‘to keep Brigade HQ too far 
back and out of touch with the immediate situation… [and] consequently support in the 
form of reserves was not forthcoming’.227 The issue of SS119 in July 1916 provided 
some clarity based upon ‘the absolute necessity for direct observation by the Brigade 
Staff’ as laid down in FSR1. It was proposed that BHQ should be positioned ‘at the 
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most forward place that can be reached in comparative safety from rifle fire’.228 
However, an ideal solution remained elusive and totally dependent upon a 
transformation in communications technology.  
A material cause of failure at Neuve Chapelle was the collapse of 
communication in the chain of command, leading to a loss of cohesion and tactical 
control. As the distances between command posts lengthened ‘communications 
between [brigades] and the units were constantly interrupted… and depended upon 
orderlies only’.229 This observation was later endorsed by a staff officer who observed 
that ‘when the first assault had been delivered, the troops got beyond the scope of the 
communications system’.230 However, in the aftermath of the attack, all aspects of 
communication were scrutinised and appropriate measures implemented at brigade 
level, GOC 20 Brigade instructing that ‘all battalion Signalling, Communication and 
Signallers… would be placed under the Brigade Signals Officer for the purpose of 
operations and training’ being billeted and rationed as separated detachments.231  
The absence of secure communications was exacerbated  by the unrealistic 
time allotted for the issue of corps’ orders with ‘ [none passing] from division to 
division… in less than 30 minutes’, usually longer.232 The attack of 23 Brigade on 11 
March was subject to IV Corps’ distorted perception of the situation where 
‘arrangements for communications between the fighting troops and the staff had not 
been adequately thought out and where… no orders reached the fighting line… [they] 
reached the batteries’.233 In consequence, 23 Brigade received their orders 33 minutes 
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before the attack, battalion headquarters being a further 1,200 yards beyond. By the 
time battalion orders were received, two companies of the Worcestershires had 
already advanced ‘to carry the others’ the supporting barrage having already 
ceased.234  
Similar factors that influenced the exercise of tactical control at brigade level 
were evident at Second Ypres. Here, the principles of FSR1 were frequently 
disregarded and the necessity for ‘timely information regarding the enemy’s 
dispositions and the topographical features of the theatre of operations’ overlooked.235 
The attack of Brigadier-General C.P. A. Hull’s 10 Brigade, 4th Division, on 25 April was 
one such occasion. Originally scheduled to take place with the support of 149 and 150 
Brigades of 50th (Northumbrian) Division with a total of 15 battalions, through a lack of 
coordination and delay, only five battalions were successfully assembled.236 The staff 
of 10 Brigade were given no time for reconnaissance, Hull having to issue orders by 
reference to what maps were available. The late issue of corps’ orders broke the 
unwritten rule that orders should reach brigade headquarters not less than 48 hours 
before zero. In the event, the attack was postponed for two hours until 5.30am to allow 
units to pass through the wire undetected. However, this notification was not relayed 
to the supporting batteries of the Canadian Field Artillery, nor the artillery of 27th and 
28th Divisions. Hence the guns stuck to the original arrangements but remained silent 
when 10 Brigade’s attack began. Without artillery support, the attack also suffered 
from a lack of communication at BHQ, despite FSR1 stressing ‘the maintenance of 
communication… [in providing] the possibility of cooperation’.237 While 10 Brigade 
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succeeded in temporarily closing the gap created by the loss of St. Julien, it came at 
a heavy cost in well trained men and the formation’s inevitable reconstitution.238 
Brigade operations at Second Ypres were therefore shaped by various factors: 
location, inconsistent exercise of command, poor communications and a shortage of 
munitions. Attacks were delivered from narrow frontages which ‘were prone to 
exposure from enfilade fire’ whilst ones from a wide front remained ‘impossible 
because of insufficient ammunition’.239 Crucially, as Prior and Wilson argue, ‘lessons 
already mastered’ had to be learnt all over again, as 24 Brigade’s attack at Aubers 
Ridge demonstrated.240 Here, having benefited from a modest rise in its artillery 
assets, First Army chose to disperse its fire-power over a wide area in anticipation of 
a rapid advance, rather than concentrating its fire-power. This deprived brigade 
operations of the necessary pre-conditions for operational success: sufficient 
preparation, an appropriate method of attack and adequate logistic support to 
accommodate the scale of the objectives. 
The BEF’s ambitious offensive at Loos in September 1915 was, despite its 
impressive logistic arrangements, shaped by similar unfavourable factors. Numerous 
contraventions of the principles laid down in FSR1 were evident. The first of these 
applied to the absence of limited objectives. FSR1 stated ‘that under all conditions the 
attacking troops must be given definite objectives’.241 First Army orders however 
presumed that having taken the first two German lines of defence ‘the advance would 
be carried on into open warfare’.242 Many of the attacking brigades were confused as 
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to their final objectives, ‘with the only clarity being the onus to attack to the utmost’.243 
Thus, Major-General T. Capper, 7th Division, a soldier deeply committed to the spirit 
of the offensive, instructed his brigade commanders that boldness and clarity were to 
be the keywords of the action.244 Similarly, when asked by a commanding officer for 
the  next objective after he taken Hill 70, Brigadier-General F.E. Wallerston, 45 
Brigade, 15th (Scottish) Division suggested that ‘if there is no opposition push on’.245 
However, as events proved, a successful advance over open ground hinged upon the 
timely establishment of a defensive flank guard.  
A second factor influencing brigade operations was the controversial handling 
of 21st and 24th Divisions, their late deployment contravening the principle of 
‘concentrating the general reserve at the right moment with reference to the 
approximate place in which it is to be used’.246  Divisional, brigade and battalion orders 
were drawn up on this premise with the brigadiers of 15th (Scottish) Division being 
under the impression ‘that there would be at least a corps in the rear’ [original 
emphasis].247 The failure to deploy the reserve divisions at an opportune moment 
stemmed from internal and external causes. Broadly, the failure to deploy the reserves 
at an appropriate time stemmed from the differing conceptions between Haig and 
French on how they should be used.248 Internally, it demonstrated the inexperience of 
the divisions, an information vacuum and a failure to maintain adequate command and 
control during the second phase of the offensive. For example, orders failed to 
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materialise for Brigadier-General B.R. Mitford’s 72 Brigade’s attack on 26 September. 
Assuming personal responsibility, he authorised the attack to go ahead ‘ as [written] 
orders have not been received yet… and they [the battalion COs] have their 
instructions from me’.249 Given that his battalions had only ten minutes to deploy and 
execute a difficult manoeuvre, their success in steadying ‘the mass of the 63rd Brigade 
on their right which at that moment was in full retreat’ demonstrated the skill of both 
brigade and battalion staff.250 
Already with little margin for error, due to the compressed nature of the 
operations, operations were affected by poor staff work on the part of both First Army 
and I Corps. This placed a heavy responsibility on corps and divisional staffs. Subject 
to their orders from higher levels, but obliged to respond to local circumstances, 
brigadiers faced painful decisions. This is neatly illustrated by a decision taken by 
Brigadier-General G.M. Gloster, GOC 64 Brigade, on 26 September, in response to 
an instruction from GSO3, 21st Division that a resumption of the attack ‘at all costs’ 
was necessary.251 Despite lacking information and his brigade major erring on the side 
of caution Gloster resumed the attack. Later, in a wry defence of his decision, Gloster 
commented that ‘if he had done nothing he might be blamed, whereas if we at least 
tried he would be free of censure’. The consequences for a brigadier sanctioning an 
attack with insufficient support and unreliable information was implicit: the onus of 
responsibility in selecting his course of action profound.   
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A third influence on the shape of brigade operations was related to terrain. At 
Loos, the 30 to 75 metre contour lines made ‘an advance eastward… extremely 
difficult’.252 Conditions did however vary between corps’ sectors, that of I Corps being 
probably the worst within First Army. The attack of the brigades of 2nd Division took 
place over ground levelled by the enemy to increase the width of no-man’s land and 
studded with advantageously positioned machine gun emplacements. To this was 
added the difficulties in obtaining artillery observation ‘with wire laying in sunken 
trenches and almost impossible to see from [the forward line] or observation 
stations’.253 These factors, combined with a change in wind direction, which blew gas 
back onto advancing troops, proved disastrous.  
The frontage of IV Corps was defined by its featureless terrain, 15th (Scottish) 
Division’s 44 Brigade straying in a south-easterly direction ‘partly due to the 
conformation [sic] of the ground and a natural tendency to follow prominent features’. 
The loss of direction was exacerbated by ambiguous orders regarding the movement 
of 47th Division, which stated that a defensive flank would be provided but failed to 
make clear their final objectives. Consequently, 44 Brigade, under the assumption that 
its flank was protected, was deflected towards the crest of Hill 70, 46 Brigade 
conforming to the same direction; this pronounced swing to the south destroyed the 
cohesion and weight of the attack and exposed its left flank.254 The difficulties caused 
by terrain and the configuration of the German lines shaped brigade operations 
throughout the war. In response, great emphasis was placed upon navigational skills 
during brigade training.  As the war progressed a proficiency in map and compass 
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reading proved invaluable, with COs, junior officers and NCOs consistently ‘warned 
that it was no good relying upon landmarks’.255 For example, Brigadier-General J. 
Ponsonby, GOC 2 (Guards) Brigade laid down in his scheme of training that ‘all young 
officers and NCOs [should] be taught to take compass bearings on different points and 
to find their own positions by the intersection of bearings’. 256                           
1.11: Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the foundation for examining the evolution of brigade 
command throughout 1916-18. It has outlined the structure and principal roles of the 
brigadier and his immediate staff. It has been demonstrated that the establishment of 
a stable and professional brigade staff, able to adapt to the challenges of modern 
warfare, was a lengthy and uneven process. From a snapshot of operations 
undertaken throughout 1915, it has been shown that brigade operations were shaped 
by factors over which subordinate commanders had little or no influence. As the BEF 
adjusted to the complexities of static warfare, the necessary preconditions for success 
were gradually established: thorough operational and logistical preparation, realistic 
objectives and the suppression of enemy artillery fire. However, the evolution of 
brigade command as an effective tactical force was aligned with the development of 
communication technology. The optimum position for BHQ proved a matter of 
considerable debate. Whilst it was desirable to move a headquarters forward to secure 
observation and reduce the distance between command posts, the exposure to enemy 
increased the likelihood of being overwhelmed or destroyed. With the development of 
communication technology and the establishment of intermediary report centres these 
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problems were alleviated to some extent. The debates which took place within the 
BEF with regards to the location and distance between brigade and battalion 
headquarters suggest that British commanders were prepared to modify existing 
practices in order to improve communications. However, as Hall contends, it is only at 
the end of 1917 that ‘the BEF’s communication system did show signs of being 
stronger and more flexible and sophisticated’.257  
Also, as this thesis argues, the influence on brigade operations of the terrain 
and the configuration of the enemy front line cannot be underestimated. Local 
intelligence was crucial in planning attacks and brigade defence schemes. The degree 
to which these criteria were met reflected the staff’s adaptation to the challenges of 
trench warfare and where successful suggests the organisational and operational 
progression of brigade command. As brigade staff grappled with new methods and 
innovative technology, their capability for adaptation was enhanced by the ethos of the 
pre-war Edwardian British army which provided a platform for organisational and 
tactical reform. This ethos, as Fox has argued, enabled instances of horizontal 
learning and good practice to take place suggesting ‘a culture that facilitated rather 
than hindered’ change.258 Throughout 1916 the pre-war concepts of warfare were 
reshaped and clarified through a systematic process of tactical appraisal. The gradual 
expansion of brigade staff signified GHQ’s acknowledgement of these changes and 
the need for tactically proficient officers willing and able to implement them. The 
implementation of these measures correlated with the evolution of brigade command 
and are examined in the following chapters.
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     Chapter 2 
 




Throughout 1915 the BEF struggled to find ways of applying offensive principles 
in an operational environment that was totally different to that which had been 
expected. Operations were shaped by universal factors over which commanders had 
little influence, principally a lack of manpower and material resources.  At a tactical 
level, formations grappled with embryonic methods of attack and innovative 
technology as they adjusted to the complexities of static warfare. It is the aim of this 
chapter to explore the BEF’s responses to these constraints and their effect upon the 
evolution of brigade command during operations on the Somme in 1916.  
 Three research questions were posed. First, to what extent were brigade 
operations shaped by the preparation and scale of Fourth Army’s offensives? Second, 
to what extent were the organisational and tactical developments at brigade level 
determined by the style of command practiced by the corps in which they served?  
Third, to what degree did the development of brigade command reflect the nature of 
the British army’s capabilities for adaptation and innovation? It will be argued that 
brigade command’s contribution to the BEF’s learning process has been substantially 
underestimated. This chapter examines three broad avenues of influence that shaped 
the course of brigade operations: training, operational organisation, and command and 




Corps at Delville Wood between 15 July-10 August: and XIV Corps at the Battle of 
Flers-Courcelette on 15 September.1   
 The battlefield performance of XIII Corps between July and September were 
shaped by the variable scale of Fourth Army operations. These operations can be 
classified into three phases. The first, the capture of Montauban on 1 July, 
demonstrated what could be achieved ‘when the objectives demanded matched the 
means available’.2 The second, on 14 July, proved that given enough artillery support, 
the New Armies were capable of greater tactical sophistication than some senior 
commanders expected. The third phase, from 15 July to 10 August in the Delville 
Wood-Guillemont area, was marked by the degeneration into ‘a multiplicity of 
piecemeal operations’.3 Lower order commanders were acutely aware of the 
inadequacies of these operations, which were marked by insufficient preparation, 
difficulties of communication and lack of cooperation with neighbouring units.4 Under 
these circumstances, command and control broke down and lessons were shown to 
be imperfectly learned. 
2.2: XIII Corps: Brigade Operations, 1 July 1916 
The piecemeal operations of the brigades of 2nd, 3rd (Regular) and 30th (New 
Army) Divisions have been examined. A summary of the attack upon Montauban on 1 
July provides a point of comparison for evaluating the difficulties encountered by XIII 
Corps at Delville Wood. A profile of the corps, divisional and brigade staffs also 
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provides a flavour of the social homogeneity and stability that served to perpetuate 
regimental values throughout the corps.   
The conditions that shaped XIII Corps’ capture of Montauban were in marked 
contrast to the unfavourable ones experienced later at Delville Wood. This was 
attributable to several factors. XIII Corps’ position dominated the entire German front, 
providing a panoramic view as far back as Montauban, giving excellent artillery 
observation.  In addition, whereas the chalk subsoil in the northern sector allowed the 
divisions of XIII Corps to build sturdy dugouts, in the south, the mixture of unstable soil 
and clay made deep excavation difficult.5 Capitalizing upon these factors and liaising 
with their counterparts in the French XX Corps artillery, XIII Corps deployed three 
Heavy Artillery Groups (HAG) to shatter the German First Line. Counter-battery 
operations were given the highest priority of any British corps during the preliminary 
bombardment.6  To ensure enough firepower, the corps rationed artillery ammunition.7 
Subsequently, the combination of the weight of Allied artillery and superior observation 
combined to create a devastating preliminary bombardment upon the vulnerable and 
weakly held German lines. These factors provided the assault brigades of XIII Corps 
with the maximum operational and tactical benefits. 
 The brigades detailed for the attack on 1 July were given ample time for 
planning, preparation and practice. Having been allotted a suitable training ground, ‘a 
complete system of trenches… was constructed representing the whole of the 
objectives to be attacked by each brigade’.8 The units of 30th Division’s 90 Brigade 
trained ‘over ground specially chosen to resemble as close as possible the ground to 
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be taken in the following attack’.9 Similarly, the units of 89 Brigade, with their attack 
frontage increased by 350 yards, had their training ground ‘adjusted accordingly’.10 
The divisions spent 17 full days in training, as opposed to five to nine days afforded to 
many other divisions.11 Accommodation for the staff and those of the artillery attached 
to the brigade, ensured that 10 officers and 70 men were provided with adequate 
shelter by the construction of a substantial Battle HQ. Close cooperation between 
brigades was actively encouraged, 89 Brigade on the right of the British line 
cooperating with its counterpart in the French XX Corps where ‘all [the] fellows, 
Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders and men were on very good terms 
with them so that we could congratulate ourselves that our liaison was good’.12 By 23 
June ‘as the result of a very strenuous time… everything had been done… and 
everything was as we wanted… [being] so well prepared that we were actually lending 
people to the 21 Brigade for work on their piece’.13  
The adoption of appropriate infantry and artillery tactics provided the assault 
troops with the maximum support available. An advance in close order formation, was 
ordered, rather than the more complicated open order formation of “fire and 
movement”.14 It is also likely that some brigades of XIII Corps benefited from the 
protection of a creeping barrage, whilst others benefited from the support provided by 
a system of timed lifts.15 The adoption of this formation dramatically reduced the 
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casualties suffered by the brigades of both XIII Corps and XV Corps ‘in which the 
greatest success was achieved’.16 Whilst credit for the artillery arrangements for XIII 
Corps’ attack were given to Brigadier-General R. St. C. Lecky, BGGS, the pervasive 
influence of Brigadier-General H.H. Tudor, BGRA 9th (Scottish) Division was clear. 
Brigades drew upon lessons gained from combat experience at Neuve Chapelle and 
Loos. These advocated the establishment of a carefully designed system of FOOs, 
Tudor maintaining ‘that every effort should be made to establish one artillery line with 
each attacking brigade… [as] the inability of infantry to locate their positions is a 
disability that will be liable to increase as trained and experienced officers diminish’. 
Other lessons stressed the importance of ensuring that assembly trenches were 
established as far as forward as possible to reduce the distance between opposing 
lines and that reconnaissance ensured that all wire cutting procedures were 
monitored.17  
 Again, drawing upon lessons of Loos, brigade objectives were strictly limited 
and predominately set by Corps and Division HQ..18 Success remained ‘dependent 
upon the consolidation of definite objectives…[with] no serious advance to be made 
until preparations [had] been completed for entering the next phase of operations’ 19 
This arrangement, combined with the beneficial factors outlined above ensured that 
30th Division, with three brigades in line, achieved the greatest advance of any division 
on the day. This applied especially to Brigadier-General F.C. Stanley’s 89 Brigade in 
achieving all its objectives by midday. Brigadier-General Hon. C.J. Sackville-West’s 
21 Brigade also made significant progress, but with more casualties. With the final 
 
16 A.F. Becke, ‘The Coming of the Creeping Barrage’ in Journal of the Royal Artillery, 58, 1931-32, p.35 
17 TNA, WO 95/1734/2, 26 Brigade WD, ‘Notes of Lessons Learnt at Neuve Chapelle and Loos, 24 March 1915 
and 7 October 1915.’ 
18 TNA, WO 95/895, XIII Corps WD, Plan of Operations 132/6, (G) Part 1, June 1916. 




assault by 90 Brigade, delivered from well behind its own front line and shielded by a 
smokescreen put down by the advanced brigades, Montauban was overrun. As the 
only division deployed in all three phases of XIII Corps’ operations, 30th Division’s 
casualty figures speak volumes with regard to the severity of future successive 
operations. In accomplishing their objectives on 1 July, 89 and 90 Brigades’ casualties 
were relatively low, the former losing only 24 men.20 In comparison, including losses 
experienced whilst serving under XV Corps, the total number of casualties suffered by 
30th Division rose throughout 1916 to a sobering 17,374, the highest of any division on 
the Somme.21 
 In evaluating the operational performance of 30th Division’s brigades on 1 July, 
it is safe to assume that success was influenced by the geographical dispositions of 
the brigades and a diligent approach to planning and preparation. These benefits were 
largely attributable to the influence of Lieutenant-General Sir W. Congreve and the 
establishment of a stable XIII Corps staff. Congreve brought to the corps the 
traditional, regimental values of strict but fair discipline and the primacy of efficient 
training. By encouraging favourable relationships between the corps and subordinate 
command staffs, he fostered the benefits of social homogeneity and high group 
morale. These qualities afforded him the respect of officers and the men of the novice 
battalions alike.22  
In disseminating these values throughout the corps, Congreve was fortunate in 
procuring the services of divisional commanders that shared his ideals. The training 
of 18th (Eastern) Division’s battalions was subject to Major-General F.I. Maxse’s 
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exacting standards based upon a strict doctrine of “Organisation and Interior 
Economy”. These principles were manifested in ‘the exhaustive explanation of every 
tactic, every theory… and a discipline rooted in confidence and self-respect’.23 Based 
on the idea that training directives should concentrate upon methods rather than 
principles, the doctrine of 18th (Eastern) Division was to 
Teach, drill and practice a definite form of attack so that every man shall know 
it thoroughly. On this basis of theory and knowledge common to all, any 
brigade, battalion or company commander varies his attack formation to suit 
any condition which may be peculiar to his front and to his objective.24 
 
This guidance reflected FSR1’s principle of valuing the opinion of ‘the man on the 
spot’. Similarly, Major-General J.S.M. Shea, GOC 30th Division endorsed the principles 
of FSR1 when advising that ‘subordinate commanders should take up positions where 
they can obtain a good view of the area in which their commands are operating and 
which are of easy communication’.25 Ultimately, Maxse and Shea both of whom ‘had 
commanded brigades and divisions’ would be invited to advise GHQ on training as the 
war progressed.26 
 A range of questions issued to subordinate commanders, relating to 
operational and tactical procedures, were symptomatic of a proactive approach to 
learning within XIII Corps. This provided a platform from which the lessons and 
grievances of brigade command were discussed and disseminated. Major-General 
W.G. Walker V.C., GOC 2nd Division, addressed concerns raised by brigade staff 
about the relay of operational orders after XIII Corps’ operations at Delville Wood. 
 
23 D. Fraser, Alanbrooke (London: Collins, 1982), p.68. Fraser’s text based upon the recollections of Major Alan 
Brooke, BMRA, 18th (Eastern) Division, November 1915.  
24 IWM, Maxse Papers, 69/53/7, p.5, paragraph 3, The 18th Division in the Battle of the Ancre, or ‘The Red 
Book’.  
25 LHCMA, General Sir J.S.M. Shea Papers, 8, p.3, 2 August 1916. See FSR1, Chapter VII, 104 (3), p.138. 
26 LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 9/3, Montgomery to Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, 27 




Bringing together officers actively engaged in the July fighting, the agenda for a 
conference held at X Corps HQ on 15 August was based upon divisional and brigade 
reports. Guidance issued by GHQ after 1 July in the form of SS119 laid down that a 
time of six hours was long enough to transmit orders from corps to company 
commanders: this estimation did not conform to the experiences of the brigade 
commanders. Heeding these concerns, Walker produced a scheme to facilitate ‘the 
economic use of time to offset delays and assist brigade staff in their duties’. This 
consisted of brigade conferences, the timely issue of signals and the systematic issue 
of battalion, company and platoon orders:  
unless time is given for all the stages mentioned [in paragraph 4] to be worked 
out carefully and deliberately, failure is likely to ensue, the good moral effect of 
everything that has been done in a deliberate manner with no appearance of 
indecision or counter order is desirable. If the opposite occurs the effect is most 
unfortunate and requires to be seen to be appreciated.27  
 
From this evidence, it can be assumed that a supportive culture of command facilitated 
the rapid exchange of knowledge and experience to the benefit of brigade command.  
The capacity to sustain unit cohesion and organisational uniformity depended 
upon the retention of corps and divisional staff. XIII Corps was fortunate in retaining 
the services of its BGGS, BGRA and DAQMG from its formation in November 1915 
until late 1916-early 1917.28  Equally, the divisional commanders averaged 19 months 
tenure of service with the corps.  This continuity was also evident at brigade level. The 
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combined average length of service for the brigadiers of 30th Division equated to 353 
days. This was the highest of any division deployed on the Somme on 1 July. Of those 
divisions replacing the shattered 18th and 9th Divisions in late July, the brigadiers of 2nd 
Division averaged 275, 3rd Division 131 and 55th (West Lancashire) Division 207 days 
of service, respectively.29  
 The routes for officers to brigade appointments were varied. Notable amongst 
the brigadiers of 30th Division, Stanley of 89 Brigade benefited from the influence of 
his brother, Lord Derby, in assisting him in the raising of the Liverpool Pals. Remaining 
with 30th Division until April 1917, his close affiliation with the Liverpool battalions 
proved highly valuable. The route to brigade command for Sackville-West of 21 
Brigade, was entirely different. Having served as aide-de-camp and GSO1 in 
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hildyard’s I Corps between 1901-02, the need for 
experienced officers prompted a move to the Indian Army, before he assumed 
command of 21 Brigade in December 1915.30               
 The assault of XIII Corps on 1 July ‘demonstrated what the New Army could 
achieve when the objectives demanded met the means available’.31 Equally, brigade 
operations benefited geographical, logistical and tactical advantages. The 
implementation of rigorous training programmes and thorough preparation, sustained 
by a stable command structure, provided a firm foundation for brigade development. 
Divisional commanders possessing combat experience and managerial skills reflected 
the rise of meritocratic promotion in response to the challenges of the Western Front.  
 
29  Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions: Part 1, pp. 42 and 50 and Part 2, p.134. Raised in December 1914 as the 
37th Division and comprising 110, 111 and 126 Brigades, the unit was renumbered during the reorganisation of 
Fifth New Army in April 1915 and thus becoming 30th Division comprised of 89, 90 and 21 Brigades.  
30 Sackville-West was one of 30th Division’s casualties of the fighting at Delville Wood, being wounded on 30 
July. 




This process was also seen at brigade level, with the appointment and retention of an 
impressive proportion of brigadiers with organisational and tactical flair.  
2.3: XIII Corps: Brigade Operations, July-August 1916 
In stark contrast, the influence of corps command at Delville Wood was diminished as 
Fourth Army, deprived of sufficient manpower and artillery support, lapsed into hastily 
conceived and poorly coordinated operations. The Anglo-French operations 
conducted between 23 July and 8 August were characterised by a series of 
uncoordinated operations that ‘combined with dreadful weather… removed effective 
control from the British and French commanders’.32 In contrast to the operations of 1 
July, a combination of geographical, logistical and tactical factors denied brigades 
opportunities for success. Piecemeal attacks were delivered from a cramped salient, 
often carried out by scattered battalions unable to exploit any significant gains. Logistic 
problems, especially concerning supply of ammunition and the maintenance of the 
guns, left brigades with insufficient artillery support. The neglect of organisation and 
preparation compromised command and control. The attacks of depleted and tired 
battalions ‘bearing little resemblance to those who went over the top on 1 July’ proved 
a comprehensive failure, save for a precarious hold gained in Delville Wood.33 
Summarising these events, Shea considered that 
the influence of constant changes in plan due to sources outside the Corps or 
Division was very marked, but as it very possible that under similar 
circumstances plans will be again frequently changed, it is important to 




32 E. Greenhalgh, The French Army and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
p.154. 





From the perspective of 89 Brigade command, Stanley observed that the period was 
one of ‘order and counter-order… his staff never [knowing] where to be at’.35    
 This case study assesses the extent to which brigade staff were able to respond 
to challenges during this difficult period. It identifies the emergence of a cadre of 
flexible and tactically proficient brigade staff, whose influence on operations is 
explored through four avenues of research: preparation, communication, the need to 
repel counter attacks in accordance with the principles laid down in FSR1 and the 
impact of operations upon the fighting strength of the brigade.36   
2.4: The attack of 9 Brigade, 3rd Division, at Delville Wood, 23 July 1916. 
In contrast to the operation conducted by Brigadier-General H.C. Potter’s 9 
Brigade on 14 July, that undertaken on 23 July suffered from insufficient preparation 
and reconnaissance.37 Previously, arrangements had been subject to thorough 
preparation and familiarity with the ground, Potter  stressing the advantage of the 
brigade having been in the line for six days, a factor that ‘could only be estimated by 
the results achieved’.38 Equally, the CO 13/K.L.R. attributed the success to everything 
being ready ‘at the appointed time and therefore no unforeseen difficulties arose… 
[demonstrating] how necessary it is for the sake of all concerned to make full 
preparations’.39 
No such benefits were provided on 23 July, showing that many lessons had 
been swiftly forgotten. On this occasion an advance over unreconnoitred ground was 
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38 TNA, WO 95/1426, 9 Brigade WD, ‘Some Lessons of the Operations July 14, 1916’. 




hampered by ‘the greatest difficulty in the assembly of the four battalions at the position 
of deployment’.40 The CO 12/West Yorkshire reported a loss of 40 NCOs and men 
during its assembly, with a late change in the battalion dispositions leaving very little 
time to explain the change in plan to his officers.41 Detailed to support the 12/West 
Yorkshire, CO 13/K.L.R. considered that ‘the attack unlike the previous one on 13-14 
July, was carried out (in my opinion) too rapidly and without any previous preparation 
or reconnaissance of the positions… and that the troops did not advance on the same 
order as settled by the Brigadier the previous evening’.42 The losses sustained during 
the assembly further depleted understrength battalions, the CO 1/Northumberland 
Fusiliers remarking that ‘even with careful preparation the task for this Battalion only 
400 strong was colossal’.43 So surprised was the OC of the leading company of the 
1/Northumberland Fusiliers at the lack of artillery support, that he contacted  battalion 
headquarters to establish whether the attack was still to take place.44  
The attack did go ahead, and 1/Northumberland Fusiliers suffered 50% losses. 
Potter moved forward to battalion headquarters to assess the situation. As soon as 
‘he was in a position to judge… he decided that it was inadvisable to recommence the 
attack’. Instead, in compliance with the principles laid down in FSR1, he ordered and 
closely supervised his units in consolidating the precarious position held, concluding 
that ‘he was [now] better placed to meet any counter-attack and to avail himself of 
such opportunities as a counter-attack might afford’.45 
 
40 Ibid, ‘Report of Operations of 9 Brigade, 23 July 1916’. 
41 Ibid, ‘Report of OC 12/West Yorkshire’, 28 July 1916. 
42 Ibid, OC 13/K.L.R. ‘Remarks on the situation during the attack by 9th Brigade on Longueval and Delville Wood 
on the 23-24 July’,  
43 Ibid, ‘Report on Operations of 1/Northumberland Fusiliers on 23 July’, 27 July 1916. 
44 TNA, WO 95/1426, 9 Brigade WD, ‘Report on Operations carried out by 9 Infantry Brigade at Longueval and 





 It would be reasonable to assume that Potter’s previous experiences influenced 
this decision to move forward to monitor the consolidation. During his brigade’s attack 
on 14 July, he had identified consolidation as a particular weakness, with little work 
having been commenced prior to ‘the arrival of the Brigadier or Brigade Staff on the 
scene… the Infantry almost entirely doing nothing’. This he suggested ‘pointed to the 
necessity of having some better plan for organising and commencing consolidation at 
once’. In his opinion junior officers lacked the experience for this work and that ‘it would 
appear advisable to retain a proportion of experienced company commanders… fresh 
and without fatigue’ to go forward at the appropriate time to organise the work.46 In 
both cases however, it was Potter’s personal intervention that stabilised a precarious 
situation. This response clearly demonstrated the qualities of adaptability and initiative 
required to influence the tactical course of brigade operations. 
2.5: The attack of 30th Division at Guillemont, 30 July 1916. 
30th Division’s assault on Guillemont was affected by a late change of plan and 
zero hour. Divisional and brigade staff’s, positive response to these changes testified 
to their organisational and operational capabilities. Originally conceived as a combined 
Franco-British attack, after five days of prevarication Major-General Shea was notified 
that the French would not attack in conjunction with his division but with 3rd Division in 
a supplementary operation. Given the minor nature of the French support and 
Rawlinson’s unwillingness to alter the start of the main assault, zero hour for XIII Corps 
attack was therefore brought forward an hour ‘so divorcing 3 and 30 Divisions from the 
main attack’.47 For Brigadier-General C.J. Steavenson’s 90 Brigade this arrangement, 
with zero hour scheduled for 4.45am after daybreak, was ‘an alteration of great 
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moment as regards the attack’. Whilst the dispositions of his battalions remained 
unaltered, the original plan to form up in the open now proved impracticable and 
necessitated ‘the assembly of 90 Brigade in trenches and NOT on a taped line as 
intended [original emphasis]’.48 Nevertheless, through the efficiency of the brigade 
staff and the rapid organisation of labour, the trenches were rapidly constructed 
without attracting the attention of the enemy. As the means of approach were limited, 
they were carefully ‘apportioned by brigade staff… in order to avoid congestion and 
so that “crossing” [of designated units] could take place’.49 
  Operational difficulties were not confined to late changes of zero hour. As the 
divisional orders stated, close cooperation throughout was essential to success, ‘the 
maintenance of touch with the French on the right, in whatever position they had 
reached… being a priority [original emphasis]’. 50 In the event, this goal was 
jeopardised when it was discovered that the adjoining brigade frontages of Stanley’s 
89 Brigade and a brigade of the French 39th Division were misaligned. To rectify this 
mistake, which apportioned incorrect dispositions for the battalions, brigade staff were 
called upon to make precise adjustments at a late hour. As Shea commented ‘there 
was a slight clash between the French left and our right which might have been serious 
but for the good understanding between the Allied Brigades’.51   
 The strength of communications within 89 Brigade’s area of operations varied 
considerably. Visual signalling remained subject to the nature and topography of the 
battlefield: the benefits of visual signalling and aeroplane contact nullified by dense 
mist. Useful results from the wireless stations established at 89 Brigade HQ and 
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Advanced Brigade HQ ‘were practically nil’.52 This was attributed to ‘the system of 
codes [which] made it difficult in the heat of battle to send particular messages for 
which the code applied’.53 However, the prior establishment of a comprehensive 
network of buried cables by 89 Brigade provided ‘good speaking and telegraphic 
communication  [with] 90 Brigade, 2nd Division, 39th French Division and the 35th 
Division through whose Area [the 30th Division] was attacking’. The relative 
consistency of this system allowed Stanley to respond to the intermittent loss of touch 
with the French and send forward reserves at a critical moment. Thus: 
although 20/K.L.R. and the French were in constant liaison, by reason of losses 
became somewhat weak, but before it was broken… the line was reinforced by 
2/Bedfords [so that they] were in perfect liaison throughout the whole of a very 
trying time.54  
 
Despite this close liaison, Stanley approached the combined operation with an 
understandable degree of caution. The problem, as he explained, was defined by the 
alignment of the French attack moving south east across the front flank of 89 Brigade 
and into the British barrage to reach their objective. His brigade was attacking east so 
‘keeping shoulder to shoulder with the French… [was] no easy matter in view of the 
different ideas obtaining in the two Armies’. Moreover, 89 Brigade’s objectives were 
oblique to the frontage ‘the southern end of the objective 750 yards further away from 
its right than the left objective of this Brigade from the North end of its start line’.55 
Given these objectives, the disposition and assembly of 89 Brigade and 35th Division’s 
106 Brigade (placed at the disposal of 89 Brigade) required efficient supervision, 
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‘based upon a thorough knowledge of the brigade sector and those adjacent to it’.56  
This reflected the principles later laid down that 
the Brigade Commander on the spot who knows the state of each of his 
battalions at a given time and decides on the method in which he will assault 
the length of objective assigned to his Brigade, can alone decide which system 
to adopt in the particular case so as to arrive at the best results’.57 
 
Having experienced the nature of the operation conducted on 23 July, Stanley had 
been in no doubt ‘of the enormous difficulty of the task’ which had been allotted to his 
brigade for 30 July. In what proved a fruitless gesture, he expressed his concerns to 
Shea ‘which he believed were then conveyed to Congreve’.58  
The response of Stanley and his brigade staff to these difficulties was testament 
to their efficiency, assisted by a thorough knowledge of the brigade sector and the 
disposition of the enemy defences. Communications too proved relatively successful, 
with buried cables and close liaison with their French counterparts enabling reserves 
to be deployed at a critical moment. However, opportunities for direct tactical 
intervention were limited. The greatest influence of the brigade staff was confined to 
organisational and supervisory roles. In his role as the leader and coordinator of his 
brigade, Stanley was ably assisted by his long serving brigade major who had, on the 
eve of the attack, been ordered to go as GSO2 to the Guards Division. It says much 
for the efficiency and working relationships of the brigade staff that Stanley considered 
this move ‘a dreadful blow… refusing to let him go [the brigade major] until after this 
fight which I knew we were in for… [his being] a most dreadful loss’.59   
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In accordance with XIII Corps’ systematic appraisal of operations, in the 
aftermath of the attack a questionnaire was circulated by Brigadier-General W.B. 
Stavely, BGRA 35th Division to elicit the thoughts and suggestions of all brigade 
commanders. This procedure was in response to the poor support provided by the 
inexperienced 35th Division artillery: ‘an unattached group of Heavy Artillery… could 
not have the same intuitive cooperation as is possible with its own Division’.60 
Brigadiers were specifically invited for their impressions of the efficiency of the Liaison 
Officers attached to brigade headquarters. To assess their effectiveness, all messages 
sent between brigade headquarters and 35th Divisional Headquarters were collated 
and evaluated.61 This offers evidence of the increasing sophistication of brigade staffs’ 
analysis of operations.     
  XIII Corps’ operations during this phase ‘reflected the British high command’s 
failure to apply the methods of 14 July’.62 In comparison to their successes on 1 and 
14 July, XIII Corps’ failure was particularly harsh. An officer of 55th (West Lancashire) 
Division identified the reasons for failure on the fact that ‘Corps and Higher 
Commanders refused to believe that Guillemont could not be taken in an isolated 
attack… that the terrain lent itself to a strong machine gun defence and the attack 
allowed the Germans to concentrate the whole of their artillery in that sector’.63 In the 
aftermath of the attacks, shying away from these considerations, Rawlinson laid 
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responsibility upon what he perceived was ‘the want of go and inferior training’ of the 
rank and file of Fourth Army.64   
Faced with these recriminations, brigadiers were swift to bring important factors 
that influenced battlefield performance to the attention of high command. Brigadier-
General A.C. Daly, GOC 6 Brigade, 2nd Division, highlighted the plight of his weary 
and depleted battalions in 
considering it his duty to bring the following facts to the notice [of his divisional 
commander that] the battalions of 6 Infantry Brigade will, by the time they are 
relieved tonight have spent 6 days and 6 nights in Delville Wood exposed to 
continuous shell fire. An attack undertaken now is with all the will in the world a 
different proposition to what it would have been a week ago with all the 
Battalions intact. The physical strain of the last 6 days…  has been very great 
and there is no use in blinking one’s eyes to the fact. Whilst he hoped that no 
misinterpretation would be placed on his report… the fighting spirit of the 
Brigade is entirely undermined [as] numbers are getting reduced [original 
emphasis].65 
 
 This protest proved of little avail: despite only seven days’ rest, 6 Brigade was 
detailed for further operations on 9 August. While casualties sustained over the six 
days in Delville Wood totalled 32 officers and 905 other ranks, 6 Brigade’s 
replacements amounted to only four officers and 69 other ranks. Daly’s concerns were 
also borne out by Major G. Dawes, OC 2/South Staffordshire, and corroborated by his 
Medical Officer, who said that 
the proposal to carry out an attack hurriedly planned with troops both physically 
and mentally fatigued was ill inspired. The insistence on disregarding the 
physical condition of the men after urgent protest by those on the spot who 
were in a position to judge and understand the facts of the case, I concluded 
and still conclude ill advised to the last degree. 
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With a large percentage of fresh reinforcements, many of whom without active service 
experience, he considered that ‘more harm was done to the efficiency of the battalion 
than can possibly be realised by days of rest and training’.66  Daly, concurred, and 
acknowledged that ‘the attack on the 9th inst. was ill advised and except for a miracle 
had no chance of success, whilst it was bound to cost the lives of many valuable 
officers, NCOs and men’.67  
Whilst a check was maintained by Fourth Army upon the number of days that 
each division spent in the front line, formations were liable to be sent into action 
irrespective of their fighting capacity.68 The brigades of 3rd Division, having spent 1-25 
July in the front line and losing 8,000 men, were considerably below strength. They 
were however sent into action on 15 August losing a further 1,900 before being 
withdrawn and sent north for recuperation.69 Units also suffered from a loss of regional 
identity as, in the face of mounting casualties and ‘at the expense of regimental “esprit 
de corps” [the War Office] posted reinforcement drafts to regiments other than their 
own’.70 Assimilation of drafts was a crucial element of the brigadier’s role. As Shea 
explained: 
The identity of the brigades of 30th Division that went into action on the 23rd and 
30th [of July] bore little resemblance to those who went over the parapet on July 
1st. This doubtless had an effect more realised within the units than without. 
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Stanley attributed the successful reception of fresh drafts into 89 Brigade to ‘a 
tremendous esprit de corps that carried us a long way’. Many of the men had no 
affiliation with the brigade and were expecting to be sent to battalions for which they 
had enrolled but were sent to where they were most required. Sensitive to the needs 
of his men and the new drafts, Stanley promoted measures to instil unit cohesion, 
whilst ministering to the wellbeing of his men. In sustaining a healthy command 
relationship, he had already introduced a scheme to acknowledge his men’s 
endeavours. This comprised the presentation of ‘little cards… that could be signed by 
Commanding Officers and counter-signed by the Brigadier… as a means of conveying 
to them and their relations at home the appreciation of those under whom they were 
serving’.72  Various opportunities existed for brigade staff to soften the hardship 
experienced by their men. These included the profits made from battalion canteens 
being redistributed in the form of free cigarettes, tobacco and matches. During the 
reorganisation of the brigade out of the line, this surplus provided cash for the 
purchase of fresh vegetables and provisions.73 
 Numerous sporting events and amusements were held with a great deal of 
friendly rivalry assisting in ‘pulling together the new troops [who] saw at once that they 
were welcomed amongst us’. These included inter-brigade sporting events, designed 
to bond the battalions of the respective brigades together. Both 90 and 91 Brigades 
‘consisted entirely of Manchester troops and [89’s] relations with these were of the 
friendly nature which added to a good honest feeling of rivalry which is the best thing 
we can have’.74  
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From Stanley’s evidence it can be assumed that he had forged a successful 
officer-man relationship within the brigade. The brigade diary demonstrates that the 
brigade was provided with adequate rest, fresh equipment, bathing facilities and 
recreation.75 For a command relationship to work effectively officers expected men to 
be loyal to their unit and by association to their officers. Conversely, the men expected 
loyalty and support from their officers: this was the traditional basis of the regimental 
system. Theoretically, the existence of a paternalistic/deferential dialectic ensured that 
obedience was given in return for an officer providing a courageous example and 
succour for the needs of his men before his own.76 Those brigadiers who maintained 
a face-to-face relationship with their men, were ideally placed to ensure the 
dissemination of this ethos.  
The establishment of command relationships also brought brigadiers face-to-
face with a contradiction of leadership in war: that commanders had to be willing to 
sacrifice those officers and men whose welfare he had nurtured in order to conform 
with operational orders. Much depended upon the calibre of the brigadier. For 
example, Sackville-West, of 21 Brigade considered that in the absence of sufficient 
artillery support on 23 July to ‘merely send forward more troops would have resulted 
in a useless sacrifice of lives’.77 Similarly, with regard to the needless loss of officers, 
Daly considered that:   
Whilst it was a glorious thing to die for one’s country [it is] much more useful to 
live for it. The British Soldier appreciates the fact that his Officers are prepared 
to be killed first [but] it is not at this stage of the war desirable for an Officer to 
go out of his way to give further proof of it.78  
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Despite the need to maintain a stable staff structure, once an efficient team had 
been established it remained at risk of being dismantled as the services of individuals 
were required elsewhere.  The loss of experienced and efficient Brigade Majors was 
keenly felt, not least than that of Captain E. Seymour of 89 Brigade whose ‘services 
to the Brigade [had] been absolutely invaluable [having]… endeared himself to all’.79 
Promoted to GSO2, Guards Division, his replacement was transferred from GSO3, 
55th Division, the natural route to a post as Brigade Major. The loss of an efficient 
officer impacted upon the efficacy of a brigade. Despite the shortage of trained staff 
officers, the Army did itself few favours by removing talented officers from the front line 
at inopportune moments of an offensive.  Nevertheless, this division had the lowest 
staff turnover of any TF formation, although as Paul Harris has demonstrated ‘no 
consistent pattern emerges…  to suggest differences in stability between regular, 
Territorial and New Army units’.80  
In relation to the reconstitution of brigades, that of 3rd Division’s 76 Brigade 
highlights the establishment of a uniform process of training. As Brigadier-General R.J.  
Kentish observed, each of his battalion COs had different ideas on training, being led 
by a Regular, TA and a Special Reserve Officer. Having ‘looked for direction from their 
Brigadier and got it’ a uniform system of training was eventually established through 
divisional command. This ensured that although ‘all Brigade staff were killed during 
the battle…because of our system we were able to retrain our ranks filled with men 
from all Battalions because of a system embedded in the heads of the COs’.81   
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  Fourth Army operations conducted between late July and early September 
proved costly and unproductive. Given insufficient time for planning, accurate 
reconnaissance or the coordination of combined tactics, command and control at 
brigade level was compromised.  Few opportunities arose for brigade commanders to 
exercise direct control of operations. Where opportunities did arise, they were chiefly 
confined to stabilising vulnerable situations. However, the capability of brigadiers to 
adapt to these circumstances marked a step in the progressive development of 
brigade command. Subject to the constraints of small scale and under-resourced 
attacks, the primary influence of the brigade staff was directed towards ameliorating 
the difficulties caused by lack of preparation and operational mismanagement. In 
accordance with the brigadier’s paternalistic role, in the face of high casualties, great 
emphasis was placed upon the material wellbeing of the brigade. XIII Corps’ command 
style encouraged a culture of open discussion and dialogue that ensured that the 
lessons were discussed and duly disseminated. This case study has demonstrated 
the flexibility of the brigadier’s role and their perpetual struggle to maintain the 
operational capacity of their brigades.  
2.6: XIV Corps: Brigade Operations at Flers-Courcelette and Morval, September 
1916 
This case study examines brigade operations of the Guards and 6th Divisions 
on the right of XIV Corps during Fourth Army’s offensive at Flers and Morval on 15 
September. This was the largest assault since 1 July with British casualties almost as 
heavy in relation to the numbers involved. Four areas of brigades’s influence are 
explored: training, preparation, communications and command and control. The 




lessons were learned from earlier attacks, to gauge as a measure of tactical 
development.  
III, XIV and XV Corps of Fourth Army attacked on a seven-mile frontage, 
supported by II Corps of the Reserve Army on the left flank. Operational orders laid 
down that the attack would be pressed ‘until the most distant of objectives [were] 
reached’.82 However, the geography of the corps’ frontage imposed its own logic on 
the operations, the German Third Line being located at the extreme limit of the British 
artillery range, with observation barely extending to the German Second Line. 
Furthermore, the disposition of the Guards’ brigades, with the heavily defended 
Quadrilateral to their right and Hop Alley to their left, meant that any failure on the part 
of the flank divisions would leave them dangerously exposed. In terms of logistics, it 
was also recognised that prospects of success would be determined by the difficulties 
entailed in moving men and material forward over the broken ground of ‘a high, 
waterless and roadless plateau’.83 The offensive saw the first use of tanks on the 
battlefield. These proved a mixed blessing, as on the front of 1(Guards) Brigade where 
‘the tank advance previous to zero hour produced little effect’.84 Thereafter no tanks 
operated within the Guards Division’s sector. 
The commander of XIV Corps was Lord Cavan. He was described as an officer 
‘cautious in his attitude to making progress and the new weapons of war’. 85  Cavan’s 
approach to command is illustrated by a document issued on 3 August 1916. This 
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endorsed the established principles of the BEF in promoting a less assertive style of 
command. Thus: 
Without wishing in any way to curb the initiative of Divisional Commanders, I 
should like to impress the following short memoranda on the minds of all, which 
are based on the experience of this battle, backed by the teaching of our text 
books.86 
 
 This guidance, whilst acknowledging that subordinate commanders resented 
encroachment on their perceived autonomy, provided the means to keep a check on 
their actions. Significantly, numerous principles in the memoranda were drawn from 
information solicited from the experiences of the brigadiers that highlighted an upward 
dissemination of information. The preparations also acknowledged the time required 
for the issue of operational order so that ‘they [could] be studied by subordinates and 
checked by Corps HQ’ [original emphasis].87 However, whilst these and other 
preparatory arrangements were designed to benefit brigades and battalions alike, the 
final arrangements were shaped by the irregularity of brigade frontages and the 
configuration of the German lines.  
2.7: Guards Division-Brigade Operations, 15 September 1916: Preparations 
Prior to its attack, the energies of 1(Guards) Brigade staff were focused upon a 
scheme of systematic training. This process represented the brigade’s efforts to 
embrace innovative methods, whilst endeavouring to mould a universal tactical 
doctrine. For ten days ‘every phase in an attack upon the enemy’s prepared positions 
was rehearsed… in conditions which were made as realistic as circumstances would 
allow’.88 The actual training was left to the COs with but Major-General G.P.T. Feilding, 
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GOC Guards Division and his brigadiers usually present. Through these measures ‘a 
uniformity of tactical doctrine was established throughout the division which was to 
prove of great value in the confused fighting in which the Guards were soon to be 
engaged’.89 The promotion of cascade learning represented an economic approach to 
the training. For example, a rota was introduced to ensure that all companies 
underwent a period of elementary bombing practice under the supervision of the 
Brigade Bombing Officer. By this means it was hoped that in the future ‘Companies 
could do their own training and allow of more advanced training to be done by the 
Brigade Bombing Officer’.90 As the brigade’s objectives had not be finalised, 
formations for attacks on variable objectives were practiced, with the primacy of 
consolidation with Lewis guns being stressed. Drawing upon the memoranda issued 
by XIV Corps on 3 August, exercises in ‘getting men across No-Man’s Land in the 
shortest time’ were undertaken. More specific guidance as to the shape of formations 
was not addressed, except that ‘brigades and battalions should adopt dispositions 
which would allow for the purpose of establishing a defensive flank’.91  
 Other brigade training highlighted some of the tactical and technological 
innovations shaping tactics. In anticipating the support of tanks ‘great attention was 
paid to training in open warfare’ although there is little evidence that the infantry and 
tank crews were afforded time for combined exercises.92 Infantry-tank training prior to 
the Battle of Flers remained haphazard and restricted, which partly explains why 
cooperation between the two arms was not particularly successful. The only direct 
evidence of training within XIV Corps is that of an exercise undertaken by 7/Middlesex, 
56th (1st London) Division, on 26 August, where Haig observed that ‘the demonstration 
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was encouraging… but we require to clear our ideas as to the tactical handling of these 
machines’.93 Further opportunities for the brigades to develop coordinated tactics were 
curtailed by essential battle preparations and constant demonstrations of the new 
weapons.94 Overall however, the training schemes initiated by the brigades of XIV 
Corps reflected their capacity to adapt to the changing nature of warfare.  
 The brigade arrangements for assembly were subject to the irregularity of 
brigade frontages in relation to the designated objectives. These factors created great 
problems for brigade staff. The allotted dispositions for 1(Guards) Brigade ‘could not 
have been worse’ shaped as they were by an irregular and exposed 500-yard semi-
circular line with no suitable trenches for assembly.95  This misalignment, curving 
backwards on both flanks, rendered it impossible to launch an attack from a position 
parallel to the objectives without the simultaneous advance of the flank divisions.  
Despite efforts of the brigade staff and the 1/Grenadier Guards to straighten the line, 
a gross underestimation of the ambitious objectives, ranging in error from 400 yards 
on the first, to 1,000 yards on the fourth objective, left the brigade hopelessly exposed. 
In relation to these dispositions, Brigadier-General C.E. Pereira, GOC 1(Guards) 
Brigade argued that  
it would seem worthwhile always carrying out minor operations before hand to 
give troops a straight line at their objectives… and a straight line and not a semi-
circular barrage in front of the leading troops.96 
 
   
  Preparations for the attack of 2(Guards) Brigade followed a similar pattern, the 
formation for the attack being on a restricted 400-yard frontage.97 Given these 
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circumstances Brigadier-General J. Ponsonby considered that ‘it [was] not possible to 
lay down any hard-and-fact attack formations’ as the frontage did not conform to the 
ideal of 6-800 yards. Instead, he reminded his brigadiers of the ‘certain principles 
which represent an ideal to which arrangements should always conform as the 
circumstances arise’, especially the necessity of forming up within 50 yards of the front 
line, in strength in number to ‘provide a man every other yard in each of the objectives 
when gained’. In the event, three alternative forms of attack were proposed, the views 
of the battalion commanders invited, and the conclusions of the meeting circulated in 
the form of ‘Notes of the Attack’.98 A further conference was then held, to address 
questions arising from this memorandum. Amongst the conclusions drawn ‘it was 
decided… according to the view of the majority of the officers present that the first line 
of attack should not go through to the last objective’.99  
 Ultimately, the arrangements settled upon by 2(Guards) Brigade staff consisted 
of a formation of four platoons per battalion, arranged in successive waves ten yards 
apart compressed into a semi-circular and cramped position.100 This unfavourable 
disposition was proposed by Major Roche, CO 2/Irish Guards who had recognised 
that the original area for assembly was susceptible to ‘a regular barrage… put down 
along the east edge of Ginchy’. It was later agreed that this decision (in spite of the 
difficulties involved) … had alone avioded [sic] very heavy losses in the twenty minutes 
preceding the attack’.101 Even so ‘no adequate landmarks could be found… to put out 
marking boards for alignment for the Brigade on a compass bearing… the Irish Guards 
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already in the line [planning] the relief most carefully and directing units as they came 
up’.102  
The work of the brigade staff in arranging the safe assembly and advance of 
the battalions cannot be overestimated. The influence of narrow brigade frontages and 
dominant enemy defences called for an accurate knowledge of brigade sectors. This 
was not always achievable. For example, whilst XIV Corps was well advanced with 
implementing the preliminary measures for the attack, the brigades were aware by 11 
September ‘that assembly trenches were out of the question for want of time’. This 
error would suggest that not all lessons of the previous operations had been learned, 
brigade officers having consistently voiced their concerns at the lack of time available 
for preparations.103 In relation to a lack of reconnaissance, it is notable that the attack 
of 2(Guards) Brigade was checked by the existence of an unknown, heavily manned 
trench, reinforced by a switch line which had proved unidentifiable from the air.104 
The work undertaken by the staff of the Guards Division’s brigades at Flers 
highlighted the staff’s influence upon the assembly, formation and direction of attack 
of their battalions. The staff’s ability to ameliorate the effect of irregular brigade 
frontages was a further step in the evolution of brigade command. This process was 
assisted by the support of experienced officers from other divisions. Prior to the attack, 
a meeting was convened at 2(Guards) Brigade HQ to discuss the imminent offensive 
with officers who had recent experience on the same ground.105 It is likely that 
information regarding the ground to be crossed and the disposition of the German lines 
would have been provided by Brigadier-General Lord Esme Gordon-Lennox, GOC 95 
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Brigade of 5th Division, his brigade having recently taken three objectives in the 
German Second Position. Having been supplied with accurate communication by both 
air and ground observers throughout this operation, he noted that the attack 
‘undertaken from the forward slope of a hill in packed trenches hastily constructed’ 
had come as a complete surprise to the enemy.106 Based therefore upon a thorough 
reconnaissance of 5th Division’s frontage ‘in preparation for the main attack [of 15 
September] a most excellent and accurate’ description of the battlefield was produced 
and shared amongst the Guards’ brigade officers.107  
Communications and accurate intelligence were the lifeblood of brigade 
command. The arrangements of 2(Guards) Brigade highlighting the priority given to 
these procedures. In readiness for the operations, the Guards Divisional Signal 
Company arranged comprehensive training for 27 men of 1(Guards) Brigade, three 
allotted to brigade headquarters and six to each of the battalions. All personnel of the 
Brigade Signal Company were provided with three days of intensive map reading 
instruction. However, the distribution of trench maps was not a strong point.  On 
numerous occasions ‘maps on which great effort had been put forth at Army HQ never 
reached the front-line troops at all… the machinery for distribution [not going] beyond 
Divisional HQ’.108 No special sheets appeared to have been issued by Fourth Army 
for the tanks or for the preliminary bombardment.109   
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The innovative employment of contact aircraft to provide the earliest information 
on the progress of the battle was welcomed by the British commanders.110 On 
occasions the use of contact aircraft proved useful for retaining command control.111  
At other times however, ‘cases occurred in which the Corps knew more of the tactical 
situation and of the position of the troops than the Brigades to which the troops 
belonged’.112  Such a situation arose on 15 September at Flers, where conflicting 
reports from brigade headquarters and those from the contact aircraft continued 
throughout the morning of the battle. To address the difficulties encountered in 
maintaining communication between ground troops and the aircrew, all company, 
battalion and brigade officers of 1(Guards) Brigade attended a lecture at No. 9 
Squadron R.F.C. HQ for instruction in the use of contact patrols.113 The tasking, 
disseminating and analysing of air photographs was an innovative step that assisted 
in the planning of operations and provided valuable intelligence on enemy dispositions. 
By embracing these innovative measures, brigade staff demonstrated their capacity 
for flexibility and adaptation. Conversely, an emphasis was placed upon standard 
battle procedures, with Ponsonby of 2(Guards) Brigade impressing upon his 
subordinate commanders ‘the necessity of scrupulous care in dating and timing 
messages [and] addressing and signing them’. It had been previously noted that 
messages received at brigade headquarters had caused ‘confusion… and were a 
common cause of loss and failure’.114 After operations on 25 September, brigade 
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officers were instructed to revisit FSR1 and the Field Pocket Book to reinforce their 
understanding of the issue of orders and the transmission of messages.115  
The transformation of staff responsibilities at this stage in the evolution of 
brigade command demanded a more responsive approach to combat conditions and 
more professionalism and better teamwork. On this basis, the training and 
organisation in preparation for operations at Flers left nothing to be desired. Measures 
to moderate the difficulties caused by the brigades’s dispositions were vigorously 
implemented. New methods of obtaining intelligence and the maintenance of 
communications were adopted to assist in planning and maintaining command and 
control. The shared experiences and information disseminated by brigadiers of other 
divisions provided evidence of a robust learning process. All these measures point to 
the enhanced role of the brigadier as the ultimate leader and coordinator of his brigade 
whilst reflecting the BEF’s capabilities for adaptation and innovation. 
2.8: The attack of the Guards and 6th Divisions. 
When examining the operations of 15 September, two lines of research were 
pursued: the initial lack of cohesion and the consequent loss of command and control. 
The lack of coordination between the Guards and 6th Divisions was rooted in difficulties 
in establishing a common line of assembly upon irregular brigade frontages.116 To 
some extent the barrage lines were arranged to conform with this misalignment, with 
the barrage supporting 6th Division advancing 500 yards beyond the enemy defences 
and several hundred yards behind that of the Guards. This arrangement provided an 
echeloned frontage and flank protection. In the event 6th Division’s barrage did not 
coincide with that of the Guards Division. Major-General C. Ross, GOC 6th Division, 
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conceded that ‘it had been impossible to coordinate the action of the artillery’ as 
ordered for the support of 16 and 71 Brigades. This he blamed upon a failure to bring 
the artillery under centralised command: ‘one portion of the artillery covering the front 
being under the orders of the Guards Division and the other under the 56th Division’. 
This left ‘the whole matter to the Infantry Brigades and their Group Commander’.117    
The lack of accurate artillery support was addressed by both brigade 
commanders, who  corroborated Ross’ view that ‘the German lines ‘lay not behind the 
crest but down the slope on the British side’.118 Brigadier-General J.F. Edwards GOC 
71 Brigade recorded that ‘at 9am… our shells appeared to be falling over the 
Quadrilateral and consequently the GOC ordered the range to be shortened at 
11.55am’.119 By that time the Quadrilateral, which dominated XIV Corps frontage, had 
inflicted heavy losses on both 16 and 71 Brigades, their lack of progress exposing both 
1 and 2(Guards) Brigades to heavy enfilade machine gun fire. Consequently, the 
1/Coldstream of 2(Guards) Brigade, inclined to the left to gain touch with the right of 1 
(Guards) Brigade and came under the protection of the latter’s creeping barrage. This 
movement to the left drew in two further battalions. Thus: 
The change in direction caused by the intensity of the MG fire… to a certain 
extent broke up the attack of 2 Guards and led to an intermingling of units, 
officers and men fighting forward in small groups without paying much attention 
to what was happening on the flanks.120 
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This combination of events was sparked by attempts to mitigate the difficulties 
caused by the irregularity of the brigade frontages and ‘a failure to set brigade 
objectives upon topographical and tactical features rather than the arbitrary lines that 
nowhere coincided with the German trenches’.121 Inflexibility of the artillery barrages 
reflected the difficulties encountered by the British gunners in accommodating 
changes in timing and objective. Moreover, the initial impact of the tank was diluted by 
its mechanical vulnerability, both leading brigades of 6th Division losing their support 
in the early stages of the battle. This loss was felt especially by 71 Brigade which had 
been reliant ‘upon the tanks to carry the line of trench in front of the first objective, 25 
to 30 minutes in front of the infantry’.122 The deployment of the tanks also interfered 
with the arrangements for the barrage, drew attention to the infantry attack and 
attracted heavy machine gun fire. 
Given an early loss of momentum, with the strength of the Guards’ battalions 
reduced to as little as 200, the tactical control of brigade command was essentially 
confined to the reorganisation of mixed units and the consolidation of the ground 
gained. However, these measures were hampered by a lack of reliable information 
which influenced the deployment of reserves. With telephonic and visual 
communication forward of 1(Guards) Brigade HQ lost, and reliant upon the use of 
runners and pigeons, great difficulty was experienced in maintaining touch with the 
Coldstream Guards in order to establish their exact positions. Because BHQ believed 
that they would be bound to be in touch, all messages were directed through 
2/Grenadiers HQ. In reality ‘the 2/Grenadiers were unaware of the position of the 
2/Coldstreams’.123 Throughout the day therefore, conflicting reports as to whether 
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forward parties of the battalions had been established on the third objective passed 
through brigade headquarters. Only when it was confirmed, by a contact aircraft, at 
corps headquarters that the Third Line had not been taken, did Cavan ‘on his own 
responsibility’ take the decision to bombard the objective.124   
The conflicting reports received at brigade headquarters compromised the 
fleeting opportunities for brigadiers to sustain the advance, exacerbated by a shortage 
of reserves. Ponsonby of 2(Guards) Brigade endeavoured throughout the morning to 
obtain reserves to capitalise upon what he understood was a disorganised enemy.125 
Reporting later, he stated that ‘there was a universal belief amongst the officers of the 
Brigade that had it been possible to throw in a strong reserve at any time between 
9am and 2pm… a decisive advantage would have been secured’. However, on 
reflection he admitted that ‘the strength necessary in such reserves and the possibility 
of throwing them in on a sufficient scale are questions beyond the purview of this 
Brigade’.126 A late deployment of reserves also influenced Ponsonby’s ability to 
establish enough forces to enable the resumption of the attack the following day, 
orders having been received to consolidate the ground gained. A battalion of 1 
(Guards) Brigade was detached but by the time it was deployed the most advanced 
parties of the brigade had been forced to retire, as Lieutenant-Colonel E. Mackenzie 
explained: 
as far as I can make out I am the only officer left of the 1 Battalion Coldstream 
Guards and I have collected in all about 65 men. I am hoping that I may be able 
to collect more men of the Battalion as they emerge from shell holes after 
dark.127 
 
124 TNA, WO 95/910, XIV Corps WD, 15 September 1916. 
125 TNA, WO 95/1217, 2(Guards) Brigade WD, 2pm 15 September. 
126 Ibid, appendix 6, ‘Report on Experiences in the Attack, September 15’. 
127 TNA, WO 95/1217, 2(Guards) Brigade WD, 1/Coldstream Guards HQ to 2 Guards Brigade HQ, message sent 





 The operations of the brigades of 6th and Guards Divisions on 15 September 
highlight the limitations of tactical flexibility at brigade level. Having organised 
measures designed to mitigate the difficulties of assembly and the initial advance, the 
brigade commanders capability to influence the course of the attack was determined 
by factors beyond their immediate control. Fleeting opportunities to deploy reserves, 
in accordance with the principles laid down in FSR1, were handicapped by insufficient 
manpower. The breakdown in communications forward of brigade headquarters made 
it extremely difficult to take an advantage of fleeting opportunities, whilst the BEF’s 
machinery for command and control remained, as Brian Hall has argued, in ‘a tactical 
void’.128 
This case study has focused upon the areas of training, preparation, 
communications and tactical proficiency that constituted some of the responsibilities 
of brigade staff. It has demonstrated that despite the energy and foresight of brigade 
command, operations were shaped by a combination of topographical, logistic and 
technological shortcomings. The success of the Guards’ brigades, in capturing a 
portion of the second objective, was tempered by heavy losses caused by an irregular 
line of advance and ‘a bombardment which in terms of the revised method of 
defence… was not of such an intensity as to ensure a reasonable chance of 
success’.129 The tanks deployed to support the Guards had problems, accurate 
observation of the German lines proved haphazard and communication was 
inconsistent. Command and control at brigade level were thus essentially limited to 
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organisation, the deployment of reserves where opportunities arose and the 
stabilisation of difficult situations.    
  The renewal of operations on 25 September was considered by Brigadier-
General C.E. Pereira, GOC 1(Guards) Brigade as ‘different from the last in that the 
whole scheme was not such an ambitious one’ with ‘every spare moment spent… 
preparing narratives of the previous operation’.130 Aimed at a single German trench 
system and a group of villages- Gueudecourt, Lesbouefs and Morval – the assault was 
preceded by a bombardment some 40% more intensive than that of 15 September. 
Less ambitious objectives were allotted to the brigades: the distance between the 
three objectives for 1(Guards) Brigade were reduced to 300, 800 and 1,300 yards, in 
each case ‘the objective [being clearly] defined and not merely a line drawn across the 
map’.131 To aid units over unknown ground, large scale maps were sent to all battalions 
early enough to allow for detailed study and for ‘all runners and signallers [to identify] 
the position of the Advanced Brigade Report Centre and the best approaches to it’.132 
With the advent of semi-mobile operations, the importance of the ‘man on the 
spot’ was accentuated, as evident in the attack of 1(Guards) Brigade. Pereira laid 
down that the attack would be undertaken in two waves, to avoid overcrowding, with 
‘2/Grenadier Guards sending up such support as is required and follow up when they 
consider the time is suitable to do so’.133 This arrangement was not to the satisfaction 
of the CO 2/Grenadier Guards, who considered it would be better to attack in three 
waves, 75 yards apart, with battalion HQ advancing with the third. By this means, he 
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suggested, the whole battalion would not be ‘on top of the ground at the same time 
and [would] leave a company at the disposal of the CO in case anything unforeseen 
should occur’.134 Having agreed to this request, Pereira issued an amendment to the 
operational order stating that ‘the Brigadier considers this will give Battalion 
Commanders latitude to carry out the assault according their suggestions’.135 These 
arrangements highlight a progression of devolved responsibility at brigade level with 
an emphasis upon flexibility and the deployment of reserves.  
 In the event, the battalions of the Guards Division were subject to mixed fortune. 
On the right of the attack, 1(Guards) Brigade was held up by three belts of uncut wire, 
reminiscent of the experiences of 16 and 71 Brigades at the Quadrilateral on 15 
September where the artillery had failed to pinpoint their targets with any accuracy. 
Thus:  
the co-operation of the Artillery was remarkable for its absence and a great deal 
of ammunition was uselessly expended on ground where no Germans were 
and places where Germans could be seen were left untouched.136  
 
In what constituted a gross oversimplification the Guards Division’s historian later 
recorded that ‘all went well with the infantry attack and there is little to record from the 
artillery point of view, except the by no means invariable information that the infantry 
was “highly satisfied with the covering barrage.”’137 Other battalions took their 
objectives with little loss, those of 3(Guards) Brigade suffering only 14 casualties.138 
 
134 Ibid, GOC 2/Grenadier Guards to GOC 1(Guards) Brigade, memorandum 23 September 1916. 
135 Ibid, amendment to OO. No. 77, paragraph 11, 23 September 1916. 
136 TNA, WO 95/1215, 2/Grenadiers WD, ‘Narrative of Events for 24-25 September 1916. 
137 Headlam, The Guards Division, p.186 with reference to TNA, WO 95/1203,75 Brigade R.F.A. WD, September 
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 In the aftermath of operations at Flers and Morval, the capture and 
dissemination of knowledge, based upon a systematic process of evaluation, 
flourished at brigade level. Pereira concluded that ‘from the attacks on September 15 
and 25 many of the lessons from the previous fighting on the Somme have been 
emphasised, while new points have been brought to light’ and itemised the lessons in 
rank order. The primacy of intelligence and reconnaissance remained supreme. Prior 
to an attack, Pereira stressed that, ‘Infantry Officers with Artillery representatives must 
inspect the wire and make a final reconnaissance’.139 Some tactical measures, the 
necessity of hugging close to the barrage, were reinforced. Others reflected guidance 
provided by the corps commander and substantiated at divisional level; for example, 
the necessity of getting men across No-Man’s Land as swiftly as possible: on 25 
September the German barrage came down on the British front line within one minute 
of zero hour. In compliance with training in open warfare, the action taken in the 
capture of the final objective was stressed, asserting the need for rapid consolidation 
and pushing out patrols to secure the final objective. To maximise the efficient 
employment of Artillery Liaison Officers, Pereira considered ‘that they should be only 
sent forward to establish FOOs when the situation is established’.140 Particular 
attention was focused upon the use of new technology with Pereira suggesting that 
‘tanks should be used for clearing the enemy trenches out of such positions as may 
hamper the immediate formation of trenches for the attack’.141 Similarly, the 
experience gained from the use of contact aircraft was evaluated in relation to ground 
to air communication.142 
 
139 TNA, WO 95/1213, 1(Guards) Brigade WD, appendix 6, ‘Lessons to be Learnt from the Operations of 15 and 
25 September 1916’. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid, No.2339, ‘Lessons learnt from operations’, p.2, 5 October 1916. 




  The lessons drawn from the Guards’ brigade operations were collated, shared 
with the subordinate officers and disseminated to divisional HQ where ‘a Report had 
been called for by the Army Commander’.143 In accordance with their role in ensuring 
that the battalions were possessed of individual skills, specific programmes of training 
were then drawn up by the brigade commanders with Ponsonby suggesting ‘that all 
units should have had some careful training in the following subjects during the 10 
days available’. These included practice attacks ‘across diagonal obstacles without 
losing direction’. It would be reasonable to presume that this exercise was in response 
to 2(Guards) Brigade having to deal with an unidentified switch line during their attack 
on 15 September.144 Acknowledging the inexperience of young officers and NCOs, 
training revisited basic fieldcraft exercises, in response to the difficulties encountered 
in traversing a featureless landscape, officers being ‘taught to take compass bearings 
on different points and to find their own positions by intersection of bearings’.145  
2.9: Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the brigade operations undertaken by Fourth 
Army’s XIII and XIV Corps on the Somme. There are four principal conclusions relating 
to the factors that influenced brigade operational performance. First, brigade battlefield 
performance was related to the style of command practiced by the corps commander. 
This conclusion supports Simkins’s argument that ‘bearing in mind the various 
strengths and weaknesses of the corps commanders… it mattered what corps you 
were in at a given time than how many corps you passed through’.146 In relation to XII 
Corps it has been demonstrated that a stable command structure was beneficial to 
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unit cohesion and organisational uniformity. The culture of inclusiveness nurtured by   
Lieutenant-General Sir W. Congreve was reflected in the relationships at divisional 
and brigade level where Major-General J.S.M. Shea, GOC 30th Division ‘showed 
extraordinary personal interest in everyone’ to the mutual benefit of all ranks.147 The 
role of brigade command in the BEF’s learning process is exemplified in Major-General 
W.T. Furse’s instructions to the brigadiers of 9th (Scottish) Division in that they 
‘must…dig out and clarify by close discussion the lessons of the fighting so far that we 
may do even better in the future… [and so] get down to facts. I want all brigadiers, 
both artillery and infantry, C.R.E. and all COs…to organise an investigation at once’.148 
In relation to XIV Corps’ prevailing style of command, Lieutenant-General Earl of 
Cavan, whilst maintaining stringent control of his subordinates, also encouraged a 
culture of inclusiveness and learning. Thus, information was upwardly disseminated 
and lessons learnt, whilst ‘many Brigadiers’ were consulted upon their favoured means 
of attack.149 Similarly, Cavan did not order but made ‘an appeal to all divisional 
commanders’ to ensure that they got their troops across no man’s land as quick as 
possible to avoid the German counter-bombardment.150 This style of command 
suggests the existence of a healthy working relationship that encouraged initiative and 
proved beneficial to brigade commanders.  
A second conclusion relates to the degree of tactical control enjoyed by brigade 
commanders. Of the Fourth Army operations examined, it can be safely assumed that   
brigadiers benefited from the inclusive style of command that prevailed within XIII and 
XIV Corps. This was however basically limited to the initial planning process and the 
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sharing of knowledge and expertise. Whether or not a brigadier was free to exercise 
tactical control during the battle depended upon the establishment of fundamental 
preconditions, as discussed earlier in this thesis. Of these the sustainability of 
communication, sufficient fire-power and a flexible programme of artillery support were 
crucial in retaining command and control. A case in point was the attack of 1 and 2 
(Guards) Brigades at Flers where communication was cut forward of the BHQs with a 
subsequent loss of tactical control and the inability to take advantage of fleeting 
opportunities in the deployment of reserves. The attack also exposed the problems 
generated by inflexible artillery programmes and the inability of subordinate 
commanders to call upon artillery support. Major-General C. Ross, 6th Division, 
claimed that on Cavan’s orders he had not been ‘permitted to alter objectives’ or call 
upon artillery support having been informed that ‘the tanks were to flabbergast the 
enemy’, a claim later refuted by the corps commander.  
Where brigades were left relatively powerless in the absence of the 
preconditions crucial for operational success, the roles of brigade staff were principally 
confined to preparation and organisation, the safe assembly of battalions and the 
appropriate formations for attack. In the aftermath of operations, the brigade staff’s 
work focused upon the wellbeing of their men, unit morale and the successful 
reconstitution of their brigades. This reflected the brigade staffs’ capability for 
adaptability and innovation in their multi-functional role.  
 A third conclusion drawn from the case studies indicates that brigade 
operational performance was related to the topography of the battlefield. The success 
of the brigades of XIII Corps on 1 July was in part due to the disposition of brigade 
sectors where full advantage was taken of the observation afforded the British artillery. 




frontages over terrain lending itself to strong defences. The attack of XIV Corps at 
Flers was also delivered from cramped, irregular positions, dominated by the enemy 
lines and prone to enfiladed machine gun fire. 
 A fourth conclusion is that brigade operational performance was shaped by the 
scale of the offensive. This was reflected in the degree of tactical influence exercised 
by the brigade commander, in relation to the manpower, artillery and logistical support 
invested in the offensive. The operational and logistical preparations for the opening 
of the Somme offensive were unprecedented, with ample time afforded to brigades to 
make their own arrangements. In contrast, the multi-division battles of early July 
degenerated into diluted, ill-conceived, narrow-front attacks. Fourth Army’s 
sophisticated offensive on 15 September was bedevilled by technological errors, poor 
communication and a flawed system of devolved operational command. In line with 
that of the wider BEF, the operational and tactical transformation of brigade command 
was erratic and regressive.    
 Having examined operations conducted under Fourth Army on the Somme, the 
next chapter takes a similar approach by evaluating the brigades of Fifth Army during 
operations on the Ancre in November 1916. It then evaluates the minor operations 
conducted during the advance upon the Hindenburg Line during the spring of 1917 to 
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The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to examine the development of 
brigade command during Fifth Army’s operations on the Ancre in November 1916. 
These operations, combining V Corps to the north and II Corps to the south of the 
river, were generally a success and effectively ended the campaign for the winter.1  
The second aim is to evaluate the minor brigade actions conducted by the two corps 
during the advance to the Hindenburg Line in early 1917. These actions were 
considered by ‘from the tactical point of view… worthy of more detailed study [to] bring 
out the increase in skill in warfare of this type gained by the British Armies in the past 
six months’.2   
 The chapter poses three research questions. First, to what extent was brigade 
command able to respond to the consistent factors that shaped operations on the 
Western Front? Second, to what extent did these responses conform to the BEF’s 
capability for adaptation and learning? Third, to what extent did the style of command 
of the corps in which a brigade served influence its operational performance? The 
research focused upon three factors: preparations, communications and command 
and control. 
 
1  Fifth Army was supported by Fourth Army’s XIII Corps which provided flank protection north of the Ancre.  




 Before examining the case studies, it is necessary to establish the 
characteristics of command in Fifth Army. As Simpson has demonstrated, in contrast 
to Fourth Army, whose corps commanders were afforded more responsibility, ‘Fifth 
Army exhibited a different way of doing things’.3 In response to what he considered 
their relative inexperience, General Sir Hubert Gough was inclined to keep a tight grip 
over his subordinate commanders. This approach, as Sheffield and McCartney 
argued, departed from the principles of FSR1 which warned against the danger of 
proscribing to subordinate commanders at a distance anything they should be better 
able to decide on the spot.4 Instead, it was laid down that ‘the choice of the manner in 
which the task assigned to each body of troops is to be performed should be left to its 
commander’.5 Whilst, as the Official History claimed, Gough ‘consulted his subordinate 
commanders freely’, the extent to which their advice was heeded remains debatable.6 
For example, Major-General G.M. Lindsay, brigade major of 99 Brigade, 2nd Division, 
related how Brigadier-General R. O. Kellett’s observations upon the deteriorating state 
of the ground were overridden before his brigade’s attack on 13 November.7 
 A Fifth Army memorandum drawing upon lessons of earlier operations was 
issued to divisional and brigade commanders in October 1916. This was intended to 
introduce uniformity to the exercise of command. Overall, the guidance encapsulated 
Gough’s views that attacking troops should advance as far and as fast as possible and 
should be given as many as five objectives. These views, however, failed to recognise 
that at this point in the war it was unreasonable ‘to ask tired and relatively 
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inexperienced troops to attempt five consecutive attacks’.8  Measures were however 
advocated to assist brigade commanders in retaining a firm control on operations. With 
regard to the position of brigade headquarters, these measures were in contrast to the 
guidance issued by Fourth Army in late 1915 stating that brigadiers should not place 
themselves in a forward position. Instead, it was suggested that they should be 
established ‘in an advanced position, being a serious error, almost an unpardonable 
one when [they] do not go forward as their formation advances’.9 Even this measure 
did not sufficiently consider the maintenance of communications which remained an 
essential precondition to operational success. Overall, Gough’s unrealistic objectives, 
combined with the impact of unfavourable terrain and overstretched divisions, 
adversely influenced brigade operations.  To a degree these difficulties were mitigated 
by the style of command exercised at corps level, as demonstrated below. 
3.2: II Corps – Brigade Operations on the Ancre   
Having assumed command of II Corps in May 1916, Lieutenant-General Claud 
Jacob transformed its fighting efficiency. This was achieved through providing 
continuity of thought, leadership and systematic organisation to the benefit of 
subordinate command. The establishment of a stable command structure was 
reflected in the retention of its command staff and the operational experience they 
provided. In relation to the appointment of brigadiers, as Hodgkinson has 
demonstrated, out of a sample of 50 first appointments of COs to brigadier command 
between 1914-1918 only 28% were ‘within corps’ appointments.10 This indicates the 
existence of a talent-spotting system on the Western Front for promotable officers as 
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the services of experienced COs were sought by corps commanders in their efforts to 
establish a successful command structure. The brigade appointments in II Corps 
reflect Jacob’s desire to retain the services of his brigadiers. Brigadier-General T.P.D. 
Ternan’s tenure as GOC 102 Brigade lasted 549 days. The brigadiers of 1st Division 
averaged 358 days tenure up to 1 July 1916, with Brigadier-General H.R. Davies, GOC 
3 Brigade serving 495 days.11 The brigadiers of 11th, 12th and 23rd Divisions averaged 
220, 197 and 164 days consecutively.12 The length of service for brigadiers in 34th 
Division was not as consistent with four changes of command within ten months.  
Nevertheless, all brigadiers serving within II Corps on the Somme, except for 
Brigadier-General Hornby, GOC 116 Brigade, were replaced by March 1917. These 
changes were attributable to sickness, injury and a need for rest from the existence of 
life on the front line. 
 Jacob was considered by Brigadier-General J.L. Jack of 9th Division’s GOC 28 
Brigade as ‘one of the soundest, most considerate High Commanders’.13 As one of 
the few officers willing to stand up to Hubert Gough, ‘ there [was] nothing “slapdash” 
about any of his arrangements; all are most carefully prepared, and he never 
[sacrificed] his men needlessly’.14 In keeping in  close contact with his subordinate 
commanders he ‘always knew the situation of everyone  and the condition of his 
troops’.15 The benefits of this support  was evident before 29th Division’s attack at the 
Schwaben Redoubt on 14 October. Brigadier-General E.H. Finch-Hatton, GOC 118 
Brigade was approached by Lieutenant-Colonel E. Riddell, CO 1/1 Cambridgeshires, 
to request substantial support for his battalion. This included the assistance of three 
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divisional artillery groups and corps artillery. Through the intervention of Finch-Hatton 
and Major-General H. De B. De Lisle, GOC 29th Division, the request was duly 
sanctioned by Jacob, who considered that ‘as [Riddell] had to do the job, he intended 
to do everything he could to help… and that he [Riddell] should meet with the CRAs 
to outline his plan’.16    
 Given the efficiency of Jacob’s BGGS, Brigadier-General P. Howell ‘on more 
than one occasion, as Earl Stanhope maintained ‘divisions made almost super-human 
efforts either to remain with the corps or to get back to it at the earliest opportunity’.17 
The style of command favoured by Jacob also lessened the workload on brigade staff 
by simplifying the formulation of operational orders. This was established before II 
Corps’ attack at Thiepval in September, setting a pattern for future operations. 
What is required by the Corps Commander is a brief rough summary, compiled 
by Divisional staff… of how the units taking part in an attack propose to carry 
out the actual execution. Copies of Division or Brigade orders which quite right 
allot the tasks do not give this information and need not necessarily be 
forwarded. It is not the intention of the Corps commander to interfere in these 
details.18 
 
These instructions deferred to the ‘man on the spot’, as laid down in FSR1 and were 
intended to provide brigade command with enhanced flexibility. This approach also 
provides an early example of the compression of standard battle procedures. To 
compensate for extremely detailed operational orders written by brigade staff ‘working 
on a scale and in conditions in which they had no experience’, a less prescriptive 
approach acknowledged the value of self-reliance.19 However Jacob still maintained 
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firm control by ensuring that a continuity of policy was maintained, as, for example, 
demonstrated in the corps defensive measures.20  
 The systematic process of tactical evaluation established within II Corps also 
benefited brigade command.  Summaries relating to operations were gathered from 
divisional and brigade staff to assist in future guidance, by noting those methods that 
succeeded and ‘those opinions [which] are known to be divided’.21 This information 
was supplemented by details of operations undertaken by the French and Canadian 
forces.22 A robust and universal scheme of instruction then ensured that tactical 
lessons were ‘thoroughly rubbed into the ranks down to the lowest… so as to be 
practically independent after the attack has started’.23 With the value placed on 
reconnaissance and a thorough knowledge of brigade sectors, prior to operations at 
Thiepval, arrangement were made ‘to acquaint all company battalion and brigade 
commanders with the ground’ a lecture by the BGGS establishing ‘the local situation 
on this particular front’.’24 The benefits afforded to the brigades of II Corps were 
manifest. A methodical command style, systematic organisation and continuity of 
leadership provided a firm framework for brigade development.  Where opportunities 
arose, the opinions of subordinate commanders were given due weight, with the 
brigade staff’s contribution to tactical evaluation pointing to their role as facilitators of 
change and capacity for adaptability. 
 Despite these benefits, the operational performance of the brigades of II Corps 
remained subject to the influence of universal factors. The consistent impact of terrain 
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on operations was compounded by the technical and logistic difficulties encountered 
by the artillery. These problems were exacerbated by a shortage of trained manpower 
were an additional constraint on brigades which had lost heavily. Figures released to 
the Manpower District Board on 26 September indicated that the BEF was short of 
80,000 men and that no more than 105,000 would be sent to France over the next 
three months. In addition, it was estimated that by 15 March 1917, a further 400,000 
men would be required to maintain the present complement of divisions up to 
strength.25 These figures highlight the difficulties of maintaining the fighting strength of 
battalions. For the brigade commander, the consistent ‘churn’ of officers and men 
constituted a perpetual challenge to fighting efficiency and morale of his brigade. For 
example, the brigades of 51st (Highland) Division suffered a 45% casualty rate during 
the attack on Beaumont Hamel in November 1916, with 123 officers and 2355 OR 
killed, wounded or missing.26 Significantly below fighting strength at the 
commencement of operations, with only 91 officers and 1986 OR, the casualties in 
153 Brigade alone amounted to 47 officers and 851 OR.27 This equated to a loss within 
the brigade of 51% of officers and 23% of OR. 
 The importance shortfall in manpower and the problems of reconstituting 
brigades can be illustrated by the case of 39th Division. The casualties suffered by the 
division in its attack of 3 September at Beaumont Hamel amounted to 2,600. By 13 
November, a total of three battalions had been reconstituted, although ‘in the case of 
a further three others… the present strength exceeded the reinforcements received by 
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[only] a small margin’.28 This placed undue stress on the overstretched division 
detailed to hold 5,300 yards of the most important position on Fifth Army’s front as ‘it 
took over the front held by 2nd Division… in addition to that held at the moment’.29 The 
shortage resulted in the battalions spending an average of 22 as opposed to 
approximately 14 days in fire or support trenches ‘with some… having done as much 
as 28 and 35 days out of 36’. Given these circumstances, it was considered by Major-
General G.J. Cuthbert, GOC 39th Division, that unless ‘five battalions were withdrawn 
into Brigade Reserve the efficiency of the Division will suffer’.30 To resolve the 
situation, and provide brigades with rest and recuperation, Cuthbert suggested that 
the divisional frontage should be reduced to that normally held by two brigades.31 This 
request appeared to have assisted brigades in providing the necessary respite from 
the front line. For example, 118 Brigade’s time spent in the front line was reduced from 
20 days in September to 6 days, followed by 6 days in reserve.32  
 The net result of 39th Division’s reconstitution was the replacement of 50% of 
the officers and 66% of other ranks. This prompted the rebuilding of brigades where 
junior officers lacked significant operational experience and most of the other ranks 
were inadequately trained. Despite the front line now being held by one brigade, the 
necessity for constant reliefs and the provision of large working parties precluded any 
consistent brigade training. As Cuthbert wrote on the eve of the division’s attack on 13 
November, ‘I hope that as soon as these [operations] are completed, that the Division 
may be rested and trained’.33 
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 The brigades of V Corps were subject to similar difficulties in maintaining their 
fighting strength. The attack of 51st (Highland) Division on 15 November ‘lacked 
sufficient weight… with all the Battalions under strength’. The three battalions 
mustered for 152 Brigade’ attack totalled only 1806 other ranks ‘although every 
available man, a few senior NCOs and instructors excepted, were in the field’. The 
situation was exacerbated by the casualties then sustained during the attack when ‘of 
those who went over the parapet, 45% were lost’.34  In addressing the shortage of 
manpower, Brigadier-General H. Pelham Burn noted that whilst the brigade possessed 
‘Officers, NCOs, transport and equipment for 1,000 men, it would seem that no good 
object is to be had by keeping the Battalions under strength’.35  
 The fighting strength of brigade formations remained in a perpetual state of flux. 
The scale of rebuilding a brigade and sustaining its fighting ability was proportionate 
to its losses through casualties and sickness. Thanks to a universal manpower 
shortage, battalions were frequently undermanned with the shortage of junior officers 
and NCOs hampering effective training. Brigades also suffered losses of staff at critical 
times. In 189 Brigade, 63rd (Royal Naval) Division, Brigadier-General L.F. Philips 
suffered ’a complete nervous breakdown just two hours before zero hour’, whilst the 
brigade major, Major R.A. Sandilands, was transferred to I Corps as GSO2 on the eve 
of the attack.36 The lack of continuity caused by the transferral of staff to other units 
added to the difficulties. Finch-Hatton complained of the problems encountered in the 
marking out of assembly positions for 118 Brigade when ‘Lieutenant Kirby of 234 Field 
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Company… [was] suddenly transferred as Adjutant to the C.R.E.’. This meant that 
different officers had to organise the assembly positions, ‘the situation having to be 
explained afresh on each occasion’.37 
Several factors influenced the operational performance of the brigades of Fifth 
(initially Reserve Army) Army during the autumn of 1916. The first was Gough’s 
interventionist style of command and his insistence on exercising control over the 
planning process. In contrast to Fourth Army, this assertive style of command 
influenced the degree of flexibility afforded to subordinate commanders. As Simpson 
has demonstrated, by August of 1916 ‘Gough was attempting to instruct all his corps 
commanders in how to do their job’ and by October he had issued a memorandum 
telling divisions and brigades how to conduct an attack.38 The responses to Gough’s 
micro-management differed according to how his corps commanders handled the 
situation. Lieutenant-General Claud Jacob of II Corps was able to mitigate some of 
these interventions whilst providing enhanced flexibility to his brigade commanders. 
Jacob’s confidence can be traced in part to II Corps’ operations at Thiepval when, 
having presented his plans for the attack, he was severely criticised by Gough. In 
response, Jacob replied that ‘he must carry out his attacks in his own way or he had 
better resign’. In the event, Gough conceded to the plan and it proved a great success.  
Building on this success, Gough and Jacob became the greatest of friends and 
consequently ‘no Corps got on as well with Fifth Army as II Corps’.39  In contrast, his 
counterpart Lieutenant-General E.A. Fanshawe at V Corps readily conceded to 
Gough’s intervention.  Consequently, his operations were subject to a lack of strict 
corps control with an inevitable impact upon brigade operations. In respect of tactical 
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flexibility at brigade level, the response of corps and divisional commanders to the 
army’s prevailing culture of command cannot be overstated.   
The second factor was the weather: heavy rain turned the battlefield into a 
morass impeding the progress of attacks, logistics coming close to collapse. Third, 
short of manpower and with casualties rising, brigades struggled to maintain the 
fighting strength of their battalions.  However, the benevolent but firm leadership and 
systematic organisation promoted within II Corps ameliorated some of the hardships 
experienced at brigade level. A less prescriptive approach to command and the 
introduction of standard battle procedures, eased the burden of brigade staff, whilst 
encouraging self-reliance. Where opportunities arose, an increased emphasis was 
placed upon devolved responsibility, in appreciation of the value of the ‘man on the 
spot’. These measures helped create a useful framework for tactical and 
organisational development, which in turn greatly benefited the operational 
performance of II Corps’ brigades. In contrast to earlier operations Fifth Army had the 
time and space to make proper arrangements for its November offensive, and the 
significant success achieved by the brigades of 39th Division testified to the 
professionalism of its officers and the command style practiced by II Corps.  
Jacob’s plan of attack for II and V Corps on 13 November was in effect a 
modification of the first phase of the offensive as ordered on 15 October. Designed to 
reduce the German defences between the Albert-Bapuame road and Serre the attack 
was thoroughly planned and provided with clear designated objectives. With the 
distance to the first objective limited to 1000 yards, the corps commanders retained 
the option to attack a second objective if circumstances altered. 40 The objective of II 
 




Corps was to drive the enemy from the remains of his front-line system and having 
cleared its south bank, secure two safe passages across the river. To evaluate the 
benefits of thorough preparation and limited objectives, this chapter now focuses upon 
the attack of Brigadier-General E.H. Finch-Hatton’s 118 Brigade (39th Division), which 
was reinforced by one battalion each from 116 and 117 Brigades. It covers three areas 
influencing the brigade’s attack: preparation, artillery-infantry cooperation, and 
command and control. 
 Preparations for 39th Division’s attack were shaped by several factors. The first 
of these was the unpredictability of the weather. To ameliorate the impact of wet 
weather, brigadiers were invited to comment upon the state of the ground ‘so that they 
were able to give the corps commander their opinion at short notice’.41 This instruction 
was in accordance with the principles laid down in FSR1, which stated that ‘the 
conditions which affect the question of frontage… must vary’ the state of the ground 
constituting an ‘inconstant factor to be weighed’.42 Following a thorough 
reconnaissance, Finch-Hatton, reported that the prevailing conditions necessitated a 
modification of the barrage. Thus: 
The barrage to the HANSA Line should be modified as the rate of progression 
will be not more than 15 yards a minute… and I am of the opinion that it will 
take the last wave of attacking infantry from the Schwaben Redoubt 20 minutes 
to reach Point 64 [original emphasis].43 
 
Two points of interest can be drawn from Finch-Hatton’s tactical appreciation 
of the situation. First, that the local knowledge of the ‘man on the spot’ was appreciated 
at II Corps HQ, his intelligence helping to formulate the shape of the artillery 
 
41 TNA, WO 95/457, Fifth Army WD, GS 1017/2/45, 27 October 1916; WO 95/518, Fifth Army S.G. 72/81, 
‘Memorandum on Operations’, 13 November 1916. 
42 FSR1, Chapter VII, 103 (3), p.138. 




programme. Thus, the rate of the barrage was established to progress 50 yards a 
minute on the right of the brigade sector and 25 yards a minute on the left to conform 
with variable conditions underfoot.44  The second point relates to Finch-Hatton’s 
decision to compensate for the difficulty in crossing the ground by replacing the 4/5 
Black Watch with fresh 1/1 Hertfordshires in the first wave of the attack.45 Having lost 
1,000 men in two previous attacks, the Black Watch was depleted, tired and suffering 
from the effects of prolonged shellfire. Instead of being committed to the main assault, 
it was deployed to support the attack upon St. Divion where little opposition was 
expected.46  
 A second factor that shaped 118 Brigade’s attack was the strength of the 
artillery support. A proportionally greater weight of firepower than on 1 July was 
available to assist the infantry with the attack  supported by a field gun every 10.25 
yards and a heavy gun every 38.5 yards of its frontage.47  To aid close cooperation, 
the artillery was placed under the orders of the Corps Artillery commander, ‘with each 
infantry brigadier detailed a battery commander whose battery when required was at 
the disposal of the former’.48 This mutual support is illustrated by a battery 
commander’s report. On the morning of the attack Captain J.R.F. Farrington, OC “A” 
Battery, RFA, having discovered that the infantry was advancing rapidly through thick 
mist  
did not consider the results of… following the barrage with my two guns by 
watch and dial would justify the risk entailed… [instead] putting one gun onto 
Hansa road and the other onto the trenches just right of St. Pierre Divion. 
 
44 TNA, WO 95/2589, 118 Brigade WD, 118 Brigade OO No.55, 26 October 1916. 
45 TNA, WO 95/2590, 1/1 Hertfordshires WD, 13 November 1916.  
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During the afternoon, having received orders to place his guns at the disposal of GOC 
118 Brigade, he met with the temporary brigadier and under his direction ‘put another 
section with my section in front of St. Pierre Divion whilst keeping one in reserve’.49 
 A third beneficial influence was the communication that was maintained 
throughout the day. This was facilitated by field telephones linking division and 
brigade, whilst forward of brigade headquarters telegraphs were used. Upon the first 
objectives being taken, arrangements were made for OC 39 Division Signal Company 
to move forward and establish ‘a Brigade Advanced Station with buzzer facilities’.50 
The influence of these arrangements on tactical control at brigade headquarters 
cannot be overstated, as evident in 39th Division’s log of messages.  
 Throughout the morning, a stream of messages confirmed the success of the 
forward parties of the battalions, with requests for additional support meeting with a 
swift response. That of the CO 16/Nottingham and Derby, was dealt with in less than 
20 minutes, Brigadier-General R.D.F. Oldman, GOC 117 Brigade having sought 
permission to deploy a reserve battalion.51 As the morning progressed and the 
battalion ‘made touch with the Black Watch’, a further request enabled companies to 
be fed in appropriately to maintain tempo.52  With responsibility for consolidation 
devolving upon 118 Brigade,  Finch-Hatton was able to respond rapidly by sending up 
‘2 Companies of the 14/ Hampshires to reinforce the 1/Cheshires and 2 Companies to 
 
49 Ibid, Farrington to GOC 39th Division, 16 November 1916. During the late afternoon, Finch-Hatton was taken 
ill and replaced by CO 4/5 Black Watch. 
50 TNA, WO 95/2588, 118 Brigade OO No. 35, undated. 
51 TNA, WO 95/2565, 39th Div. WD, Log of Message, Message 12, CO 16/Nottingham and Derby to 117 Brigade 
HQ, timed 6.49am and Message 13, 39th Division HQ to 117 Brigade HQ, message timed 7.07am.  




mop up and reinforce the Black Watch’.53  Frequent reports were sent in by the Brigade 
Intelligence Officer and Liaison Officers from the Advanced Brigade Station ‘forwarded 
to Divisional HQ and where necessary to the Group R.A.’54  
Whilst the telephone remained the main means of communication, a Visual 
Signal Station was established to carry messages, and cables were laid forward. 
Special attention was also paid to the establishment of a series of relay posts in order 
to guide runners across the broken ground. The arrangements also acknowledged the 
large-scale introduction of contact aircraft, with an R.F.C. Liaison Officer attached to 
each battalion and brigade headquarters.55 All these measures combined to provide 
brigade staff with a smooth and efficient flow of information and the means to retain a 
firm tactical grip. 
 A fourth benefit for 118 Brigade’s initial advance was that brought by the 
configuration of the brigade frontage. As opposed to the difficulties presented by 
attacking from a narrow and cramped front, this operation was delivered from ‘a 
somewhat wider front of attack’. This facilitated a formation of eight waves of four 
battalions. Three battalions were assembled to advance 1,100 yards in a northerly 
direction, a fourth in a divergent movement to the north west. These moves were in 
keeping with the inflexible methods advocated by Gough.56 The tactics were 
essentially designed to ensure that enough troops were available to cater for any 
eventuality ‘since communications were bound to break down and so deprive anyone 
 
53 Ibid, Message 51, 118 Brigade HQ to 39th Division HQ, message timed at 10.04am.  The consolidation of 118 
brigade was completed on 14 November under the orders of CO 4/5 Black Watch, Finch-Hatton being 
indisposed and leaving the battlefield. He relinquished command of the brigade on 4 December through 
sickness. 
54 TNA, WO 95/2588, 118 Brigade WD, 118/3013, ‘Report on Operations of 27 September’. 
55 Ibid, 118 Brigade OO No.55, ‘Communications (23 and 24)’, 26 October 1916. 




but the ‘man on the spot’ of the ability to influence matters’. 57 The assembly of the 
assault units was also influenced by the absence of ‘jumping off’ trenches but 
compensated by precise brigade instructions that ensured ‘all lines [were] taped out 
and the dividing lines between the Battalions… marked out with iron screw pickets and 
spun yarn with labels attached stating the flanks of the Battalions’.58 
 Three significant conclusions can be drawn from the attack of 118 Brigade in 
relation to the organisational and tactical development of brigade command.  First, the 
efficient preparation conformed to II Corps’ command culture. These arrangements 
were marked by the deployment of sufficient firepower, close cooperation between 
arms and a consistent flow of communications that provided a significant degree of 
tactical flexibility. Second, in recognition of the value placed on ‘the man on the spot’, 
Finch-Hatton and his staff were given enhanced flexibility in their responses to the 
difficulties caused by the brigade frontage. Third, the importance of delivering an 
attack from a broad frontage, as opposed to a cramped position, was borne out by the 
degree of flexibility that shaped the formation for attack.  
3.3: V Corps – Brigade Operations on the Ancre 
In contrast to the attack of II Corps, that of V Corps was subject to want of strict 
corps control, lack of coordination and late changes in the order of battle. To illustrate 
the effect of these problems here follows a case study of brigade operations of 2nd and 
3rd Divisions, examined through two perspectives: the measures employed by the 
brigade staffs in preparing for the attack; and the consequences of changes made to 
the original battleplan and the issue of subsequent amendments. 
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 Before the battle, there was through reconnaissance to ascertain the strength 
of the German defences. Brigadier-General R.O. Kellett, GOC 99 Brigade, 2nd Division 
personally ‘observed and examined the wire… from several places with a very 
powerful telescope’ concluding that he could not find ‘any appropriate lessening of the 
Enemy Front Line Wire and that of the rear lines still seemed… intact’.59 Further 
information was provided from numerous raiding parties and patrols as efforts were 
made ‘with a view to finding a practicable gap in this sub-section’.60 Based upon these 
observations, Kellett expressed his concerns to Major-General W.G. Walker, GOC 2nd 
Division. 
There is no one more keen about these operations… and more sanguine as to 
its result than myself, but I do think that to launch an Attack in the existing state 
of the enemy wire would be premature and… court disaster’.61 
 
The arrangements for the attack were fashioned by the ‘state of the ground and 
the necessity to increase the times of the barrage at present laid down’, the opinion of 
each attacking brigade being sought as to the suitability of these times in relation to 
conditions underfoot.62 Opinions differed. The general consensus amongst the 
brigadiers of 2nd Division was that if the ground was considered good enough to go 
ahead with the attack ‘infantry should be able to maintain the pace of 100 yards in four 
minutes’.63 Kellett concurred, considering ‘that as the times had been laid down, 
studied and impressed upon all Ranks… any alteration would be inadvisable’.64 
 
59 TNA, WO 95/1294, 2nd Div. WD, G.S.1017/3/27, 1 November 1916, 7pm. 
60 Ibid, G.S.1077/3/28, ‘Report on Reconnaissance by OC 23/Royal Fusiliers’, 2 November 1916. 
61 Ibid, G.S.1017/3/27. 
62 TNA, WO 95/747, V Corps WD, GS 1017/2/45, 27 October 1916. 
63 Ibid, Brigadier-General G.M. Bullen-Smith, GOC 5 Brigade, reply to G.S.1017/2/45, 27 October 1916. 




Brigadier-General A.C Daly, GOC 6 Brigade strongly disagreed, stating that ‘with the 
ground in its present condition the time allowance should be doubled’.65 
Similar conditions influenced the attack of Brigadier-General E.G. Williams’ 8 Brigade. 
Thus: 
It may be doubted whether it is at all feasible to write a plan of attack… under 
distinctly varying conditions i.e part of the frontage under chalk and part under 
clay with the probability of all objectives being gained. Either the barrage will be 
too slow for the troops moving over the chalk or too quick for those moving over 
clay. The latter appears the greatest evil and is what happened to the 8 Infantry 
Brigade on 13 November 1916.66 
 
As a result of the conditions underfoot, as identified by Williams, the brigades of 3rd 
Division were denied any possibility of a swift advance; the troops of 8 Brigade, like 
those of 6 Brigade on their right ‘[lost] the battle in the mud’.67 
Faced with featureless ground, the attention of the brigade staff also turned to 
the difficulties of maintaining the direction of the advance.68 Accordingly, appropriate 
measures were taken to ensure that all battalion and company officers were had the 
requisite skills to establish and maintain the direction of attack. The initial preparations 
entailed establishing an assembly line parallel to the opposing objective. However, 
irregular brigade frontages complicated matters. To compensate, brigade training 
schemes focused upon marching on map reading with officers and NCOs of 6 Brigade 
practicing ‘constantly in marching on a compass bearing [original emphasis]’.69 The 
consistent training proved beneficial when, on 13 November, 6 Brigade strayed into 8 
Brigade’s sector and vice versa. Similarly, at the beginning of the attack the left 
 
65 Ibid, Brigadier-General A.C. Daly, GOC 6 Brigade, reply to G.S.1017/2/45, 27 October 1916. 
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company of 2/South Staffordshires, in order to get the correct bearing in thick fog, 
were required to wheel sharply to the left. Guided ‘by their officers marching on 
compass bearings they went straight towards their objective’.70 
 Despite the preparations for the attack, the call upon men for corps working 
parties continued unabated. These demands were addressed by the divisional 
commander, who ‘considered it most important that the greatest amount of work 
should be demanded from the Battalions holding the line [because]… it is much better 
for a man in the line to be kept really hard at work’ and ‘the men out of the line will get 
some rest’. Instructions issued to the brigadiers stated that ‘it is a rule that additional 
labour be demanded as a “standing order” for a particular piece of work rather than a 
sudden demand’. However, these measures did not ease the demand placed upon 
brigades out of the line, the returns for November showing that a total of 800 men were 
drawn from the reserve brigade.71  
While providing the labour for maintaining the front line, it was also the 
responsibility of the brigadier to ensure that his defences were sufficiently manned, a 
measure that the brigadiers of 2nd Division appeared to have neglected. This lapse 
was highlighted in a memorandum from the divisional commander which noted that 
‘garrisons appeared to have been materially reduced, if not withdrawn altogether 
without reference to me… I want to remind brigadiers that the garrisons are fixed by 
me in Defence Scheme [sic] and are not to be altered without my sanction’.72 In 
response, all CO s were notified that  
 
70 J.P. Jones, History of the South Staffordshire Regiment (Wolverhampton: Whitehead Brothers, 1923), p.335. 
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in case of urgent necessity, the Battalion Commander may sanction the 
temporary withdrawal of a Post to prevent heavy casualties but this must be 
reported at once to the Brigadier for covering authority and the Post must be 
re-occupied immediately the emergency is past. This does not apply in the case 
of an enemy attack when all ground is to be held to the last [original 
emphasis].73  
 
This process of micro-management reinforced the control exercised by the divisional 
commander and reminded his subordinates of his expectations.   
The implementation of these measures demonstrates the influence of brigade 
command in preparing for offensive and defensive action. However, the extent to 
which the advice of the brigadiers was heeded at V Corps HQ was inconsistent. For 
instance, despite Daly’s recommendation to reduce the rate of the barrage on 6 
Brigade’s front for the attack of 13 November, it remained set at 100 metres a minute 
and consequently ‘ran away from the troops’.74 Where the going was better to the right 
of the brigade sector ‘the advance proceeded according to the Timetable’.75 Clearly, 
the command structure suffered from a significant breakdown in communications in 
infantry-artillery cooperation which had an adverse impact on the troops of 6 Brigade. 
Having reached their first objective the assault troops, ‘not having been told that 25% 
of [our] guns would barrage 50 yards short of the enemy front line’, suffered severe 
casualties.76 
The failure experienced by the brigades of 2nd and 3rd Divisions may be 
attributed to two fundamental causes. First, despite reservations on the part of 
subordinate commanders, arrangements for the attack did not fully take account of the 
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conditions on the battlefront. The observations and recommendations of the brigadiers 
were overridden, and the value of the ‘man on the spot’ was insufficiently appreciated. 
Second, V Corps arrangements were subject to hastily conceived amendments, and 
infantry-artillery cooperation was faulty. The flexibility of artillery programmes 
remained conditional to the technological ability of the gunners to accommodate 
changes in timing and objectives. Given these limitations, brigade command was 
deprived of any effective tactical control. 
 Arrangements for the opening of the offensive were also affected by the 
manpower shortage. This influenced the formations adopted for brigade attacks. 
Kellett’s 99 Brigade, for example, was ordered to undertake an attack on Munich 
Trench on 14 November, less one battalion. To adjust to the brigade frontage, he was 
forced to adopt a formation consisting of two waves of the 1/Berkshires ‘as had they 
remained in 4 waves touch could not have been maintained’. This order clearly 
contravened the principles of FSR1 which prescribed the value of the ‘man on the spot’ 
for Kellett was clearly conversant with the challenges of by his brigade sector. Later, 
in commenting upon ‘the weakness of the battalions in relation to the Frontage 
allotted… a weakness accentuated as the attack proceeded’, he advocated a 
minimum ratio of one yard per man of battalion strength as the optimum number to 
press an attack to a successful conclusion.77   
 Late change in arrangements also influenced the establishment of close 
cooperation between units. For three weeks before the attack, Daly of 6 Brigade 
remained in close touch with his counterpart in 9 Brigade, 3rd Division, Brigadier-
General H.C. Potter. Throughout this period ‘the COs of [9 Brigade’s] right and leading 
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supporting battalions were in constant touch with the COs of [6 Brigade’s] left 
supporting battalions’ when ‘all possible eventualities and difficulties were discussed’. 
However, two days before the attack, Major-General C.J. Deverall, GOC 3rd Division, 
decided to deploy two brigades instead of three. Because of this change of plan, Daly 
was told that due to a change of dispositions ‘the 8 Brigade, with whom we had no 
previous liaison, was taking the place of 9 Brigade’. The effect of these changes was 
that throughout the attack, the barrage being lost ‘all four battalions of 8 Brigade lost 
direction and mixed in confusion with the left of the 2nd Division’.78 
 The late issue of amendments to the operational plans, issued in response to 
Fifth Army’s orders, influenced the course of brigade operations and continued to do 
so during the resumption of operations on 18 November. These procedures were not 
restricted to V Corps. To a lesser degree they were experienced by the brigades of II 
Corps. For example, the plans of the two assault brigades of 19th Division (II Corps) 
were both subject to late amendments that placed an inordinate workload on brigade 
staffs. Brigadier-General G.D. Jeffreys, GOC 57 Brigade judged that  
the additions to the tasks already laid down [entailing] hurried amendments to 
the orders of corps and lower formations and eleventh-hour preparations which 
as previous experience had shown over and over again, were fatal to success. 
Lieutenant-General Jacob, whose information differed from that on which the 
Army had acted, protested in vain.79  
 
Similarly, Brigadier-General F.G.M Rowley, GOC 56 Brigade received amended 
orders at 1am on the morning of 18 November having been allotted two more local 
objectives. With barely five hours before zero hour, Rowley was forced to issue verbal 
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instructions to OC 7/East Lancashires with the ‘56 Infantry Brigade OO No.132 being 
amended at 3.15am’.80 
 The attack on 18 November by Brigadier-General J.B. Jardine’s 97 Brigade, 
32nd Division, on the Munich and Frankfort trenches, crystallises the difficulties 
encountered in complying with Fifth Army’s late amendments to the plan of attack.  In 
this instance, no written orders were received at 97 Brigade Headquarters by 10.35pm 
on the eve of the attack. Jardine then, having briefed his COs, sent a verbal 
confirmation forward ordering them to ‘carry on in accordance to instructions… as [he] 
was of the opinion that it was impossible under the circumstances that existed for 
orders to reach OCs in time, nor were actual written orders necessary’.81  
 The late issue of Fifth Army orders was typical of Gough’s interventionist style 
of command that deprived subordinate commanders of tactical influence. This was 
reflected in the preparation for Jardine’s attack where ‘the whole of the arrangements, 
even including the selection of Advanced Brigade HQ were definitely laid down to us 
by Corps HQ as the Army Commander’s decision [original emphasis]’.82 This decision 
did not sufficiently reflect the importance of the ‘man on the spot’ as laid down in FSR1. 
It denied the brigade commander the opportunity to choose the optimum position for 
his Advanced Brigade Headquarters (ABHQ) based upon personal local knowledge. 
In the event, Jardine found himself marooned with ‘little contact with his forward units 
and hardly any means of communication with his artillery and certainly not in time for 
its action to be of any use’.83   
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 This style of command exacerbated the gulf between Fifth Army and 
subordinate commanders, as demonstrated by Gough’s displeasure at the handling of 
112 Brigade, 37th Division on 15 November. The incident concerned two battalions of 
the brigade being placed under the orders of Major-General W.G. Walker, GOC 2nd 
Division. Walker, having tried in vain to persuade V Corps to postpone the attack to 
allow for reconnaissance, realised that Brigadier-General P.M. Robinson, GOC 112 
Brigade, possessed no knowledge of the ground to be attacked.  Walker therefore 
decided 
that the only feasible way of giving the attack a chance of success was to place 
the two battalions [of 112 Brigade] under the orders of GOC 99 Brigade whose 
troops had attacked on the 14th and knew the ground. 84  
 
Gough’s response showed no understanding of or sympathy for Robinson’s 
predicament: ‘there seemed no reason why GOC 112 Brigade should have been 
ignorant of the situation and handed over his Brigade to another officer… [this being] 
an improper proceeding’. Instead, he stated that Robinson should ‘have made more 
effort to keep himself and his battalion commanders better informed and that…  the 
Corps should have given him some guidance’.85 
 Fifth Army’s attack was generally a success.  Beaumont Hamel and portions of 
the Redan Ridge were captured although the cost was considerable. Gough’s 
interventionist style of command influenced both the planning and execution of brigade 
operations. However, several positive factors contributed to the success. The 
offensive benefited from enhanced artillery support, meticulous preparations and an 
attack frontage that lent itself to logistical support. From a negative perspective, 
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attacks were hampered by unfavourable ground and inexperienced divisions, whose 
‘period of training [had been] necessarily short’.86 The resumption of the attack on 18 
November was complicated by hastily conceived orders and divided command. With 
relatively little latitude for control after zero-hour, the brigade staff’s influence was 
mostly confined to preparation and moderating the difficulties raised by a pronounced 
lack of coordination.  
 Two conclusions about the development of brigade operations can be drawn 
from this case study of the Ancre. First, that the brigades of II and V Corps were subject 
to differing styles of command: this influenced their operational performance. The 
commanders of II Corps operated within the parameters of an unambiguous concept 
of operations, with a significant degree of flexibility. This was reflected in a systematic 
approach to operational and logistic planning, an approach reflected at brigade level 
where the value of the views of subordinate commanders was acknowledged and 
acted upon. A benevolent but disciplined corps-level leadership fostered a culture of 
mutual support and sustained morale. These benefits suggest that this approach 
enhanced opportunities for success. V Corps command, in contrast, was 
characterised by lack of cohesion and consultation. This was manifested in poor 
cooperation between the infantry and artillery during 2nd and 3rd Divisions’s attack of 
13 November. Contrary to the principles laid down in FSR1, affecting ‘the question of 
the frontage to be allotted for the attack’, the local knowledge of the brigadiers was 
side-lined.87 Gough’s intervention and Lieutenant-General E.A. Fanshawe’s 
indifference to the opinion of his subordinate commanders did not bode well for 
operational cohesion.  
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 The second conclusion relates to the role of the brigadier in unit administration 
and maintaining the fighting proficiency of his brigade. This raised a fundamental 
contradiction of leadership for brigadiers. As John Bourne argued, ‘the certainty that 
the men to whose welfare they devoted so much attention would one day have to be 
sent into battle’ proved problematic.88  However, measures were implemented by 
brigade staff to mitigate adversity. These included appropriate training programmes, 
thorough preparations for attacks and the provision of rest and recreation. By these 
means the morale of the brigade was sustained and the paternalistic obligations of the 
brigadier satisfied. 
  A further influence was brought to bear through the brigadier’s role as a 
facilitator of tactical change. This was achieved through ensuring that soldiers 
possessed individual skills to meet the challenges of the battlefield. Lessons ‘learnt in 
the earlier fighting on the Somme [were] borne out in the recent operations’.89 As part 
of the BEF’s tactical reappraisal, these were disseminated and incorporated within 
appropriate brigade training schemes for the specific benefit of inexperienced officers 
and men. This process constituted a significant step in the organisational and tactical 
development of infantry brigade command.  
3.4: Brigade Minor Actions, January-April 1917 
The second part of this chapter focuses upon the minor operations conducted 
by II and V Corps of Fifth Army during its advance towards the Hindenburg Line in 
1917. As noted above, these actions were considered by an official historian as worthy 
of study ‘to bring out the skill in warfare … gained by the British Armies in the past six 
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months’.90  From the perspective of artillery support, the advance ‘was fruitful in useful 
lessons… due to the fact that it was a miniature campaign compressed into a small 
space of time and country’. Great emphasis was placed upon ‘the importance of good 
co-operation between the infantry and artillery… especially in the attack of the villages, 
when the artillery needed information from every possible source in order to locate the 
hostile machine guns’.91 Within this context, this chapter now assesses the extent to 
which brigade operations benefited from the operational and tactical reform based 
upon the lessons of the Somme. Fundamentally, the operations were shaped by the 
principles laid down in SS135 that promoted a systematic step-by-step approach with 
limited objectives.92 As the offensive doctrine of the BEF developed further, the 
standard procedures laid down in SS143 and SS144 provided the general framework 
for the planning and implementations of brigade operations.93 
 The first case studies examine two successive brigade operations conducted 
by II Corps in February 1917. These are followed by a comparison of two attacks 
undertaken by II and V Corps in March upon similar fortified villages. Three factors 
that defined the shape and outcome of the operations are assessed: preparations, the 
formation adopted for the attack; and command and control.  
3.5: Action at Puisieux Trench – 3 February 1917 
An attack on the Puisieux and River Trenches by 63rd (Royal Naval) Division of 
II Corps was the first of four phases of operations designed to secure the Loupart 
Wood Line to gain observation for the further advance of Fifth Army. The attack of 
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Brigadier-General L.F. Philip’s 189 Brigade is significant because of its similarity to an 
operation conducted by the same brigade on 13 November 1916. In both cases the 
brigade assembly area was overcrowded. In November it was confined to a frontage 
of 600 yards and ‘attended with every element of risk since the conditions of the 
trenches and the absence of adequate communications made movement slow and 
retirement impossible’.94 In 3 February 1917 the assembly area was constrained by a 
frontage of 1,300 yards, requiring careful arrangements by brigade and battalion staffs. 
Despite the difficulties imposed by these cramped conditions, all brigade 
arrangements conformed to II Corps’ systematic approach to operations.   
 The benefits of mutual support between 189 and 190 Brigades were 
abundantly evident. Close cooperation between the Brigade Transport Officers of the 
two brigades ensured that a reserve echelon of men were formed to be held in 
readiness to replenish the supply dumps when necessary.95 The administrative 
arrangements were efficiently supervised by ‘Staff Captain A.E. Barre in organising 
the Transport and Supply of stores whilst also carrying on the duties of the Brigade 
Major during Captain Barnett’s absence at Advanced Brigade Headquarters’.96  The 
manual work carried out by 190 Brigade when holding the line, provided adequate 
cover for the assault and reserve companies detailed for the attack.97 The deployment 
of 190 Brigade Machine Gun Company provided tactical support for 189 Brigade’s 
attack. A total of 22 Vickers guns reinforced those of 189 Machine Gun Company 
under the overall control of OC 190 Machine Gun Company. Having moved forward 
to the approximate line of consolidation, the exact line being left to the discretion of 
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the commanders on the spot, great assistance was provided in repelling 
counterattacks during the phase of consolidation.98  
Whilst the preparations for 189 Brigade’s attack benefited from systematic 
organisation, the attack highlighted the importance of training in platoon tactics.  The 
formation for the attack on 3 February was in direct response to the failure of the attack 
on 13 November when an unidentified strongpoint escaped the attention of the artillery 
and inflicted large casualties upon the brigade. The formation thus adopted specified 
that ‘troops were not allowed to be held up by any defended points in the enemy’s 
line’.99 This arrangement, conforming with guidance issued by GHQ to brigade and 
battalion commanders as early as August 1916, stated that attacks should not be 
wasted in frontal assaults against ‘strong places’ but be delivered by attacks from ‘the 
flank and rear’.100 The platoon attack therefore was organised in two waves, the first 
pushing on to a second objective, whilst the second “mopped up” the first objective, 
supported by parties on both flanks. However, this formation proved difficult to 
maintain during the attack as ‘whilst the men passed by on either side… a coordinated 
attack on the strongpoint proved difficult to organise’.101 Thus: 
Throughout the day the existence of the strongpoint hypnotised the attention of 
Brigade Headquarters who on the one hand denied vigorously that it existed 
and on the other hand gave continuous instructions for its capture.102 
 
 In a later report on the attack, Brigadier-General L.F. Philips blamed a lack of training 
by inexperienced junior officers and NCOs and a failure on the part of platoons from 
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supporting flank companies ‘to counterattack without further orders as instructed’.103 
However, the historian of the Hawke Battalion took a different view, blaming brigade 
staff for ordering frontal assaults on the strongpoint: 
regardless of the fact that the tactics which had led “D” company of the Hawke’s 
to go round it in the initial advance instead of attempting to rush it… followed 
on General Shute’s wholly correct enunciation of the outstanding lesson of the 
earliest battle of the Ancre.104 
 
Whilst from these observations it is evident that 189 Brigade’s staff struggled with the 
application of tactics drawn from the lessons of the Somme, it can be seen that the 
emergence of the platoon as a fighting unit constituted a milestone in tactical 
development. As operations transitioned from static to semi-mobile, the ability of 
brigade staff to capitalise upon these new tactics, through appropriate platoon training 
exercises, marked a further step in brigade development.    
The benefits of close infantry-artillery cooperation implemented by robust 
communications were evident during 189 Brigade’s attack on Puisieux Trench. 189 
and 190 Brigade Signal Companies combined to establish cables to 189 Advanced 
Brigade Headquarters, complemented by a line of runner posts. Specific instructions 
laid down by OC Signals stated that ‘all battalion COs should see that reports were 
sent back at least every quarter of an hour until everything went quiet’.105 The 
establishment of communication to battalion headquarters proved vital, as information 
regarding the deterioration of the situation on the northern flank flowed down to 189 
Brigade HQ. When observed to be preparing for a counterattack, Brigadier-General 
Philips was able to call down an artillery bombardment upon the assembled troops. 
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Guns were ‘detached from the barrage groups and sent to straighten the flanks’ in less 
than an hour.106   
 189 Brigade Signal Company worked alongside their counterparts in 190 
Brigade to establish cables forward to the ABHQ, complemented by a line of runner 
posts. Instructions laid down by OC Signals stated that all ‘battalion COs should see 
that reports were sent back [using power buzzers] at least every quarter hour until 
everything was quiet’.107 The benefits of close communication between brigade and 
artillery commanders were evident as the Germans prepared to counter-attack. As the 
situation on the northern flank deteriorated, orders were relayed from brigade 
headquarters to request that ‘4 guns be detached from the barrage groups and sent 
to straighten the flank’, the procedure being completed in one hour.108  
 The attack carried out by 189 Brigade on 3 February benefited from efficient 
administrative and logistic arrangements implemented by mutually supportive brigade 
staff. New flexibility in attack formations reflected the BEF’s efforts to penetrate the 
German defences through the adoption of platoon tactics. These factors provided a 
substantial framework for operations and illustrate the strides achieved in the form of 
brigade attacks. Conversely, the attack exposed the difficulties encountered by 
brigade staff in sustaining a coordinated attack.    
3.6: Action at Irles – 10 March 1917  
The operations undertaken at Irles and Bucquoy were designed to capitalise 
upon the German tactical withdrawal to a second line of defence astride the Ancre 
(Operation Alberich). The Official History claimed that: 
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It is seldom, in comparing two attacks such as those against Irles and Bucquoy, 
each against a ruined village and a section of earthworks, each conducted by 
two brigades of different divisions, one finds it so easy to realise why one 
succeeded and one failed.109  
 
These case studies explore preparation, artillery-infantry cooperation, the formations 
for attack, and command and control.110 
Grevillers Trench, and the village of Irles which dominated its north western 
extremity, were the objectives for II Corps’ attack on 10 March. The attack was 
undertaken by 99 Brigade, 2nd Division and 53 Brigade, 18th (Eastern) Division. In 
accordance with II Corps’s command culture, the administrative and logistical 
arrangements were meticulously addressed. The arrangements benefited from 
thorough preparations made by energetic and efficient divisional and brigade staffs. 
When the onset of wintry conditions made it necessary to keep transport off the roads, 
the attack was postponed until conditions improved to ensure enough ammunition and 
supplies were available.111 
Kellett’s 99 Brigade was fortunate in obtaining the services of a most capable 
and efficient staff to implement the preparations for his attack. As brigade major, Major 
G.M. Lindsey displayed ‘unceasing energy and tactical administration… having the 
knack of getting the maximum amount of work done with the minimum of friction’.112 
Similarly, Captain E.M. Allfrey, the staff captain, whilst perfecting the administration 
arrangements, ‘was responsible for the Outpost Lines being pushed out [as far as 
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possible]’. The work of Lieutenant N.V Shillito, R.E. Brigade Signals Officer, proved 
WHOLLY satisfactory and successful [original emphasis]’.113  As Roger Lee has 
argued, ‘an understanding of and confidence in the ability and judgement of others in 
the chain of command is well recognised as critical to success in battle’.114 Clearly, 
previous lessons were embodied in the preparations. For example, with regard to the 
positioning of supply dumps, Kellett ordered that ‘as far as possible [dumps] should be 
kept out of anything like a STRICT ALIGNMENT so that if the enemy discovers one 
dump and shells a line through it, some of the dumps in any case will escape 
unscathed [original emphasis]’.115  
 As with the attack at Miraumont, the artillery arrangements were designed to 
conform to the attack frontage and the irregularities of the enemy defences. These 
arrangements necessitated a detailed knowledge of the brigade sector and close 
infantry-artillery cooperation.116 Preliminary arrangements were shared between 
Kellett, his battalion COs and their supporting adjutants who ‘held several joint 
reconnaissance’s [sic] from convenient spots lasting several hours, with all the 
information tabulated at Divisional HQ’. It was standard practice, that if the brigade 
was out of the line ‘officers went up each day to observe the wire and report back to 
the Brigadier’.117 
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The action at Irles was notable for the methods adopted for an attack of limited 
scope ‘in which the artillery left the least possible burden on the infantry’s 
shoulders’.118  The artillery scheme conformed to the attack frontage and was 
designed to progress at a rate of 100 yards in four minutes with twelve 18-pdrs 
concentrated upon the dangerous ravine known as the “Lady’s Leg”, their fire moving 
through it with the rolling barrage. Thus: 
Two of four guns on the Left were detailed to establish themselves on the South 
entrance of the [Ravine] to support our Infantry in their progress if called upon 
to do so and the other two guns to take up a position about 250 yards in 
advance: the idea being that two of the guns would always be in a position to 
fire while the other two moved forwards to assist the infantry.119 
 
 All troops proved ‘eloquent with regard to the accuracy, intensity and efficiency of the 
barrage… having implicit confidence in the skill of the 2nd Division gunners’.  In order 
to establish strongpoints, the 99 Brigade staff devised an innovative scheme, in 
cooperation with the artillery, by which a series of shell holes were formed by 6-inch 
howitzers on a line 200 yards beyond the first objective. This was subsequently 
occupied by section of Lewis gunners. A machine gun barrage, employing 18 guns 
and supported by those of 7 Australian Brigade conformed with the progress of the 
attack throughout.120  
 The shape of the attack consisted of ‘a normal formation modified into two 
waves against a single objective’. Where it differed was that having completed the first 
advance, the assault troops circumvented the village, a form of attack considered ‘a 
bold conception for that period of the campaign’.121 Summarising the brigade’s 
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success, Major-General C.E. Pereira, GOC 2nd Division considered that ‘no new 
lessons were learnt regarding trench-to-trench warfare… but several were 
emphasised’. Significantly, in recognition of the advent of semi open warfare, Pereira’s 
post-operational report is divided into two sections: one related to the exercise of 
trench-to-trench warfare and one to semi-open warfare.122 
 While it would be misleading to suggest that the transformation of brigade 
command was smooth, 99 Brigade’s success suggests that the process was well 
advanced within II Corps. This was achieved despite the brigade being significantly 
undermanned: the fighting strength of the four battalions ranged from 527 to 270 other 
ranks and 20 to 12 officers per battalion. Consequently, far fewer men were kept back 
from the attack, although a total of 20 brigade staff remained in reserve.123 This 
deficiency was offset by several beneficial factors that combined to provide adequate 
support for the attack. A cohesive and systematic approach to administrative, 
operational and logistical planning laid a firm foundation for success. These 
arrangements were implemented by efficient, flexible and courageous brigade staff 
officers. A close cooperation between infantry and artillery command lent strength to 
this support, substantiated by the trust placed upon the 2nd Division gunners by the 
assault troops. Kellett, whilst remaining at 99 Brigade HQ was, throughout the day, 
provided with valuable information by his Brigade Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant F.C. 
Bull, who ‘went twice through a heavy barrage [to] examine the objective captured and 
conferred with the COs… as to exactly the conditions’.124 From this snapshot of 
brigade operations at Irles,  it can be appreciated that when the necessary 
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preconditions were in place, the opportunities for operational success were 
substantially increased.    
3.7: Action at Bucquoy – 14 March 1917 
In contrast to the action at Irles, that of V Corps at Bucquoy was a comparative 
failure.125 The attack, undertaken by 7th Division’s 91 Brigade and 46th (North Midland) 
Division’s 137 Brigade was considered 
a most unsatisfactory incident that tended to create a feeling that the highest 
authorities in rear [sic] hardly appreciated the practical difficulties to be 
encountered by those in front and were in consequence asking officers and 
men to attempt the impossible.126 
 
The attack, originally conceived as a joint exercise to capture the high ground north of 
the village on 15 March, was reduced in scope at short notice and brought forward to 
14 March. This late change of plan served to exacerbate an operation already subject 
to a lack of time and exposed fundamental flaws in V Corps command structure. A 
lack of preparation, flexibility and cohesion ran counter to the establishment of a firm 
base for the attack. Disregard for the views of the brigade commanders militated 
against the value of the ‘man on the spot’.  
 A want of strict corps control, manifested in misapprehension and a lack of 
cooperation, influenced the outcome of 91 Brigade’s attack. The first of these related 
to the disregard of reconnaissance carried out on the German lines that had identified 
the presence of uncut wire within the multiple lines of defence. This information was 
duly relayed to V Corps HQ, Major-General G. De S. Barrow, GOC 7th Division, having 
considered that ‘the wire was not sufficiently cut to justify the projected attack’.127 In 
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response, with time at a premium, V Corps suggested that rather than cancelling the 
attack, if the wire was not sufficiently cut then ‘strong patrols with scouts should be 
sent out’ instead of attacking in conventional waves.128 By this time however, it was 
too late to change the formation for attack, Brigadier-General H.R. Cumming, GOC 91 
Brigade writing that ‘no one who had seen the position by day, with its triple bolt of 
wire scarcely damaged, can be surprised that it was able to withstand an impromptu 
attack… by men to whom the ground was entirely new’.129 
 Protests from brigade command over the time set for zero hour were 
overridden.  With the attack scheduled for 11.45pm, the brigade orders and barrage 
arrangements were received at 6.10pm and 8.15pm respectively. This left little time 
for the relay of orders down to battalion and company levels: journeys of three hours 
were needed between brigade and battalion HQs, ‘one hour for the Orderly’s outward 
journey and two journeys for the COs’.130 In addition, the battalion commanders had 
to monitor the laying out of tapes and the carrying of sufficient stores.  In the event, 
some concession was given to Cummings’ request for a postponement of the attack, 
zero hour being moved forward to 1pm, but his preferred time for a dawn attack was 
refused. As Captain C.A.H. Palairet, the brigade major, commented ‘these people 
don’t realise the time it takes to make out orders at Brigade and for them to go 3 miles 
to the …battalion commanders’.131 The impact of the late issue of orders was also felt 
by two battalions of 137 Brigade, 46th (North Midland) Division who were practicing in 
a rear area, under the assumption that the attack was scheduled for 15 March. The 
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issue of 1/5 and 1/6 Staffordshire’s movement orders, arriving at 2pm on 13 March, 
resulted in an eight-mile march in rain and darkness, many of the companies arriving 
after zero hour.132 
 All possibilities of achieving a surprise attack were negated by the artillery 
arrangements. While concessions were made to conform with the waterlogged 
ground, the rate of the barrage being increased from ‘2 to 4 minutes in 100 yards’ no 
alterations were sanctioned in the timing of the preliminary barrage to accommodate 
the change in zero hour, as evident in the following instructions.133 Thus: 
continuation G.698 attack will take place tonight… artillery programme is 
cancelled and the following substituted… modifications as in telephone 
conversation to artillery programmes… zero 1am instead of 11.45pm… timings 
altered in proportion with the exception of Heavy bombardment which remains 
at 10-10.30pm.134 
 
The failure to adjust the barrage timings left the assault troops facing the ordeal of 
attacking in darkness across unknown ground, the preliminary bombardment serving 
only in alerting the enemy to an impending attack.   
 The lack of organisational and logistical administration resulted a shortage of 
ammunition and stores. Major-General W. Thwaites, GOC 46th (North Midland) 
Division blamed this failure in part to the hurried arrangements ‘especially with 
reference to making forward dumps of S.A.A., grenades and R.E. Stores’. In contrast 
to preparations at Irles, no concessions were made to mitigate the impact of wintry 
conditions, ‘the state of the road communications [and] the impossibility of organising 
supplies of S.A.A. in the darkness’ delaying all attempts at consolidation.135  
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In contrast to the success of II Corps at Irles, the attack at Bucquoy exposed 
fundamental flaws in the command structure of V Corps. The attack was delivered with 
unseemly haste and was poorly resourced. Operational orders were subject to late 
amendments, with little time afforded for preparation.  A disregard for the brigadier’s 
views militated against the value of the ‘man on the spot’ and allowed brigade 
command little influence. Because of these constraints, opportunities for brigade 
success were significantly reduced. What assistance was provided to 91 Brigade, 
proved too little, too late. 
3.8: Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the development of brigade command within Fifth 
Army during the closing phase of the Somme and the minor actions undertaken during 
its advance towards the Hindenburg Line. Three principal conclusions have been 
drawn. First, the value of a stable and cohesive style of corps command is clear; the 
corps in which a brigade served did make a difference to its operational performance. 
This conclusion is given weight by II and V Corps’ actions during March 1917. The 
attack of 99 Brigade (II Corps) on 10 March, benefited from Jacob’s measured 
approach to planning and preparation, which were informed by the views of his brigade 
commanders. By contrast, the assault of 91 Brigade (V Corps) on 14 March, was 
shaped by a lack of preparation and flexibility, the views of the brigade commanders 
having been largely side-lined. 
The second conclusion relates to Gough’s interventionist style of command and 
the issue of late amendments to operational plans. Where this occurred, brigade staff 
were placed under inordinate pressure and attacks jeopardised. Such divergence from 




also influenced by late changes to operational plans, as crystallised by the attack of 
97 Brigade on the Munich and Frankfurt Trenches in November 1916. In these 
circumstances, the corps commander’s influence in ameliorating the impact of these 
changes was fundamental to operational success.      
The third conclusion highlights the brigade staff’s role as facilitators of change 
at a tactical level, with lessons being disseminated and codified as part of the wider 
learning process of the BEF. The desirability of devolved command at brigade level is 
shown by the need to shape operations according to a knowledge of brigade sectors, 
objectives, direction and suitable formations for attack. Where the value of ‘the man 
on the spot’ was appreciated, in accordance with the principles of FSR1, brigadiers 
were afforded enhanced tactical influence. This flexibility was evident in the brigade 
operations of II Corps. Where brigades were subject to excessive micro-management 
from corps and division, brigadiers were denied tactical flexibility. This lack of influence 
was evident in V Corps. Although the operations were significantly different in scale, 
the performance of 2nd Division’s 99 Brigade on the Ancre in November 1916, when 
serving under Fanshawe’s V Corps was in marked contrast to its success at Irles when 
serving under Jacob’s II Corps. To assess whether a similar degree of inconsistency 
was present in Second Army, the brigade operations of X and IX Corps during 1917 











The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the development of brigade command in 
Second Army during operations at Messines and Third Ypres in 1917. Three research 
questions address aspects of the operations of the brigades of X and IX Corps: first, 
to what extent did brigade operations benefit from General Sir Hubert Plumer’s 
meticulous approach to planning and preparation? Second, were these benefits 
consistent across the two corps? Third, to what extent did the direct influence of 
brigade staff reflect the BEF’s capability for adaptability and learning? The chapter 
focuses upon four spheres of brigade command: training, operational preparations, 
communications and command and control. 
4.2: X and IX Corps - Brigade Operations at Messines, 7 June 1917 
Two broad factors defined the course of brigade operations at Messines. The 
first related to the topographical and geographical features of the Messines Ridge, 
which shaped British and German perspectives alike. For the Germans, the 
predominately sandy and poorly drained soil, compelled the construction of a system 
of strongpoints designed to repel a frontal assault. In effect this constituted a ten-mile 
fortress that exploited every spur and natural feature.1 For the British, clay-rich and 
alluvium soils necessitated the construction of trenches ten metres lower than their 
 




counterparts. This caused considerable difficulties in the safe assembly of the 
brigades.2 However, the consistency of the Ypres ‘Blue’ clay, enabled the British 
tunnellers to excavate to a depth of 100 feet in preparing the mines for the preliminary 
opening of the attack.3 
 The second factor related to Plumer’s meticulous approach to operational 
planning that reflected his appreciation of the capabilities of both guns and 
ammunition. His plans were firmly based upon experience gained during the Somme, 
with an emphasis upon counter-battery work, the timetabled barrage and the efficient 
application of machine gun fire. The concentration of guns was unprecedented, 
equating to one artillery piece to every seven yards and their allocation was based 
upon careful mathematical analysis rather than a vague notion that more guns would 
guarantee success.4 Having achieved a concentration of force upon a narrow front, it 
was envisaged that the inevitable counterattack would be drawn forward into a 
combination of artillery, machine gun and small arms fire. These measures laid down 
in SS98 (Artillery Notes) and applied in conjunction with SS135, SS143 and SS145 
provided the framework upon which the offensive was conceived.5  
The benefits for brigade command of the unparalleled preparations for the 
offensive cannot be overstated. For the partnership of General Sir Herbert Plumer and 
Major-General ‘Tim’ Harington, his MGGS ‘the watchwords of Second Army were 
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‘’Trust, Training and Thoroughness’’’, the guiding principles of which were circulated 
to corps and divisional commanders on 7 June.6  From a corps commanders 
perspective, Lord Cavan noted Plumer’s willingness to ‘not only listen to ones [sic] 
difficulties, but to suggest remedies… and give decisions’.7 As Harington later recalled: 
There was not a detail of those preparations which the Army Commander 
himself did not supervise. Every gun position, every light railway for 
ammunition, every railhead, hospital and back arrangements he visited. He 
consulted Corps, Divisional and Brigade Commanders as to the best hour of 
attack, the pace of the barrage and the various objectives and other details and 
then decided himself and asked me to issue the orders.8 
 
This account encapsulates the dynamics of Plumer’s command style in exercising 
close control of his subordinate formations whilst listening and engaging closely with 
his commanders. This approach was reflected at brigade level as the staff embraced 
the principles designed to maximise the likelihood of operational success. Indeed, as 
GSO2, II Corps, Earl Stanhope considered that Jacob ‘was beloved by us all, as we 
felt that he would back up his subordinates through thick and thin’.9 In contrast, 
although Gough also ‘took great pains to make his preparations complete… his trouble 
was that success went straight to his head… and [he wanted’ his troops to push on… 
when they were tired or had suffered severely to be asked to do anymore without 
rest’.10  Whilst as Ian Beckett has highlighted, although there were many commanders 
who challenged Gough and survived, he nevertheless created a command culture 
based on fear and uncertainty.11 As Neil Malcolm stated in November 1916, in this 
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atmosphere subordinates were often unwilling to express their candid opinions for fear 
of appearing ‘disloyal’ or losing their positions.12    
 
4.3: Brigade training and preparation 
With the constant demand upon brigades to provide working parties, judicious 
use of manpower ensured that enough time was provided for training and rest with the 
front line lightly held. The brigade training schemes, implemented throughout X and XI 
Corps, reflected Plumer’s systematic attention to detail. Extraordinary measures were 
taken to replicate the ground to be crossed by the assault troops, with designated 
areas in the corps’ sectors providing similar conditions to the battlefront. A large clay 
model of the Messines Ridge ‘the size of two croquet courts’ was constructed by IX 
Corps to show the country two miles beyond the final objective.13 Similarly, on its 
training area north-east of Steenvorde, X Corps were able to practice their attack 
over ground marked out as nearly as possible to full-scale size. There was also 
a well-constructed model of the ground at 41st Division HQ… the first we had 
seen and of invaluable assistance in the explanation of all detail.14 
  
The brigades trained over flagged courses, the training schemes stressing the 
importance of tracing assembly lines in parallel with the enemy lines.15 Where specific 
topographical difficulties were envisaged, a greater degree of flexibility was built into 
the training as befitted the platoon’s function as a flexible fighting unit, their ‘exact 
formations… depending upon the ground, obstacles, enemy shellfire etc.’.16 To 
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supplement the guidance afforded to subordinate commanders, special maps were 
issued to 24th Division, showing every enemy trench on the divisional front up to 2,000 
yards beyond the final objective. It was later suggested by one divisional commander 
that, despite the security risk, maps ‘should in future be placed where every officer 
and NCO could see them; YMCA huts, Field force Canteens etc.’.17 
 The framing and organisation of brigade training schemes were a major 
contribution to the BEF’s tactical reappraisal. Based upon the guidelines laid down in 
SS143, brigade staff were instrumental in developing flexibility in attack formations 
and promoting the platoon as a self-contained fighting unit. The platoon training 
scheme for 109 Brigade for example, was based upon ‘thorough organisation and the 
dissemination of to all ranks of information they should know’. After his brigade’s attack 
at Messines, Brigadier-General W.M. Withycombe commented that ‘the new platoon 
organisation was a complete success’.18 The thoroughness of training can be gauged 
from the fact that ‘officers from flanking battalions of divisions attended each other’s 
field days to ensure that in the minutest details there was harmony along the line’.19 
 Lessons garnered from brigade operations at Messines were disseminated and 
provided the basis for further training prior to the corps’ operations at Third Ypres. 
Based upon their experiences, all subordinate commanders were provided with 
guidance as to the form in which their narrative should be submitted for the purpose 
of future training.20 In response, the brigade training schemes conformed to a 
consistent pattern. The brigades of 11th Division participated in two days of platoon 
training, two each of company battalion instruction and one day for the whole brigade. 
 
17 TNA, WO 95/2190, 24th Div. WD, ‘Notes collected by 24th Division as a result of the attack on 7 June 1917’. 
18 TNA, WO 95/2491, 36th Div. WD, ‘Narrative of part taken by 36th (Ulster) Division in the Operations against 
Messines’, comments of GOC 109 Brigade. 
19 C. Falls, History of the 36th (Ulster) Division (Belfast: M’Caw, Stevenson and Orr, 1922), p.83. 




A stress upon devolved command was evident in an exercise to test the initiative of 
junior commanders. Based upon the guidance provided by SS159, the scheme 
required company and platoon commanders to find immediate solutions to tactical 
problems.21 With a focus upon ‘vigorous training in flank liaison’, combined exercises 
also took place between 32 Brigade and the brigades of 20th and 48th (South Midland) 
Divisions. Similar combined exercises were designed to exploit the advantages to be 
gained by the employment of contact aeroplanes and wireless.22 The implementation 
of these measures reflected the brigadier’s responsibility for ensuring that his 
battalions were suitably equipped and in possession of the skills required for them to 
fight successfully. In turn, the training and leadership provided by the brigade 
commander generated confidence and high morale throughout the brigade.   
 A fine balance existed within the measures implemented by brigade command 
in finding time for training and the provision of sufficient working parties.  However, the 
training undertaken before and after Messines in the brigades of X and XI Corps, 
reflected the BEF’s efforts to improve training methods and to develop better tactics. 
The experiences of the Somme laid the foundation for tactical appraisal and the tactics 
which the British armies were to employ throughout 1917. Many publications designed 
to aid the training of formations and units provided the basis of brigade training. Of 
these, SS143 was a tactical milestone in platoon training and ultimately brigade 
success. By 1917 a system of schools at army, corps, divisional and brigade level had 
been established. A combination of these measures constituted the foundation upon 
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which brigades steadily improved their efficiency and competence, their development 
aligned with that of the wider BEF. 
The dissemination of tactical lessons and the implementation of training 
schemes across Second Army reflected the development of brigade command as an 
integral part of the BEF’s wider learning process. The benefits afforded by a thorough 
knowledge of brigade sectors also denoted a progressive line of development within 
the organisational and tactical acuity of brigade staff. In the brigades of 36th Division 
(IX Corps), the attention of battalion and company commanders was drawn to ensuring 
that ‘the routes to the front line were thoroughly reconnoitred, day and night, by Platoon 
Officers’.23 All eventualities were addressed in the brigades of 11th Division. Thus: 
The division is liable to be used on any part of IX Corps Front… [and] it is 
necessary that officers of all units should have a good knowledge of the Corps 
Front especially of the different lines of approach… and of the main 
topographical features… through which the advance beyond our trenches will 
be made.24  
 
In conjunction with artillery and machine gun practice attacks, brigades arranged 
substantial raids to gather intelligence while assessing the ability of the assault troops 
to keep close to the barrage.25 Reports submitted daily, by infantry and artillery 
officers, provided an up to date picture of the extent of the wire cutting programme on 
both corps’ fronts.26 In essence ‘each brigadier [was given] as much information as 
possible and in as much detail as possible’.27 
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 The benefits of this information were evident in the attack of 23rd Division (X 
Corps) on 7 June. During 69 and 70 Brigades advance into the enemy lines, between 
the Zwarteleen Spur and Mount Sorrel, acting upon careful reconnaissance, plans for 
the attack took maximum advantage of the irregular terrain. To avoid an advance over 
the marshy ground of the valley, the units attacked on each side of the valley ‘the inner 
flanks of the two brigades… being directed so as to bring them in touch on the enemy’s 
support line at the head of the re-entrant’. With the ground ‘previously studied on the 
training ground, the infantry followed the perfect barrage without the smallest 
hesitation’.28 
 As with all aspects of Second Army’s planning, the organisational and logistical 
elements of planning at brigade level were subject to consultation and dialogue. In 
preparation for his division’s attack, Major-General O.S.W. Nugent, GOC 36th Division, 
invited his brigadiers for their opinions on all administrative arrangements. One 
suggestion put forward by Nugent, that to avoid unnecessary strain upon the assault 
troop ‘reliefs should take place every 24 or 48 hours, up to 2 days before the attack, 
by battalions not participating’ was met with disfavour. It was the concerted opinion of 
the brigadiers that ‘frequent reliefs would cause more casualties and more fatigue… 
than would be compensated by the advantage gained’. As an alternative, it was 
suggested that it should be possible ‘to hold the line with one Battalion and if that could 
be done then matter of reliefs would be greatly simplified’. Similar flexibility was 
allowed in the choice of equipment used in the attack. Where, for example, 109 
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Brigade preferred their men to carry a pack, other brigades preferred a haversack, 
Nugent merely stipulating that ‘all Battalions in each brigade must carry the same’.29 
  Brigade logistic arrangements reflected the importance of maintaining an 
adequate supply of S.A.A. and resources to consolidate the first objective and provide 
enough ammunition for the second phase of the attack. For 109 Brigade M.G.C., a 
total of 5,000 rounds of S.S.A. per gun was carried forward under company 
arrangements and in accordance with SS143.30 With 16 pack animals held in 
readiness, guidance for the distribution of the ammunition was issued by the brigade 
staff to the battalion commanders. Thus: 
This will need careful preparation and organisation if the distribution is to be 
carried out expeditiously and without confusion. The Battalion Commanders 
must decide whether the stores should be laid down at the assembly trench 
allotted to each platoon or whether all the carriers will be sent forward before 
the rest of the Battalion to get their loads and join their respective platoons as 
they come up.31 
 
The experience gained at brigade level assisted other units in their logistic 
arrangements. Brigadier-General H. Gordon, GOC 70 Brigade, 23rd Division 
suggested improvements in the construction of S.A.A. dumps to avoid localised loss 
by shelling through ‘having dumps close up and more numerous and smaller with a 
large Brigade reserve 800 yards in the rear’. Clearly this lesson was based upon 
personal experience, Gordon noting that ‘a large Brigade Reserve, 1,000 yards in the 
rear, had took fire and this might have caused a shortage… [It is better to have several 
smaller R.E. Dumps further up’. In respect to the movement of ammunition and stores, 
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he maintained that only tried NCOs should be detailed for the Brigade (three officers 
and 100 men) and Battalion (one officer and 50 men) carrying parties.32  
  The benefits of a systematic approach to administrative and logistic planning 
at brigade level were consistent throughout X and IX Corps. A culture of consultation 
and dialogue provided brigade commanders with a substantial degree of influence in 
preparation and planning as befitted their roles as coordinators and supervisors of 
their brigade. Their contribution to tactical evaluation also ensured that operational 
best practice was captured and duly disseminated. For example, Harington (MGGS) 
provided his counterpart in Fourth Army with pamphlets based upon Second Army’s 
operations at Messines, including suggestions for improvements in existing practice.33 
Subsequently incorporated into the SS training pamphlets, this practice, as Fox 
demonstrated, provided ‘a way of distributing best practice without revamping 
wholesale FSR’. 34 To this extent, the tactical debate, fuelling the BEF’s efforts to break 
the stalemate of the Western Front, was enhanced by the contributions of brigade 
command.   
The administrative and logistical measures undertaken by Second Army at 
Messines provided brigade command with maximum operational and tactical benefits. 
Equally, the measures implemented to ensure the smooth and rapid flow of 
communications influenced the capability of brigade commanders to sustain effective 
tactical control. As Hall has demonstrated, the meticulous preparation, limited 
objectives and successful of counter-battery fire ‘made for a generally positive picture 
as far as communications were concerned’.35 These preconditions were essential for 
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effective communication and their benefits a requirement for brigade operational 
success.  
At the heart of Second Army’s preparations was the establishment of a Forward 
Army Report Centre at Locre designed to link army headquarters with the attacking 
corps’. This enabled ‘information from all available sources of the Army to be obtained 
by the quickest possible manner... with the least delay’.36 The primacy of intelligence 
was promoted with the establishment of Corps Advanced Intelligence Report 
Centres.37  The judicious employment of Liaison Officers (LO) provided essential links 
between subordinate levels of command and was considered by Lieutenant-General 
Sir Thomas Morland, GOC X Corps as ‘the eyes and ears of the Corps commander’.38 
Thus ‘Liaison, Brigade and Battalion Intelligence Officers proved invaluable in 
assisting the Brigade Majors… and going forward to ascertain the exact position’. 
Providing the link between brigade and battalion, LOs attached to brigade 
headquarters also ‘supervised runners where the Staff Officers had been detached for 
special duties’.39  A comprehensive system of LOs was employed to maintain 
communications between infantry brigade headquarters and the artillery. This called 
for Senior LOs ‘to direct and coordinate all liaison arrangements between the Artillery 
and Infantry Brigades, to transmit information to R.A.H.Q. and F.A Brigades… [whilst] 
acting as Artillery Advisor to GOC Brigade’. For this purpose, it was laid down that 
‘Junior LOs with Battalions will act in accordance with [the Senior LOs] instructions’.40 
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Overall, their employment by X Corps provided brigade staff with a timely and accurate 
picture of the battle, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert, GOC 69 Brigade, 23rd Division 
considering that ‘communications between the Artillery Liaison Officer and Brigade 
Headquarters [were] exceptionally valuable’.41 The adoption of these innovative 
measures represented a further incremental stage in the evolution of brigade 
command and their capacity for adaptation and flexibility.    
  Whilst two thirds of Second Army’s field artillery provided a creeping barrage, 
a further third were detailed to provide standing barrages ‘within the limits as dictated 
by the Creeping Barrage’ to target centres of resistance.42 To enable brigade HQ to 
call upon the assistance of the artillery and sustain a consistent flow of information to 
and from the R.F.A. and Group Commanders, a comprehensive network of 
communications was established. These arrangements adhered closely with the 
principles laid down in SS148. Based upon the ‘grid’ system employed at Arras, 
telegraph and telephone lines were buried at a depth of six feet as far forward as 
battalion headquarters. Wireless sets were issued as far forward as Advanced 
Battalion Headquarters.43 Within 36th Division, a strict allocation of telephone lines, to 
avoid unnecessary traffic, restricted ‘the number of lines laid forward of the cable head 
not to… 3 pairs per Brigade…  in addition to each Artillery Group laying an overhead 
pair and FOOs laying their line to Brigade Forward Stations’. A suggestion that 
‘telephone lines be abolished entirely in front of Brigade Headquarters’ was received 
with opposition from GOC 109 Brigade.44 
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 The role of brigade staff in establishing Brigade Forward [or Advanced] Stations 
(BFS) as quickly as possible was crucial to tactical control. For example, on IX Corps’ 
front during the morning of the attack, aided by the success of the counter-battery fire 
and the enemy’s weak response, Brigadier-General P. Leveson-Gower’s 49 Brigade, 
16th (Irish) Division, established his BFS at an early stage from which ‘information 
[was] rapidly sent back… and the necessity of good Command Posts… demonstrated’. 
Similarly, 19th Division’s 57 Brigade left nothing to mischance, brigade orders 
stipulating that 
“A” detachment of the Brigade forward party will go with the 4th line of the 
attacking battalions and establish the Brigade Forward Station at a designated 
post. The battalion forward station will lay its wire back to Brigade Forward 
Station and a detachment must be sent back to… to lay a cable to meet the 
detachment coming from the Brigade Battle HQ. Relay Runner posts… must 
then be established on the route.45 
 
While the preliminary arrangements for communications for Messines were 
meticulously addressed, the operations nevertheless exposed the difficulties 
encountered in sustaining tactical control at brigade level during an extended advance. 
The loss of control experienced by the brigades of 16th (Irish) Division echoed the 
losses incurred during previous offensives, where Brigade Forward Stations were 
exposed to enemy shellfire. In 23rd Division’s 69 Brigade, the party detailed to 
establish the brigade post was ‘practically wiped out going forward’. In 70 Brigade, 
despite ‘the rapidity with which a telephone line was laid from 8/Yorkshire to Brigade 
Headquarters’ communications deteriorated as the attack progressed and remained 
‘indifferent… owing to the loss of signalling equipment’.46 In the aftermath of 
operations, the attention of brigade commanders turned to the difficulties encountered 
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in retaining communications during a distant advance. Brigadier-General T.A. Cubitt, 
GOC 57 Brigade, 19th (Western) Division suggested that ‘to conform to the distance 
between Brigade and Battalion, Division should establish an advanced exchange so 
as to shorten the Brigade communication front’.47 
With communications constituting the lifeblood of command and control at 
brigade level, the preliminary arrangements were generally perceived as having 
provided ‘the necessary organisation for quickly disseminating information’.48 The 
difficulties arose, in some sectors, as the Brigade Forward Stations advanced and 
became increasingly exposed to enemy fire. In this respect, those staff sent forward, 
remained equally as vulnerable as during the battles of 1915. This pattern, underlining 
the difficulties in maintaining communication forward of brigade headquarters would 
continue, the losses experienced spiking during the German offensives of March 
1918.49  
  Operations conducted at Messines reflected Second Army’s style of command. 
A focus upon meticulous preparation was duplicated throughout corps command to 
the benefit of brigades. The relative success of the brigade operations reinforces the 
argument that the corps under which a brigade served influenced their battlefield 
performance. Through a process of consultation and mutual support, the 
organisational and tactical influence of brigade command was energised. It has been 
demonstrated that the tactical influence exercised at brigade level relied solely upon 
the establishment of a comprehensive and effective system of communications. To 
determine whether these benefits were transposed onto brigade operations conducted 
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at Third Ypres, the remainder of this chapter examines the operations undertaken by 
X and XI Corps on 20-25 September 1917. 
4.4: Third Ypres – 20-25 September 1917 
Lieutenant-General Sir Hubert Plumer’s proposals for Second Army’s 
operations during the second phase of the Ypres offensive were dictated by cautious 
planning and a succession of ‘bite and hold’ operations subject to limited objectives.50 
Reflecting the shape of the Messines operations, the assault upon the Gheluvelt 
Plateau promised no incisive advances and a slow operational tempo: its purpose to 
capture those strongpoints which had eluded Fifth Army during August. Several 
advantages, compared to those afforded to Fifth Army, defined Plumer’s planning and 
preparation. 
 First, for a few weeks at least, a spell of dry weather was forecast, the folly of 
attacking through deep mud having been acknowledged. Second, a concentration of 
artillery and ammunition along a frontage of 14,500 yards provided a concentration of 
shells three times larger than that employed on 31 July. Third, in contrast to Gough, 
whose attack had involved an advance of 4,000 yards, Plumer adopted a more 
calculated approach. In recognising that the depth of an attack should be defined by 
‘the ground that can be covered by the artillery and the limit of endurance of the 
infantry’ Second Army’s advance was designed to conform comfortably to the range 
of the artillery at 1,600 yards, rather than a distant geographical objective.51 The 
formations for the attack were significantly shaped by the configuration of the German 
defensive system. Objectives were ‘selected according to the lie of the land and [those] 
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which gave the greatest advantages to defeat the enemy counter-attack, there [being] 
no longer any definite lines of trenches to form objectives’. With attacks proposed in 
greater depth, carefully regulated to ensure mutual support between successive 
waves, it was considered that ‘there was little to add to the principles laid down in 
SS144 ‘the New Organisation [having] worked well’.52   
The brigade operations conducted by X and XI Corps have been examined in 
relation to Plumer’s calculated approach to the resumption of the offensive. The case 
study focuses on operations between 20-25 September (the Battle of the Menin Road) 
seen through the prism of two spheres of influence exercised by brigade command.53  
The first focuses principally upon the preparation and planning of brigade operations 
in 23rd Division (X Corps). The second examines command and control in the brigades 
of 23rd Division and 19th Division (IX Corps) on 20 September. A similar approach was 
applied to the brigade operations of 39th Division (X Corps) during the resumption of 
the attack on 25 September. Finally, the lessons from the operations were evaluated 
to determine the extent to which they benefited further operations.  
4.5: X Corps: Brigade Operations 20 September - Preparations 
The preparations undertaken by brigade staff for the attack of 20 September 
conformed to Second Army’s meticulous command style and echoed preliminary 
arrangements made at Messines. The painstaking work undertaken by the brigade 
staff of 23rd Division provides a clear example of the focus upon reconnaissance 
throughout X Corps. The procedures undertaken by 68 and 69 Brigades were intended 
to survey the Basseville Becke valley ‘which formed a considerable obstacle… 
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rendered difficult by much marshy ground and its northern end blocked by high ground 
from which dangerous enfilade fire could be brought’.54 Acting upon the advice of 
Second Army Intelligence, a close study of air photographs was undertaken. This 
confirmed, that between the place of assembly and the brigades’ objective, where the 
elevation had prevented direct observation, there was an area of boggy ground ‘where 
it had been inferred that the prolonged shellfire had probably shattered the natural 
barriers of the lake’.55  
 Acting upon this information in framing his plans, Brigadier-General G.N. 
Colville, GOC 68 Brigade, arranged for ‘the centre Company of the 10/Northumberland 
Fusiliers to move… eastwards intending to afterwards sidestep to its objective’ and so 
circumvent the marshy ground.56 In 69 Brigade, through the diligent use of patrols, the 
average width and depth of the stream was established, this intelligence being 
supplemented by information sought ‘from reliable refugees’ as to the structure of the 
sub-soil. Based upon this intelligence, it was concluded that ‘there is no question about 
any portion of this stream or its neighbourhood being impossible for the infantry’.57 In 
the event, the attack proceeded with clockwork precision: ‘patrols being pushed 
forward… as close as possible to the standing barrage and crossings over the 
Basseville Beek and surrounding boggy ground’ established.58 
 Close cooperation between 23rd Division and 68 Brigade staff ensured that 
arrangements were put in place for their companies to pass through the area to be 
captured by 69 Brigade in order to reach their objectives beyond Dumbarton Lakes. 
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This movement was calculated to avoid confusion ‘with posts and guides arranged to 
pass them through… all the companies reaching their allotted places in time to get 
close to the barrage’. Similar arrangements were provided for the companies of 68 
Brigade in passing through the area allotted for 41st Division.59 The benefits of previous 
observation and of those derived from Colville’s tactical acuity were demonstrated in 
his arrangements for the assembly of the battalions. Having established the enemy’s 
practice lines, he ensured that all support and carrying companies were well up in 
advance of the forward trenches before zero hour. In the event this decision proved a 
crucial one for, as Colville later reported, ‘at 4.30am the enemy put a barrage on this 
trench system, this verifying my conjecture’.60  
 The systematic approach to preparations, combined with Colville’s combat 
experience and tactical proficiency influenced the course of 68 Brigade’s operation. 
Capitalising upon all sources of information and intelligence, a detailed picture of the 
brigade frontage and the enemy’s intentions was established. This enabled the 
brigade staff to ensure that all measures designed to moderate the difficulties 
encountered by the assault battalions were successfully implemented. This decisive 
approach signified the gradual emergence of a new generation of professional and 
knowledgeable brigadiers able to adapt to combat conditions.61 
The importance of intelligence capture and interpretation, as illustrated by the 
brigade staff of 68 Brigade, was not confined to X Corps.  In response to the 
operational needs of its constituent forces, Second Army interacted with Fifth Army in 
seeking advice. The brigades of Fifth Army’s II Corps for example, benefited from 
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information sourced from successive divisions holding the same sector of the line, 
particularly the three brigades of 56th (1st London) Division. All three brigades prior to 
their attack at Glencorse Wood on 16 August were issued with ‘detailed drawings to 
be read with the 1/10,000 sheet of 18th Division… outlining the method of holding the 
brigade sectors [and the] suggested dispositions of the Battalions’.62 Subsequently, 
based upon this map and the lessons gained from their attack, information was shared 
with the brigades of 23rd Division (X Corps), detailed to attack over the same ground 
on 20 September. This information was supplemented by a series of questionnaires 
issued to the brigade commanders of 56th Division, intended ‘to elicit full information 
which may be of benefit to the Division concerned and will probably be extremely 
valuable to any units which may be called upon later to attack over the same ground’.63  
Based upon 167 Brigade’s experiences on 16 August, the prevailing conditions 
influencing operations at Glencorse Wood and Polygon Wood were discussed in a 
report by CO 2/London and distributed to the brigades of 23rd Division a month before 
their attack on 20 September.64 Information was not confined to matters of terrain. 
Regarding the most suitable formation for attack, Brigadier-General G.H.B. Freeth, 
GOC 167 Brigade, stated that ‘the method of attack at Glencorse Wood failed to adapt 
itself’ against the enemy’s outer zone of defences. In order to conform with the 
configuration of this outer zone, he suggested the employment of ‘a 2-company front, 
each of 2 platoons in line, with support and reserves’.65 This proposal was endorsed 
by Brigadier-General E.S. De E. Coke, GOC 169 Brigade who advocated that reserves 
should ‘be dribbled forward in an attempt to exhaust the enemy’s counterattacking 
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troops before going on… instead of doing it afterwards’.66 The sharing of information 
is evidence of learning and progression in tactical thought. Lessons were adopted and 
implemented to the benefit of brigade command. Through an exchange of ideas and 
information, individual formations were able to develop their own solutions. These 
examples support Fox’s argument that ‘irrespective of time and place, individuals used 
the best means at their disposal to obtain the ends that they desired’.67       
  Measures designed to identify obstacles upon brigade fronts and the staff’s 
responses to them, represented a seminal step in the development of brigade 
command. Whilst the principles of reconnaissance remained in accordance with those 
laid down in FSR1, innovative technological and organisational procedures provided 
new dimensions.68 Progressive improvements in the quality of air photography brought 
clarity to the irregularities of brigade areas. The breadth and depth of aerial coverage 
created a wealth of material to ascertain enemy intentions, attack frontages being 
scrutinised for changes in the enemy dispositions which were disseminated to brigade 
command and helped shape the formation of attacks.69 Brigade command’s adoption 
of innovative methods and technique reflected the tempo of the BEF’s organisational 
and tactical development. 
4.6: IX Corps-Brigade Operations, 20 September: Preparations 
The attack of Major-General G.T.M Bridges’s 19th (Western) Division (IX 
Corps), detailed to establish the southern flank between Groenenburg Farm and the 
Comines Canal, merits a close examination in relation to the arrangements and tactical 
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influence exercised by the brigadiers. With three weeks respite between the close of 
Second Army’s operations at Pilckem Ridge and the resumption of the offensive, 
ample time was made available for preparations.  The arrangements of 57 and 58 
Brigades show clear evidence of the effective use of this time, the divisional front 
having been taken over on 12 September.  Brigade training took precedence over the 
preparation of the ground, both time and labour only permitting ‘the bare necessities 
to be undertaken i.e., routes for brigade assembly, communication trenches and aid 
posts’. Routes were carefully marked out to ‘circumvent our own gun positions which 
were subject to frequent counter-battery fire and to avoid [the targeted] crossings over 
the canal’. Whilst it was later considered that if more labour had been invested in 
providing cover, casualties amongst the reserves might have been lessened, Bridges’ 
opinion remained that ‘there was no doubt that the policy of having well trained and 
fresh troops… at the expense of preparing the front… was proved right in this case’.70 
While these arrangements proved beneficial, the late arrival of reinforcements, to bring 
the battalions up to strength, underlined the difficulties encountered in incorporating 
fresh troops into depleted formations. Bridges later commented that ‘reinforcements 
were only received 3 or 4 days before the attack… and therefore they went into the 
fight before coming acquainted with their leaders and with very little training’.71  
 From 15 September, while the assault troops detailed for the attack were 
afforded four days of rest, ‘time at battalion level was devoted to the completion of 
arrangements… instructions having been received from Brigade from time to time’.72 
The efficient use of time ensured that arrangements for the brigade staffs and Brigade 
Signal Companies were suitably advanced, with the GOsC of 57 and 58 Brigades 
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sharing a double Brigade Battle HQ which was opened on 18 September.73 This was 
in accordance with instructions issued by IX and X Corps ensuring that brigades 
opened their battle headquarters as early as possible and placing a detachment of the 
Brigade Signals Companies at their disposal.74 Communication arrangements were 
designed to compensate for the loss of cable routes forward of brigade headquarters 
as the Germans ‘targeted labour parties undertaking construction work by night’ 
leaving routes exposed and incomplete.75 Five miles of cable were amassed at the 
Brigade Forward Station, complemented by an eclectic range of alternative 
communications including wireless, visual, Power Buzzers and pigeons.76 In 
accordance with the stress placed upon liaison, the whole of 56 and 57 Brigade 
‘Instructions for the Offensive’ outlined the comprehensive arrangements for the 
employment of Liaison Officers.77  A combination of these measures ensured that 
arrangements for brigade operations were suitably advanced.   
Plumer’s guiding principles were preparation and flexibility, with priority given 
to the control of reserves.78 These were reflected in the attack formations adopted by 
the brigades to deal with an immediate enemy counterattack. The principles of this 
formation were laid down in SS144 and involved keeping reserves under the direct 
 
73 TNA, WO 95/2088, 58 Brigade WD, Instructions for the Offensive, Part 1, (20), 12 September 1917. 
74 TNA, WO 95/2055, 19th Div. WD, 19th Division ‘Instructions for the Offensive’ G.127 and appendix 1, 
‘Communications’, G.127/0/27, 17 September 1917. 
75 Hall, Communications, p.219. See also J. Lee ‘Command and Control in Battle: British Divisions on the Menin 
Road, 20 September 1917’ in Sheffield and Todman, Command and Control, pp.119-39. 
76 TNA, WO 95/2088, 58 Brigade WD, Instructions for the Offensive, Part 1, Communications, 16 September 
1917 – Buried Cable Systems under OC Divisional Signals Company and 2 Companies of 56 Brigade Signals 
permanently attached. Despite a rather lacklustre performance during the Somme offensive, by early 1917 the 
British commanders were beginning to realise the potential of wireless technology.  The Power Buzzer or Earth 
Induction Set used a 15–200-yard base line for the transmission of electrical impulses through the ground 
which were picked up by a receiving amplifier between 2,000 – 5,000 yards away. They were particularly prone 
to enemy interception. 
77 Ibid, Instruction No.5 for the Offensive, Part 1, 12 September 1917. 




control of battalion and brigade commanders.79 The success of this arrangement 
depended upon setting minimum objectives and the capability of the artillery to provide 
consistent firepower throughout the attack. This arrangement for the brigades of 19th 
Division ‘proved right against the present German defence system’.80 Devolution of 
responsibility ensured that each company, upon arriving on its first objective, had one 
platoon in reserve, each battalion one company and each brigade one battalion. Each 
commander had therefore troops available to clear any previously undetected enemy 
positions, reinforce units which had suffered heavy casualties or repel any 
counterattacks. A battalion commander would be sent forward from brigade 
headquarters ‘to judge the whole tactical situation… and was given power to employ 
any portion of the reserve troops as he thought fit without asking for the sanction of 
the Brigade Commander’.81 The historian of the Cheshire Regiment considered that 
‘one might think that this was the Brigade Commander’s duty and place, if someone 
is to command his reserves, it is not clear what purpose the Brigade Commander 
serves in battle’.82 This comment failed to comprehend the advance in tactics that 
these measures represented, especially in dealing with counterattacks and 
ameliorating breakdowns in communications. 
The movements of the battalions of 19th Division’s three brigades, informed by 
intelligence supplied by Brigade Intelligence Officers, Corps observers and contact 
aircraft, demonstrated the benefits derived from the appropriate deployment of 
reserves. For example, acting upon intelligence provided from air reconnaissance, a 
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message was sent from 19th Division HQ to Brigadier-General A.E. Glasgow, GOC 58 
Brigade stating that ‘we have got another contact map and it shows a gap of about 
500m yards at Hessian Wood. I will give you the coordinates [and] have sent you a 
telegram so you must not let it worry you’.83 Acting upon this information, in order to 
clear the eastern half of the wood, Glasgow requested that ‘the 2 remaining 
Companies of the battalion of 56 Brigade be placed at [his] disposal’.84 Consequently, 
divisional orders were issued to 56 Brigade for ‘the release of the 7/King’s Own to be 
placed at the disposal of 58 Brigade… 56 Brigade to move forward another Battalion 
to replace [it]’.85  
 The twin benefits provided by a comprehensive communication network and 
the efficient use of reserves was a major step forward in the operational performance 
of brigades. If a smooth and reliable system of communication existed forward of 
brigade headquarters, brigadiers were given enhanced tactical flexibility, being 
provided with the means to deploy reserves at an opportune time. Successive 
companies leapfrogging from one objective to the next were ensured the support of a 
reserve company to assist in consolidation or deal with local counterattacks. Thus, 
during 19th Division’s attack, the left brigade ‘attacked with 3 companies and 1 in 
reserve… each leapfrogging on the first objective to attack the second’.86 These 
arrangements, designed to sustain tempo and provide for consolidation, were a further 
step in the tactical development of brigade command.  
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4.7: The attack of 23rd Division, 20 September 1917 
Morland’s X Corps’s attack on 20 September highlighted the degree of 
responsibility devolved to brigade command. As John Lee has argued, the exchange 
between Major-General J.M. Babington, GOC 23rd Division and Morland demonstrates 
‘that the British generals were far more tactically aware than their critics gave them 
credit for’.87 On 11 September Babington, in response to a Corps memorandum, 
confirmed that he was aware of the threat of enemy counterattacks but intended 
leaving the details to his brigade commanders. Thus: 
I have impressed on the Brigadiers concerned the necessity of having their 
reserves suitably positioned to meet any counter-attacks, but I submit that the 
actual time when their reserves should move be left to the G.O.C concerned. 88 
 
This confirms that while divisional command retained executive control over the 
conduct of the battle, brigade command was given enhanced flexibility. This is evident 
in the dispositions of 68 and 69 Brigades on 20 September whose arrangements were 
‘carried out without a hitch’ although complicated 
by the necessity to ensure that at least one Company of the 8/Yorks was 
available soon after zero as Brigade Reserve… and that the force detailed for 
attack… should take their place into the forward area in sufficient time and by 
progressive stages without confusion through the “bottlenecks” which were the 
only means of ingress.89 
 
Thus, arrangements undertaken by 69 Brigade’s staff were designed to moderate the 
difficulties encountered by the narrowness of the brigade frontage with  
the advance [being] arranged in two waves… the principle of allotting one 
battalion to clear its own area and consolidate in depth [being] found to work 
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well… in reducing the risk of confusion as there was when more than one 
battalion attacked the same objective.90  
 
Whilst these measures provided an element of flexibility the benefits derived 
from the deployment of the Reserve Brigade were multi-faceted, with two battalions of 
70 Brigade being ‘suitably placed to resist a counterattack and where some cover is 
available [to ensure] that they are not shaken and remain as fresh as possible’.91 
These measures accorded with Morland’s instructions that ‘although he did not wish 
to interfere with GOsC and Brigades in making their dispositions’, he stressed that ‘the 
actions of the Brigades should be in the form of an immediate counterattack’.92  
 Suitable arrangements for the disposition of the battalions were accomplished 
by the judicious employment of the brigade LOs assisted by personnel from the 
Reserve Brigade. Having spent ‘four days in the line and undertaken a large amount 
of patrolling and two raids’ the reserve brigade’s staff were conversant with the brigade 
sector.93 To establish close liaison between the two assault brigades Brigadier-
General H. Gordon, GOC 70 Brigade requested that ‘accommodation be found at 68 
and 69 Brigades Headquarters for 1 officer and 4 Scouts… who would be sent at 7pm 
preceding “Attack Day” and if desired to be sent forward with the battalions’.94 
 The deployment of 68 Brigade’s reserves influenced the course of the attack in 
serving a dual tactical purpose. The reserve company of 12/Durham Light Infantry 
‘followed the 11/Northumberland Fusiliers to await [brigade] orders and to form an 
advanced ammunition dump well forward of the enemy’s barrage’. This company then 
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took part in further fighting, assisting in consolidation and the reinforcement of 
advanced parties. Throughout the day, subject to ‘the constant and pressing demand 
for S.A.A.’ Brigadier-General G.N. Colville, GOC 68 Brigade, organised a consistent 
flow of ammunition ‘employing the personnel of the T.M.B. for carrying where it was 
urgently needed’.95 The safe retention and timely deployment of reserves was a crucial 
factor in sustaining the tempo of an attack or repelling counterattacks. The constant 
flow of ammunition to forward dumps was essential to success. Both these measures 
were dependent upon the organisational efficiency of the brigade staff. 
The degree of command and control provided at brigade headquarters 
remained conditional on the existence of adequate forward communications. To 
ameliorate any conceivable loss, the forward movement of battalion headquarters was 
strictly controlled by Colville. Whilst the COs were free ‘to move temporarily to Forward 
Command Posts… Battalion HQs were not allowed to move permanently without the 
previous sanction of Brigade Headquarters’. By these means, the ultimate 
responsibility for the movement of headquarters remained with the brigadier, thus 
ensuring that he retained control on the movement of his battalions. 
 As the pace and complexity of operations escalated the role of the brigade staff 
was transformed, as the move from static to semi-mobile operations needed enhanced 
flexibility. This meant a more prominent role for staff in the forward areas. Following 
23rd Division’s action at Polygon Wood on 30 September, Brigadier-General H. 
Gordon, GOC 70 Brigade was swift to acknowledge the work of his staff, writing that 
although the issue depends upon the determination and gallantry of the fighting 
troops and on the energy and initiative of their COs, yet a very heavy task falls 
upon the staff. The strain and responsibility of five days of continuous fighting 
is severe. Captain Grimwade and Captain Pyman, as Brigade Major and Staff 
 




Captain, more than justified the high opinion I have of them. I cannot say too 
much of the ability and devotion to duty of the Brigade Major with little or no 
sleep he worked continuously and his cool judgement and quick grasp merit 
particular notice.96  
 
Similarly, Gordon considered that the manner in which the various phases of the battle 
had been handled by his COs had demonstrated ‘a ready grasp of the situation… 
[using] their reserves in manner which proved their capability as leaders’. Similarly, 
credit was given to the runners and Brigade Signal Company for their contribution in 
maintaining communications to and from brigade headquarters. The close cooperation 
between the infantry and artillery also attracted Gordan’s attention, the infantry being 
supported with great energy by Lieutenant-Colonel Butler (33rd Divisional Artillery 
Group) who provided ‘sound advice and appreciation of the situation’.97   
 Arrangements for brigade operations on 20 September were broadly consistent 
across X and IX Corps reflecting Second Army’s approach to operations which gave 
a significant degree of flexibility to brigade commanders. This was particularly evident 
in the disposition of the reserves brigades from where brigadiers were able to order 
their deployment as and when it was necessary to repel counterattacks. The 
procedure conformed to the principles in FSR1 that laid down ‘sufficient troops were 
[to be] held in reserve for immediate counter-attack’.98 The close cooperation 
established between the brigade staffs was reflected in the mutual support and 
assistance rendered across the division. These measures helped to influence the 
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development of brigade command as Second Army adjusted to the challenges 
imposed by German defence in depth. 
4.8: The attack of 118 Brigade, 25 September 1917 
The flexibility experienced by the brigades of 39th Division (X Corps) also merits 
evaluation in relation to their timely deployment of reserves. This was evident in 118 
Brigade’s (Brigadier-General E.H.C.P. Bellingham) attack on Tower Hamlets on 25 
September. This operation was shaped by a reduction in the front and depth of the 
advance, designed to compensate for the difficulty in getting the artillery forward. 
Heavy hostile fire resulted in the loss of forward communications and affected 
Bellingham’s efforts to reorganise his units after the initial advance. He reported that 
‘he had no idea what was happening with the…  1/1 Cambridgeshires’.99 This situation 
was exacerbated by the fact that the battalion HQ, shared with 4/5 Black Watch’s HQ, 
was under continuous shellfire, ‘with six of the best signallers and runners killed during 
the morning’.100 With cables cut, forcing the use of lamps to communicate at Advanced 
Brigade HQ, ‘three hours was required for messages to pass from the Brigade Forward 
Station to company commanders… runners having to bolt from shell hole to shell 
hole’.101  
 Despite these difficulties, the disposition and timely deployment of battalion 
reserves provided Bellingham with tactical flexibility. The arrangements for the attack 
had conformed to the retention of reserves at each subordinate level ‘the battalions 
attacking in 3 platoons in 3 waves, each Company having a platoon in reserve… and 
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each battalion one Company as Battalion Reserve’.  Having been stiffened by the 
reserve company of 1/1 Cambridgeshires, the assault battalions reached their final 
objective only to be forced to give ground.102 At this point, with a further battalion (1/1 
Hertfordshires) at his disposal, Bellingham established ‘a better tactical line than the 
one shown on the objective [being] just below the Western edge of the Ridge’. Then, 
with communications partially restored, he was able to call upon the artillery and ‘turn 
the guns onto… enemy movements’ and break up three counterattacks.103 With 
communications eventually re-established, tactical control was restored.  
The experiences of 118 Brigade underlines the extent of tactical development 
at brigade level throughout 1916-1917. On reporting to 118 Brigade HQ in June 1916, 
Lieutenant-Colonel E. Riddell, 1/Cambridgeshires had discovered that in 39th Division 
there were ‘no rules governing tactics’ leaving commanders not knowing what course 
of action to pursue ‘under variable circumstances’.104 This failure to provide adequate 
instruction had been noted by the divisional commander as early as October 1915: 
‘Brigade Commanders found it difficult to systematise the training of their units owing 
to their divergent standards’.105 However, prior to the Somme offensive the 
replacement of the divisional and brigade commanders was accompanied by a 
renewed emphasis upon training.106 This was preceded by the appointment of 
additional staff, 118 Brigade receiving ‘orderly officers, a grenade officer and the OC 
of the Brigade TMB’.107 The Divisional School was reopened and courses for the 
training of instructors carried out weekly. As units steadily gained experience, the 
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syllabi of the Divisional Bombing, Signals and Machine-Gun Schools ensured that 
systemised training was undertaken ‘on a uniform basis’.108 The direct influence of the 
brigadiers was evident in the mutual support exercised between brigades. For 
example, GOC 118 Brigade gave a lecture on the use of the machine gun to the COs 
and Company OCs of both his own and 117 Brigade.109  As Robbins has demonstrated 
‘poor training was probably the single most serious weakness of the British Army’.110 
The experiences of 39th Division suggest that by the second half of 1917 this failing 
had been rectified by the implementation of appropriate training and instruction at 
brigade level.   
4.9: Tactical evaluation 
In the aftermath of operations on 20 September a series of questionnaires were 
issued to brigade commanders to elicit information and suggestions from their 
experiences. This procedure, consistent throughout Second Army, was an element of 
the BEF’s learning process and the organisational, logistic and tactical development 
of brigade command. 23rd Division’s brigadiers’s comments ranged from observations 
on the artillery support to localised issues related to communications. For example, 
Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert, GOC 69 Brigade suggested that given the little 
support provided by the tanks, they would have been ‘more useful as carriers’. When 
asked his preference for the form of the barrage, he replied 
that it would be one formed of ground bursts of Howitzers without big lateral 
spreads of shell fragments, if such a thing could be invented… [for] it’s very 
difficult to gage [sic] the shrapnel from Field guns when the front bursts are all 
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in the air and the shells are passing very close over the heads of the advancing 
infantry.111  
  
With regards to local issues, he suggested that as black was a difficult colour to 
distinguish, telephone cables should be covered with coloured material to assist the 
signallers in detecting breaks.112 As evidence that lessons were disseminated across 
a wide network, it is noteworthy that 69 Brigade was provided with notes on 4th 
Australian Division’s experiences at Polygon Would, prior to its deployment in the 
same sector on 1 October. These emphasised the effective employment of small 
platoon tactics in ‘dealing with pillboxes that were holding out’ on the brigade front and 
the need to provide a gap between successive lines to deal with enemy 
counterattacks.113  
 The responses to the questionnaire were collated and issued to all subordinate 
commanders from division level down, in the form of a Second Army memorandum. 
The recommendations, in accordance with enhanced devaluation at company and 
platoon levels, stressed training in open warfare and reinforcing ‘the initiative and 
power of Junior NCOs and Privates’. The value of laying out tapes to guide troops to 
points such as the Brigade Forward Stations and Battalion Advanced Headquarters 
was underlined.114 A further memorandum, following the renewal of the attack on 25 
September, reinforced all these measures and stressed ‘how experience had shown 
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the necessity that all Commanding Officers should be ready at any moment to form a 
defensive flank or fill a gap with their Reserves’.115   
 There was no standard approach to learning in the British armies; rather there 
was an ever-changing network of a fleeting nature. Innovations and lessons were 
identified and acted upon different ways. Irrespective of time and place, individual 
formations used the best means at their disposal to obtain the ends they desired. 
Individuals able to interpret and make sense of their experiences were able to share 
new operational knowledge through social interaction. As Fox has demonstrated, the 
army recognised these realities and possessed ‘a heightened awareness of the 
relationship between the sharing of knowledge and the promotion of learning and 
innovation’. 116 A snapshot of 23rd Divisions’ operations highlights the rapid exchange 
of knowledge and experience that comprised horizontal learning at brigade level. 
Through brigade command’s response to Second Army’s evaluation, it’s role as a 
facilitator of organisational and tactical development was corroborated.  
4.10: Conclusion 
This chapter has examined brigade operations conducted during two major 
offensives of 1917. The case studies focused on X and IX Corps to determine the 
extent that Second Army’s meticulous approach to preparation influenced operational 
performance at brigade level. The chapter examined three spheres of influence 
exercised through the multiple roles of brigade command: preparation, training and 
command and control. There are four principal conclusions. 
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 First, the meticulous preparations undertaken prior to an attack included the 
primacy of reconnaissance at brigade level. The benefits derived from this procedure 
were shown to have translated into actions designed to mitigate hostile terrain. The 
establishment of a comprehensive intelligence network, supplemented by advanced 
technological measures, harvested a wealth of intelligence on the enemy and the 
topography of the battlefield. Based upon this information, appropriate formations for 
attack were more than likely to be shaped by the irregularities of the brigade frontage 
and the disposition of the enemy’s defence-in-depth.       
Second, it has been demonstrated that where possible systematic brigade 
training schemes took precedence over the provision of large working parties. 
Subsequently, through a consistent process of operational evaluation, lessons 
deduced from the training were disseminated and incorporated into future SS 
pamphlets. This input by brigade staff included organisational and tactical matters, 
with a specific focus upon platoon and specialist training in accordance with the 
guidance laid down in SS143.117 This manual emphasised flexible self-contained 
fighting units. The basic ideas of SS143 were then reinforced by SS185 which, 
amongst other measures, contained new sections on practicing rapid counterattacks, 
as laid down in FSR1.118 During subsequent operations an instant call upon reserves, 
as befitted his traditional role, provided the brigadier with a significant degree of tactical 
flexibility. The deployment of reserves, however, was constrained by the vulnerability 
of communications, the alternatives to telephones being unreliable. Any disruption was 
likely to deny brigade staff the means to call upon artillery support to sustain tempo or 
exploit windows of opportunity. 
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The third conclusion concerns the degree of responsibility devolved to brigade 
level.  X Corps’ brigadiers had a significant degree of tactical control based upon their 
interpretation of local circumstances. Whilst the divisional commanders retained 
executive control, the dispositions and actions of the brigades were dependent upon 
the initiative and tactical acuity of the brigadiers. This approach, designed to enhance 
the tempo of an attack, reflected the capability of brigadiers to respond to the transition 
from static warfare to more flexible operations.  
A fourth conclusion concerns a transformation in the role of the brigade staff as 
the pace and complexity of operations increased. This transformation was consistent 
across Second Army’s X and IX Corps and reflected in operational planning and 
organisation. This approach reflected what Simkins argued were the conditions that 
fostered ‘the devolved command that permitted more mobile operations a year 
later’.119  The brigade staffs of both corps’ benefited from a style of command that 
encouraged consultation and open dialogue with the opinions and observations of staff 
invited. They benefited from shared intelligence and mutual support. As agents of 
change, brigade staff provided a valuable contribution to the BEF’s operational and 
tactical development. 
 Second Army’s operations were preceded by Fifth Army’s assault at 
Langemarck (16-18 August 1917). The next chapter examines this phase of the 
offensive to compare Fifth Army’s brigades’ operations with those undertaken by 
Second Army on the Menin Road.
 











This chapter examines the operations of Fifth Army’s XIV and XVIII Corps on 
31 July, and those of II and XIV Corps on 16 August 1917. The operational and logistic 
arrangements for these two phases of Third Ypres were significantly different. The aim 
of this chapter will be to establish the extent that brigade operations were shaped by 
these differing circumstances. Three questions were posed. First, to what degree did 
planning and preparations differ between the two phases of the battle? Second, how 
was brigade command able to respond to the unfavourable circumstances that defined 
the second phase? Third, to what extent did these responses reflect the BEF’s 
capacity for learning and adaptation? There are two case studies: the operations of 
39th and 51st (Highland) Divisions (XVIII Corps) on 31 July, and 8th and 56th (1/London) 
Divisions (II Corps) and 20th (Light) Division (XIV Corps) on 16 August 1917.  
 Although the opening of the offensive on 31 July did not fully realise all of 
Gough’s expectations, it achieved partial success.  Cavan’s XIV Corps and Maxse’s 
XVIII Corps, with carefully rehearsed infantry tactics and tank support advanced 
almost as far as Gravenstafel. Lieutenant-General H.E. Watt’s XIX Corps on the right 
of II Corps made the greatest advance of the day although suffering heavy casualties. 




time could deliver results’.1  In contrast, the resumption of operations on 10 August left 
little time for effective artillery preparation, which contributed to a shallow advance in 
exchange for 2,200 casualties.  As Prior and Wilson have argued, ‘the only prospect 
opened up by the favourable aspects of the fighting on 31 July was a limited 
geographical advantage’.2 However, rather than concentrating on clearing the 
Gheluvelt Plateau, Gough switched his attention back to the northern sector on 16 
August. The attack was inadequately prepared, had ineffective artillery support and 
was delivered by understrength divisions over waterlogged terrain. Similar conditions 
shaped the operations at Langemarck (16-18 August 1917). 
5.2: Fifth Army - Brigade Training 
Before establishing the factors that shaped Fifth Army’s operations, the scope 
and composition of brigade training within the formation will be examined. The 
organisation and monitoring of instruction in brigade command was a primary 
developmental factor as formations adapted to the tactical challenges imposed by the 
enemy’s defence-in-depth. Rigorous training programmes were used throughout all 
four corps of Fifth Army. Guidance laid down in SS152 stated that ‘a commander will 
train the troops that they lead into action… a principle which must never be departed 
from’.3 How well this training was accomplished depended upon the commander’s 
approach. The training of each division was carried out under the direct guidance of 
the divisional commander and supervised by the corps and army. The programmes of 
instruction were overseen by junior officers and NCOs.  
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Having previously neglected the creation of a structured training regime during 
1915-early 1916, the introduction by GHQ of an influential series of publications was 
designed to provide a further means to encourage the growth of tactical uniformity. 
The issue of SS135, in December 1916, laid down adequate and appropriate training 
schemes. It fell to brigade staff to ensure that these schemes were organised and 
monitored, and lessons disseminated accordingly. Thus, COs were consistently 
provided with the manpower to reform their companies and platoons as the fighting 
efficiency of the brigade was maintained.  
The training undertaken by 20th Division (XIV Corps) while rebuilding their 
brigades prior to Third Ypres was representative of this process. In accordance with 
GHQ directives 20th Division instructions stated ‘that SS143 and SS135… are to be 
taken as orders for the purpose of obtaining uniformity and organisation in all units 
[original emphasis].4 This guidance was supplemented by the issue of successive 
pamphlets including SS156 and SS161 in addition to special guidance in the 
deployment of Lewis guns and the training of specialist bombers.5 All training 
procedures were open to consultation between the brigadiers, their COs and the 
second-in-command or Adjutant, with steps taken to ensure an ample supply of 
‘pamphlets, FSR1 and Infantry Training Manuals’.6 Drawing upon the division’s past 
experiences, a three week training period commenced with platoon training in strict 
accordance with SS143,  ‘the new handbook on the subject’.7 This training, lasting 
eight days, reflected the emergence of the platoon attack as a vital milestone in tactics, 
with ‘all Brigade Commanders ensuring that their platoons [were] properly organised… 
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and that each speciality section [was] expert in their own particular branch’. 
Arrangements were carefully timetabled. Mindful of providing sufficient rest for the 
infantry, the divisional commander suggested that ‘without wishing to tie the hands of 
the brigadiers… as regards the hours of work’ a maximum of four hours should be 
devoted to training with the remainder of the day devoted to recreational activities. 
Appealing to the competitive spirit of the battalions and promoting  a sense of esprit 
de corps and regimental tradition, at the end of this period ‘the best platoon of the 
Brigade was called upon to give a demonstration… chiefly of “fire and movement”’ for 
the benefit of the Brigade officers.8 In accordance with a process of tactical appraisal, 
at the end of each day battalion commanders, drawing upon the comments of their 
company and platoon leaders, were instructed to submit ‘the usual report… of the 
day’s training’ to brigade headquarters.9  
 A similar systematic approach was implemented for company training, as 
‘company and platoon commanders alone could keep their hand on the pulse of 
battle’.10 This lasted for four days and was based upon the principles laid down in 
SS144, with battalions liable to be called upon by the divisional commander to carry 
out a simple tactical manoeuvre as part of an inspection.11 For brigade staff, training 
in the shape of ‘Skeleton Exercises and Staff Rides’ under divisional orders consisted 
of ‘working out a solution step by step and discussing it with other brigade staff on the 
ground’. On other occasions, brigadiers were instructed to ‘bring out their COs and 
work on the same exercise in greater detail… [and] if the ground selected was 
conveniently placed for further explanation, the COs of the Battalions will complete the 
 
8 TNA, WO 95/2124, 61 Brigade WD, ‘Notes on 20th Division Training, (3)’, 25 June 1917. 
9 TNA, WO 95/2113, 59 Brigade WD, Z1/ 294, 1 July and Z1/334, 5 July 1917. 
10 TNA, WO 95/2096, 20th Div. WD, 20th Division Instruction No.2, 12 July 1917, with reference to Fifth Army 
No.S.G.671/1, 7 June 1917 received at 20th Division HQ 1 July 1917. 




scheme by working it with [the] troops’. 12 This approach ensured consistency across 
XIV Corps, with exercises designed to test the tactical skill of brigade commanders 
repeated at battalion and company levels. However, the ongoing transformation of 
tactical doctrine and the reconstitution of brigades contributed to a constant 
reorganisation of training programmes. Brigadier-General R.C. Browne-Clayton, GOC 
59 Brigade, for example, had difficulty in implementing ‘a cut and dried programme for 
the week ahead’ as called for by the divisional commander. The continuous arrival of 
new drafts meant that ‘as training progressed, new facts as to the standard of training 
of the men continued to crop up necessitating changes in programmes’.13 To assist 
him Browne-Clayton drew on the experiences of the Canadians at Vimy Ridge during 
the Arras offensive. These consisted of ‘many points which will be helpful to all 
concerned… and must be brought to the attention of all platoon commanders in the 
form of a lecture’.14 Evidence of similar cooperation can be found in training 
undertaken within II Corps, where the brigades of 56th Division were given 
‘demonstrations by the Canadians on how to maximise the use of Lewis guns to 
supplement the training of the combined use of platoon weapons’.15 
 In preparation for the offensive, all contingencies were taken into consideration 
and the probable supporting role of 20th Division with ‘Brigade exercises… practiced 
with a view to gaining experience and discussing the best methods of pushing out 
battle patrols against a disorganised enemy’. As it was considered by Major-General 
T.G. Matheson, GOC 20th Division that ‘the unexpected in war is more often than not 
the exception’ all units of the division were expected to have a good working 
 
12 TNA, WO 95/2124, 61 Brigade, WD, ‘Notes on 20th Division Training (7 and 7a)’, 25 June 1917.  
13 Ibid, G.277, 27 July 1917. 
14 Ibid, 59 Infantry Brigade, Instruction No.2, Z1/418/96, ‘The Notes on Operations by the Canadians on Vimy 
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knowledge of the initial stages of the offensive.16 This knowledge included 
understanding all available means of communication. An exercise was devised by 
divisional staff to develop close cooperation between the brigades and the contact 
aircraft of No. 3 Squadron R.F.C. Although  R.F.C. personnel were prepared to assist 
in the organisation, ‘it was understood that Brigades were responsible for the training 
of their men in contact aeroplane work’.17 Comprehensive schemes designed to 
standardise the training of battalion signallers were implemented in brigade areas, 
using ‘a skeleton Brigade Headquarters and a detachment of the Brigade Signal 
Section’.18 Each brigade was instructed ‘to make full use of their affiliated Field 
Company with particular attention to be paid to wiring and trench construction… the 
essence of rapid wiring lying with the organisation of the wiring parties’. 19 
 This systematic approach to brigade training ensured that all efforts were 
maximised to mitigate the challenges faced by the battalions on the offensive. Despite 
a severely strained training system, evidence from across Fifth Army reflected 
increasing uniformity. For example, in accordance with Maxse’s, emphasis upon the 
training of troops, 51st (Highland) Division (XVIII Corps) was given six weeks of training 
‘perfected down to the minutest detail’.20 As Brigadier-General H. Pelham Burn, GOC 
152 Brigade explained, the facilities available for training included 
a full-sized practice course, ample time at our disposal and the care and trouble 
taken by the Battalion COs and others… [leaving] little doubt as to the ultimate 
issue of the fight. The value of training was revealed time and time again… in 
the way in which MG’s [sic] in concrete emplacements were engaged by Lewis 
Guns, Rifle Grenades and riflemen.21  
 
16 TNA, WO 95/2096, 20th Div. WD, Instructions No.2, 12 July 1917. 
17 Ibid, 20th Div. WD, appendix c, 10 July 1917. 
18 TNA, WO 95/2113, 59 Brigade WD, Z1 386/1, 11 July and Z1 429/60, 15 July 1917. 
19 TNA, WO 95/2096, 20th Div. WD, ‘Notes on 20th Division Training (9)’, 25 June 1917. 
20 Bewsher, The 51st Division p.197. 





Practice attacks in breadth and width were carried out alongside units of 153 Brigade 
and supplemented by exercises designed to maximise the promotion of combined 
infantry -tank tactics.22  
 Implementing comprehensive training was one of the many roles of the 
brigadier and his staff. This cyclical task, ensuring that officers and ORs possessed 
individual skills and were up to date with tactics, was a crucial component in the 
development of brigade command. Training, discipline and leadership provided by the 
brigadier and his COs enhanced the capabilities and confidence of the brigade. 
Although the late arrival of new drafts reduced the time available for training, it is 
reasonable to assume that most of the brigades of XIV Corps deployed on 31 July and 
16 August had been adequately trained.  
5.3: XIV Corps - Brigade Operations, 31 July 1917 
In accordance with Fifth Army’s directive, the attacking formations had ample 
time to prepare for the set-piece offensive of 31 July. XIV and XVIII Corps’ were 
instructed that ‘as far as possible plans must be thought out well beforehand and 
subject to our own preparation being sufficient, there must be no delay in putting them 
into execution’.23 Foremost amongst these measures was brigade reconnaissance 
and intelligence gathering. Building on an existing programme of ‘incessant raiding… 
to impress on all ranks their superiority over the enemy and to simultaneously lower 
the German moral’, numerous raids and patrols penetrated the enemy lines.24 For 
example, 1(Guards) Brigade’s incursions into the German lines were intended to 
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address ‘the necessity for all officers and NCOs getting to know the country east of 
the Canl [sic]’. These raids established that ‘the enemy held the front line weekly [sic] 
and it was comparatively easy to get across the Canal’.25 The British built up  
comprehensive knowledge of the topography and disposition of the German lines in 
the Boesinghe sector, which offered ‘admirable opportunities’ for reconnaissance; this 
was aided by the distribution of ‘numberless maps and aeroplane photographs… to 
assist Officers and NCOs in their study of the ground’.26 Upon the commencement of 
the preliminary bombardment on 16 July, instructions were issued for a ‘daily 
reconnaissance of the wire on the Brigade front carried out by an Artillery Officer and 
an Infantry Officer specially detailed by Brigade Headquarters’.27 
As the ultimate role of 1(Guards) Brigade remined unsettled, in order to provide 
transparent planning, no preliminary orders were issued ‘as it was thought that 
continued orders and counter orders would only meddle and dishearten all 
concerned’.28 On 8 July, however, preliminary instructions were issued prior to the 
brigade coming out of the line for a period of training. Thus ‘when the Brigade came 
out… every Unit knew the outline of its Role, the plan of communication trenches and 
the landmarks of most of the ground… and as events turned out these instructions 
had to be altered very little’. All units were conversant with their forming up areas and 
the tracks to them ‘the preparations being well advanced and most of the details 
thought out’.29  
 
25 TNA, WO 95/1214, 1(Guards) Brigade WD, ‘Narrative of Operations carried out by First Guards Brigade, July 
1917’.  
26 Ibid. Valuable as these opportunities proved, they came at a cost. Being consistently exposed to German 
observation, brigade reconnaissance duties resulted in the loss of 239 officers, NCOs and ORs in total. 
27 TNA, WO 95/1218, 2(Guards) Brigade WD, 2(Guards) Brigade Instruction No. 4, 8 July 1917. 
28  Ibid, Notes of a Divisional Conference, 10 June 1917. 




The overall arrangements for the attack of XIV Corps were dependent on three 
preconditions essential for operational success. The first was thorough 
reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, and the second was the provision of 
sufficient artillery support. Much time and attention were paid to these arrangements. 
The advance of the Guards brigades was covered by a creeping barrage provided by 
six brigades R.F.A. and a standing barrage by the heavy artillery of XIV Corps. The 
whole scheme, finalised with few subsequent amendments on 27 July, was 
supplemented by a machine-gun barrage provided by all three Guards Brigades and 
88th Machine-Gun Companies.30 Having anticipated the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the assembly and advance of his battalions, Brigadier-General J. 
Ponsonby, GOC 2(Guards) Brigade asked divisional headquarters for counter-battery 
fire. This was swiftly arranged, with ‘extraordinary heavy fire consisting of a barrage of 
gas shells being brought to bear upon all German Battery positions for 5 hours’ 
suppressing most of the enemy guns.31   
The third precondition for operational success was the establishment and 
maintenance of secure communications. Brigade arrangements were based upon the 
issue down to company level of the guidance provided in ‘Communications within the 
Brigade in a Trench to Trench Attack’. 32  Arrangements for 1(Guards) Brigade 
consisted of four Brigade Forward Stations (BFS). Each was provided with a telephone 
through which any unit could communicate. At BFS 1 a Visual Station was established 
in direct contact with the Central Divisional Station, while BFS 2 contained a trench 
wireless. This enabled the movement forward of Brigade HQ ‘arriving at Abris Wood 
 
30 TNA, WO 95/1218, 2(Guards) Brigade WD, appendix 12, 2(Guards) Brigade Orders (Provisional), 19 July and 
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31 Ibid, appendix 11, ‘Report on Operations of Second Guards Brigade’, 9 August 1917. 




where communications with the leading Battalions had already been established… by 
telephone under the direction of the Brigade Signals Officer who had gone forward in 
advance’. Prior to zero/ all battalions were provided with pigeons ‘some to be used 
exclusively for communication with the French’.33   
Despite these comprehensive arrangements, the communications were erratic. 
While for 2(Guards) Brigade ‘the signal section worked without a hitch and 
communications with the Battalions were throughout the whole action not interrupted 
for one moment’ the experience of 1(Guards) Brigade was entirely different.34 The 
routine destruction of telegraph and telephone lines left brigade staff’s 
‘communications with Divisional Headquarters… precarious… [with] the Brigade 
Visual Station proving of the utmost value’.35 It is clear from such experiences that the 
BEF’s communication system during Third Ypres was inadequate and inhibited 
efficient command and control. The development of a sustainable communications 
system was, as Hall has demonstrated, ‘a long and painful process of trial and error, 
which included almost as many failures as successes’.36 The development of 
communication systems at brigade level corresponded to this irregular pattern.   
Planning within XIV Corps for 31 July was in accordance with that for a large 
set-piece offensive. The arrangements embodied three crucial preconditions 
necessary for operational success: thorough reconnaissance, sufficient artillery 
support and the establishment of a robust communication network. The benefits of 
these measures were reflected in the improved administrative and organisational work 
of brigade staff. Careful reconnaissance led to the relatively safe assembly of assault 
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35 TNA, WO 95/1214, 1(Guards) Brigade WD, ‘Narrative of Operations of 1(Guards) Brigade June-August 1917’. 




troops, and the choice of an appropriate attack formation. proved robust as most of 
the German guns were temporarily suppressed by vigorous counter-battery fire. 
5.4: XVIII Corps - Brigade Operations, 31 July 1917 
The arrangements for XVIII Corps’ attack on 31 July benefited from similar 
arrangements that conformed to Maxse’s doctrine of systematic organisation.37 As 
Pelham Burn wrote upon reflecting on his brigade’s preparations ‘it is not far from the 
point to say that the modern battle is won or lost before Zero’.38 Arrangements for 152 
Brigade’s attack capitalised upon accurate reconnaissance which had identified 
landmarks to be avoided with ‘the intention…  to get off the map and thus avoid hostile 
fire [and] reduce casualties’. The strength of waves was based on ‘one man for every 
2.5-3 yards of frontage, with one platoon or a half platoon detailed to capture each 
farm building’. Great stress was placed upon logistics, with brigade staff ensuring the 
establishment of a large supply dump 1,000 yards behind the line, sub-divided into 
small sections. This was supplemented by the formation of a additional dump created 
on the afternoon of Z Day, 1,500 yards in advance of the front line. The success of 
these arrangements ‘was such that units carried with them sufficient S.A.A. and Rifle 
Grenades to deal with all situations… all stores from the Brigade dump being used for 
forming a forward dump’.39  
 51st Division’s front, overlooked by enemy positions, caused great difficulties 
for the brigade staff in ‘eliminating all likely causes of delay’. Acting upon a thorough 
knowledge of the brigade areas and tracks to and from the front line, the march forward 
was ‘rehearsed in the dark by bodies of troops both with respirators and without so 
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that it could be ensured that sufficient time was allowed for the operations when 
selecting zero hour’.40  Although the assembly area was crowded, with 39 platoons on 
a frontage of 700 yards, it was considered that because it avoided another position 
where ‘the hostile barrage invariably fell… the risk was justified’.41   
 To illustrate the value of thorough preparation and the influence of brigade 
staff, the attack of Brigadier-General M.L. Hornby’s 117 Brigade of 39th Division has 
been examined.42 Despite ‘the promiscuous shelling of the communication trenches’ 
the assembly was carried out without incident, fresh troops having been brought 
forward two or three days previously. Assaulting troops were moved by a circuitous 
track, so avoiding the inevitable shelling of identifiable forward trenches.43 The attack 
formation was equally well planned, the rapid advance of the troops behind the 
barrage ‘reducing the minimum distances between Units’.44 This ensured that the 
rearmost waves were clear of the front line when the enemy barrage came down at 
zero plus eight minutes. 
Hornby’s ability to respond to successive counterattacks was rooted in a 
relatively secure communications network. This was achieved by two parties of 117 
Brigade Signal Company going ‘forward behind the fourth wave of the attack’ ensuring 
that although one party failed to maintain a secure line forward, the second party was 
able to establish a link with the Brigade Forward Station (BFS). Thus ‘touch [was] 
never… lost throughout the day with the situation on the front line’. In addition to the 
Signals Section, the BFS was manned ‘by the Brigade Intelligence Officer and four 
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trained patrols of Scouts who kept [Hornby] constantly informed of the situation and 
registered the batteries of both the Field and Heavy Artillery’.45  The move forward of 
Hornby’s HQ at zero-hour plus 3 thus conformed with the principles laid down in FSR1 
and endorsed by Fourth Army Notes stressing a rapid response to changing 
circumstances.46 For example, upon reports filtering through that 118 Brigade was 
threatened by a counter-attack, sufficient reserves, accompanied by a sub-section of 
117 Brigade MGC, were sent forward ‘taking with them wire and supplies of S.A.A.’ to 
assist in consolidating the forward positions.47  
 Communications for the brigades of 51st Division also remained relatively 
robust. A secure link was maintained by telephone between brigade and battalion 
headquarters, its establishment assisted by a novel form of transport. This consisted 
of a cable-tank which, immediately after the advance, transported the signal gear to a 
pre-arranged dump, enabling a cable to be rapidly run out to battalion headquarters.48 
Ultimately, although wireless communication was established from 152 Brigade HQ to 
‘the Divisional Advanced Report Centre and the Left Brigade Headquarters’, as 
Pelham Burn concluded, ‘the telephone and runner (well versed in map reading skills) 
are the two means of communication on which reliance can be placed, while the 
pigeon is a usual adjunct’.49  
 The brigades of 51st Division generally had good communications, with ‘little 
trouble [being] experienced’.50 Equally comprehensive measures were established in 
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39th Division. These allowed Brigadier-General E.H.C.P. Bellingham, GOC 118 
Brigade, to provide direct information to the C.R.A. However, Bellingham’s experience 
highlighted the dangers of the establishment of an Advanced Brigade Headquarters 
(ABHQ): it was exposed ‘to the severity of the hostile barrage’ which forced a 
withdrawal to 116 Brigade HQ during which the BIO was mortally wounded.51 The 
dangers associated with ABHQs, as operations transitioned from static to mobile, was 
a constant problem; in March 1918 that of 118 Brigade was overrun with Bellingham 
and his brigade major taken prisoner.52  
Whilst the brigades of XVIII Corps had secure signal arrangements, not all 
corps were so fortunate. For example, 55th Division (XIX Corps) having suffered the 
loss of its telegraphic and visual apparatus, found that the flow of information provided 
by runners was disrupted by a deterioration in the ground conditions. On 164 Brigade’s 
front the extensive distance from BHQ to the Advanced Forward Station (AFS) 
diminished Brigadier-General C.I. Stockwell’s ability to exercise effective tactical 
control. Even by pushing out the AFS to ‘a distance of 3,000 yards as the crow flies 
[it] meant that messages under the most favourable conditions which prevailed during 
the day took about 1 to 2 hours’ to reach BHQ.53 It is clear from the experiences of 
164 Brigade that whilst the BEF’s communication system was reaching a highly 
developed state, the ability to support operations varied according to the disposition 
of brigades, the state of the terrain and the depth of attacks. 
The establishment of a relatively secure network of communications by XVIII 
Corps was matched by efficiently organised logistics. As Bewsher wrote: 
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In each phase of the operations the infantry advance was closely followed by 
other arms of the service in exact accordance with the prearranged plans, with 
the result that before nightfall the whole of the captured area had been 
powerfully organised.54 
 
These views accorded with Pelham Burn’s, who considered that ‘the success of the 
action was such that units carried with them sufficient S.A.A. and Grenades to deal 
with all situations’.55 The organisation entailed at divisional and brigade level was 
impressive, with ammunition, sandbags and miscellaneous signalling equipment being 
transported within three hours of zero hour and the next day’s rations being delivered 
to the front line by 7pm. This, as GOC 39th Division observed, was ‘an instance of the 
advantage of beginning quickly and in daylight during the comparatively undisturbed 
hours behind the fighting line that follows an attack’.56  
Overall, XVIII Corps’ attack was delivered under relatively favourable 
circumstances. The benefits for brigade operations were manifold: thorough 
preparation, limited objectives, the deployment of fresh troops, the suppression of 
enemy batteries and the establishment of a comprehensive network of 
communications. These operations demonstrate the preconditions necessary to 
maintain tactical control at brigade level. First, a massive amount of preparatory work 
ensured that an operational infrastructure was firmly established. Systematic training 
schemes enhanced the fighting efficiency of the brigade. This included the training of 
signal personnel and the provision of a supporting infrastructure, such as the 
establishment of sufficiently manned AFSs. The deployment of a Senior Artillery 
Liaison Officer at brigade headquarters was supplemented by ‘Artillery FOs going 
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forward with the attacking troops… Battalion COs being able to apply to them for any 
additional Artillery Support required’.57 To compensate for the loss of cable 
communications, an array of alternative signalling apparatus was employed supported 
by Brigade Liaison and Brigade Intelligence Officers. These measures reflect a steady 
and constant rate of development at brigade level. The pragmatic approach of brigade 
staffs in providing a wide range of solutions, informed by running large-scale 
operations under combat conditions, were a mark of their professionalism and 
efficiency.  
The second precondition for operational success was effective counter-battery 
fire to suppress the enemy artillery, as evident in 117 Brigade’s attack. Counter-battery 
work, combined with carefully rehearsed infantry tactics and tank support, enabled the 
tempo of the attack to be sustained during the critical first phase. The third factor 
influencing the outcome of operations was the setting of limited objectives that 
remained within the effective range of the communications available. The lack of 
suitably limited objectives remained a consistent stumbling block which continued to 
prejudice operations. The brigadier’s sphere of influence was determined by the 
successful achievement of these preconditions: where they were met his tactical 
influence was enhanced, but where they were absent, it was diminished. 
5.5: II Corps-Brigade Operations, 16 August 1917   
The logical consequences of the renewal of the offensive on 10 August should 
have resulted in a further postponement.58 Instead, after two days of heavy rain, a 
further attack was conducted on 16 August. In contrast to the preparations for 31 July, 
this assault was hastily prepared. Whilst on the left XIV Corps advanced well, in the 
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centre XVIII Corps achieved only a partial success, XIX Corps advanced hardly at all 
and II Corps’ attack proved fruitless. Where thorough artillery preparation supported 
the infantry advance, success was achieved. Where difficulties were encountered in 
bringing forward sufficient artillery pieces, success proved elusive. This chapter will 
compare the operations of II Corps’s brigades which were shaped by unfavourable 
circumstances, with those of XIV Corps which achieved an element of success.   
II Corps’s attack was delivered by 56th and 8th Divisions, with 18th Division’s 53rd 
Brigade forming a southern defensive flank.59 The difficulties faced by Brigadier-
General G.H. B. Freeth’s 167 Brigade of 56th Division highlight the problems caused 
by insufficient time for reconnaissance and exposure to German observation.60 The 
brigade’s preliminary arrangements left ‘no time to get objectives into the heads of 
officers, NCOs and men… the assembly being carried out with some difficulty in 
consequence’. As regards neighbouring formations, there was little evidence of mutual 
assistance; no information was forthcoming from 75 Brigade when relieved by 167 
Brigade ‘as they had been in the sector for only 24 hours and the guides did not know 
their way about’.61 Enemy observation of the front line also complicated the 
movements of battalions and increased the workload of brigade staff. In response, 
Freeth arranged for the relief of the fatigued 3/London and replaced them with 
1/London and 8/Middlesex during the night of 14/15 August ‘to reduce movement on 
the night of the attack’.  This however, left the two replacement battalions with ‘only 24 
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hours to study the ground, a matter of great difficulty at any time owing to continuous 
shelling’.62  
A lack of time and cooperation also influenced the arrangements for the supply 
of S.A.A., the previous occupants of the line having failed to ensure adequate 
provision. Some attempts were made to establish a forward dump in a secure location 
on the morning of the attack, but this was not achieved until 9.45am. Messages sent 
from brigade to battalion HQs, notifying them of the dump’s location failed to 
materialise and the shortage of ammunition contributed towards the failure of the 
attack. Similar negligence contributed to a lack of communication, as ‘no 
arrangements for signal communication in advance of Brigade HQ were taken over 
when this Brigade went into the line’.63  
The brigades detailed for the attack were also understrength because of battle 
casualties and sickness, the CO of the 8/Norfolks considering that his battalion would 
not ‘be fit to carry out an attack’.64  Representations were duly made to the BGGS, II 
Corps, by Brigadier-General H. Higginson, GOC 53rd Brigade stating that ‘the 
battalions of the 53rd Brigade were not fit enough to carry out an attack’.65 In response, 
a relief battalion (4/Londons) from 168 Brigade was placed under Higginson’s orders.66 
However, the CO of this battalion was wounded on his arrival at the front line leaving 
‘his Second-in-Command [to go forward] the next day thus leaving his Battalion with 
barely 24 hours to make all the necessary reconnaissance and preparations’. 67 
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The situation was further complicated by Gough’s intervention, when it was 
decided, 16 hours before zero-hour, to alter the starting line of the barrage and the 
jumping off lines for the first waves of the attack.68 This decision was intended to 
compensate for the irregularity of the attack frontage caused by 56th (1/London) 
Division’s lack of progress on 8th Division’s right flank. This situation, as Major-General 
W.C.G. Heneker, GOC 8th Division observed, threatened the progress of his own 
brigades and he was ‘convinced that the Division on [his] right should be thrown 
forward and that… the [8th Division] held back until good progress has been made on 
[the] right’.69 His request for a change of plan was however refused by Gough who  ‘for 
various reasons… considered [it was not] desirable to postpone the main attack and 
the II Corps attack will be carried out as ordered in II Corps OO No.117 at 12th August 
1917’.70 Gough’s decision ignored the expert opinion of ‘the man on the spot’ and had 
a direct bearing upon the attack of 25 Brigade.  
By response, to mitigate the effect of enfilade fire, the brigadiers of 8th Division 
were instructed to ‘bear the question of defensive flanks in mind… as the configuration 
of the ground renders it more likely that [one] will be necessary’.71 For additional 
support, Brigadier-General C. Coffin V.C., GOC 25 Brigade was given a call upon the 
brigade reserve… from zero onwards in forming a defensive flank at his discretion’.72 
Theoretically this arrangement provided him with a degree of flexibility and ensured 
that he retained the capability of deploying sufficient reserves to compensate for the 
irregularity of the brigade frontages. Conversely, Gough’s intervention in overriding the 
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advice of his divisional commander influenced the course of brigade operations ‘as the 
doubts which the Divisional Commander had expressed in the memorandum already 
referred to, proved only too well founded’. 73 In the event, deprived of artillery support, 
exhausted and thinned in numbers, the rout of 25 Brigade was stemmed by Coffin’s 
direct intervention. Having gone forward to reconnoitre the position, rally the line and 
establish a composite force, the enemy was checked. There can be no doubt, as in 
the similar circumstances that occurred on 31 July where Coffin gained his V.C., that 
‘his courage and coolness… had a very high moral effect on his troops and on more 
than one occasion turned the scale by his personal intervention’.74   
In contrast to the lack of assistance given to the brigades of 8th Division, more 
suitable arrangements were implemented upon their relief by 47th (London) Division. 
For example, instructions were issued to the GOsC of 23 and 25 Brigades ‘to meet 
with GOC 141 Brigade to suggest how he should hold the Divisional front with 2 
battalions in line and 2 in support’. Brigade staff were also instructed ‘to provide guides 
to show the incoming COs and Company officers the routes to reconnaissance… as 
recommended by the Brigadiers’.75 Arguably, the constant movement of battalions in 
and out of brigade sectors attributed to a lack of consistency in procedures and 
arrangements as much as failings upon the part of brigade staff.  
The attack of II Corps on 16 August was generally shaped by hurried 
preparations, unfavourable ground, inadequate artillery support and the employment 
of battle-weary troops. These inadequate measures contradicted the note of caution 
expressed by Major-General Sir J. Davidson, head of GHQ’s Operational Branch. who 
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considered that ‘we know from experience that hurried preparations and the use of 
part-worn troops are generally the cause of failure and that failure involves a waste of 
valuable time and personnel’.76 These fears were endorsed by Haig, who advised 
Gough to wait for fine weather and the opportunity ‘to enable our guns to get the upper 
hand and to dry the ground’.77 Throughout however, Gough failed to abide by the 
principles of careful preparation and sufficient logistic support. In such cases, 
‘operations [were] doomed to fail if [the] artillery could not suppress the defence and 
the ground was impassable’.78  As in the latter stages of the Somme and Arras battles, 
the assaults tested the patience and morale of officers and men as brigade staff 
endeavoured to mitigate the consequences of operational mismanagement.  
With direct criticism of higher command bearing the risk of censure or even 
dismissal, the observations provided by brigadiers were generally confined to 
recommendations based upon tactical analysis. Recrimination came later. For 
example, Brigadier-General P.V.P. Stone, GOC 17 Brigade, 24th Division (II Corps), 
considered that the preparations for the offensive had been thorough but condemned 
the failure of ‘the Operational Staff to realise the limitations of the human element… 
remaining [instead] tied to their offices and maps’.79 Having endured the strain of 
command in battle conditions, Stone would have been acutely aware of his obligations 
to provide loyalty and support to his brigade. As John Buchan wrote with reference to 
Brigadier-General C.G. Rawling, 62 Brigade, 21st Division ‘there is nothing that men 
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appreciate more than the knowledge that their commander values their lives and will 
not needlessly sacrifice them’.80  
The operations of II Corps’s brigades on 16 August lacked the preconditions for 
operational success: realistic objectives, careful preparation, the suppression of 
enemy fire, secure communications and efficient logistic support. Initially, since 
counter-battery fire failed to suppress German artillery on the Gheluvelt plateau, II 
Corps’ back area was under heavy bombardment. This resulted in heavy casualties 
and disruption in supply and replenishment of forward dumps. These conditions, 
combined with poor weather and tough enemy defences, meant that the attack was 
delivered under the most unfavourable circumstances, as the operations of 167 
Brigade, 56th Division demonstrated. 
 In his tactical analysis of operations, Brigadier-GeneraL Freeth identified two 
factors that influenced 167 Brigade’s attack. These reflected the universal challenges 
in adapting to the German system of defence-in-depth. First, he considered that the 
objectives had been too distant; and second, that objectives should be selected for 
tactical reasons and ‘not to establish ourselves on imaginary lines’. Otherwise, he 
believed that in many cases ‘we are sacrificing men to gain a continuous coloured line, 
whereas much of the ground would automatically become ours by concentrating our 
attacks on tactical points’. 81 With the distant objectives for 16 August set at 1,500 
yards, double those aimed for on 10 August and delivered from a narrower frontage 
(250 instead of 400 yards), the difficulties of tactical control were magnified. Similar 
views were voiced by other brigadiers. For example, Stone condemned what he 
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perceived as the linear mentality that consumed Fifth Army and was evident at Ypres 
‘where attacks were an example of considering a strategical objective when a tactical 
success was possible’.82  
It is clear from Freeth’s observations that the shape of his brigade’s attack did 
not reflect the challenges imposed by the German defences and the capability of 
British infantry to sustain the tempo of an attack over a long distance. Similarly, 
Brigadier-General E.S. De E. Coke, 169 Brigade raised some fundamental problems. 
He considered that having made good progress for the first 300 yards on 16 August, 
the outer zone of the German defences proved ‘a strong and troubling position’ that 
needed ‘to be specially dealt with’.83 At this point, with the infantry fatigued and 
disorganised, the enemy delivered a counterattack. As Coke observed, with reference 
to the lack of surprise, ‘evidently the enemy now expects us to attack a comparatively 
distant objective, which has been… clearly indicated by our preliminary bombardment 
and he makes his arrangements accordingly’.84 A further factor was the failure of 
Higginson’s weakened 53rd Brigade to establish a defensive flank. This exposed 167 
and 169 Brigades to extensive machine gun fire from a pillbox at the corner of 
Inverness Copse, which through ‘a misunderstanding [in] the preparatory shelling by 
4.4-inch howitzers’ had failed to neutralise the strongpoint.85 The views expressed by 
these brigadiers, based on their analysis of operations, reflected their confidence, and 
their capability of finding solutions to the challenges posed by the enemy’s defences. 
 However, there were only limited opportunities for II Corps’ brigade staff to 
respond to these difficulties. Owing to the entire absence of forward telephone 
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communication on 167 Brigade’s front, ‘information was very slow in coming through 
and the first intimation received at 5.30am that the attack had commenced favourably 
was from 25 Infantry Brigade on the left’.86 The loss of visual and telegraphic 
communication through shellfire was exacerbated by a shortage of replacement 
equipment. For most of the day, communications remained restricted to runners, ‘but 
in most circumstances they took at least three quarters of an hour to reach Advanced 
Brigade Headquarters’.87 The shortage of logistic support meant that the 
establishment of forward dumps was neglected, with few trackways available to bring 
forward ammunition. Because the opportunities for brigades to influence the course of 
the attack were limited, this diminished their capability of deploying reserves at 
opportune moments. So, because orders to deploy a reserve company and a machine 
gun party to fill a gap in the line went astray, the company remained immobile. The 
effectiveness of what few machine guns were available was limited by the shortage of 
ammunition, only 40 boxes having been brought forward.88  
Thus, the reasons for 56th Division’s failure on 16 August were deeply rooted. 
Apart from the consequences of attacking over unfavourable ground, brigade 
operations were shaped by over-ambitious objectives, inadequate logistic support and 
uncoordinated planning. These problems were exacerbated by failures of 
communications. Thus, brigade commanders were deprived of the means of tactical 
control and assault troops of the benefits of thorough arrangements. 
 Four conclusions emerge from this analysis of the operations conducted by 8th 
Division’s 23 and 25 Brigades. Each has a direct bearing on the operational 
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performance of brigade command. The first concerns the broad parameters that 
defined brigade operations on II Corps’ front. It has been demonstrated that earlier 
operations benefitted from Jacob’s systematic approach to operational and logistic 
planning. This was true on the Somme and prior to operations at Irles in March 1917 
when he persuaded Gough that a postponement was necessary to facilitate the 
movement of supplies and ammunition. Similarly, at Third Ypres, Jacob’s influence as 
a corps commander assisted in the temporary delay of operations in response to the 
onset of unfavourable weather. However, the operations of 16 August were subject to 
Gough’s insistence on conducting another hurried attack using tactics ‘inappropriate 
for the circumstances’.89 This attack was made on a broad front following two days of 
heavy rain leaving the divisions of Fifth Army largely paralysed by the condition of the 
ground. On II Corps’ front, the German artillery was not suppressed, and the British 
infantry lacked sufficient artillery support. In consequence, opportunities to build and 
maintain the tempo of attack were limited, which in turn diminished the performance 
of the brigades. With the preconditions for success neglected, the operations 
demonstrate that the BEF’s operational and tactical development was far from smooth.  
The second conclusion concerns the fighting efficiency of the brigades of 8th 
Division. Like those of 56th Division’s brigades, their attacks were hampered by poor 
preparation, insufficient logistic support and the short time available for making good 
the losses of on 31 July. Nevertheless, a total of 48 officers and 2,213 other ranks 
were absorbed into the three brigades of 8th Division between 2 and 16 August.90 This 
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task, whilst increasing the workload of brigade staff, was accomplished despite the 
need to replace no less than eight commanding officers. 
A third conclusion concerns the position and staffing of 23 and 25 Brigade 
Headquarters. With greater emphasis placed upon the role of staff officers in forward 
areas, the establishment of ABHQs reflected the importance of accurate knowledge 
of brigade sectors as highlighted by previous operational analysis. In the case of 23 
and 25 Brigades, these forward positions, staffed by the Brigadier, Brigade Major, 
Brigade Signals Officer and a Senior LO Artillery Officer, offered ready opportunities 
for direct intervention, as demonstrated by the influence exercised by Coffin. 
  The fourth conclusion relates to the capability of the brigade staff to respond 
to changing circumstances given the vulnerability of communications. Regarding the 
artillery support, Brigadier-General Grogan of 23 Brigade considered that it was 
‘excellent, the S.O.S. calls on the whole principally replied to’. The problem arose 
however ‘in laying down the exact line of fire owing to the exact position of the troops 
being unknown during most of the day’.91 This was blamed on the ineffectiveness of 
the green Very Lights used to call for assistance. Only one aircraft was sent up by II 
Corps to look for enemy counterattacks and S.O.S. signals calling for artillery support. 
It reported ‘few of the former and none of the latter, though the day was a clear one’.92 
In consequence ‘hostile counterattacks were deployed by the time the S.O.S. barrages 
were put down’.93 In summarising these difficulties, Major-General Heneker 
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considered that ‘with the artillery at our disposal no counterattack could make any 
progress provided information could be sent to the batteries in time’.94 
The meritocratic rise of experienced staff with confidence, courage and tactical 
proficiency reflected the transformation of brigade command and the brigadier’s role.  
The commanders of 23 and 25 Brigades were representative of this process, although 
differing in their command style and strength of character.95 Grogan, for example, 
looked to Brigade Major P.C. Vellacott for guidance, while remaining in awe of 
Heneker as a divisional commander who retained a reputation ‘for breathing fire and 
slaughter’. Indeed, Grogan’s staff captain considered Vellacott to be ‘the central figure 
in the Mess’ and that 
Grogan was secretly a bit afraid of Vellacott… who was quicker and better 
trained and with very strong views of how a Brigade should be run… not having 
the kind of mind to control troops in action [as Coffyn had] [sic] and kept forward 
because he thought it encouraged the troops… as it did’.96  
 
Grogan implemented various steps to break down the average regimental officer’s 
disapproval of the staff by arranging dinners ‘with all colonels, seconds in command 
and Adjutants… in turn at the Brigade Mess’. This integration reflected Maxse’s plea 
that a system of communication should be adopted to eradicate the term ‘brass hat… 
in the minds of both staff and regimental officers’.97 
 A significantly different approach was taken by Coffin of 25 Brigade, who was 
considered by Lieutenant P.A. Ledward, the Staff Captain of 23 Brigade, as ‘rather 
ascetic and deadly serious… never entertaining… [but with] his whole mind being 
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concentrated on fighting’. In his efforts to protect his men from unnecessary risk ‘he 
never hesitated in opposing an operation which he thought devoid of strategical and 
tactical value’. Clearly undaunted by Heneker’s reputation, upon being informed that 
it was brigade command’s responsibility to keep in touch with divisional headquarters, 
Coffin responded that it was his responsibility to ‘keep in touch with the troops… and 
it is the task of the Divisional staff to keep in touch with me’ [authors emphasis]. During 
three subsequent operations his brigade made no attempt to keep in touch with the 
Division [but] always with… the Battalions’. Similarly, in relation to Heneker’s policy of 
continuous raids and minor operations, Coffyn ‘would not have hesitated in opposing 
an operation which he thought devoid of strategical and tactical value and the opinions 
he would have expressed would have pricked the bubble of General Heneker’. Thus, 
a combination of moral integrity and physical courage served to place ‘Coffyn [sic] in 
a different class from the other senior officers of the VIII Division’.98  
 The level of affinity between the brigades of 8th Division is interesting from the 
perspective of unit cohesion. While 23 and 25 Brigades maintained a degree of 
‘friendly rivalry’, the former had ‘no respect for the 24 Brigade… as they had poor 
Brigadiers… their Staff Officers were not remarkable and our feeling towards them 
[was] tolerant and patronising’. Neither was their staff deemed efficient enough to 
undertake even the most minor of operations ‘in case they bungled it’.99  If indeed the 
division suffered from a lack of unit cohesion and inefficiency, it is difficult to 
understand, given his reputation as a martinet, why Heneker was unable or unwilling 
to stamp his authority on the situation. It is equally difficult to pinpoint the source of the 
enmity directed at Brigadier-General H.W. Cobham. It could be construed that he had 
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simply failed to match the exacting standards expected of his divisional commander. 
As 8th Division’s GSO1, Lieutenant-Colonel E.H.L. ‘Moses’ Beddington wrote in 
January 1917, it was impossible ‘to put the Division right without new leaders, yet we 
could not report badly about the present ones’.100 Nevertheless, within three months 
of Heneker’s appointment as divisional commander, all three brigadiers had been 
replaced. Of the new appointments, Cobham had recently experienced a period of rest 
following his battalion’s operations on the Ancre, it being felt that ’the hard work that 
he had done…  had affected [his ] health’.101 Following four months as GOC 24 
Brigade, he received on 23 May  an appreciation from Fourth Army HQ for ‘the ‘good 
services rendered during the past 7 months’.102 Furthermore, there is no evidence 
within the war diaries of any contravention of procedures or specific failings of the 
brigade on 31 July where the attack was delivered ‘over an extraordinarily difficult 
piece of ground’.103 Subsequently however, having returned from a third period of 
leave in ten months, Cobham was recommended for home leave under the six month 
rule. This move would suggest that he was in dire need of further rest and 
recuperation. This in turn may have generated an opportunity for Heneker to appoint 
one of his own COs, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Haig, 2/Royal Berkshire, as GOC 24 
Brigade. In the event, Cobham returned to duty on the Western Front in late August 
1918 to command 175 Brigade, 58th (2nd/1st London) Division during the Hundred 
Days. As a retired Indian Army cavalryman of 50 years of age, he would by this time 
have been one of the oldest brigadier-commanders serving on the Western Front. 
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The premium placed upon the accurate knowledge of the battlefront and the 
transition towards increasingly mobile operations necessitated a more prominent role 
for brigade staff. However, the attack on 16 August underlined the parameters which 
defined their tactical influence. This was primarily due to delays in the transmission of 
messages and intelligence, with runners providing the sole means of communication 
forward of brigade headquarters. Despite the establishment of Advanced Report 
Centres where it was suggested that brigade staff officers could obtain information 
‘from wounded officers and men’, opportunities to implement a rapid tactical response 
to enemy counterattacks were limited.104  
5.6: XIV Corps: Brigade Operations - 16 August 1917 
The assault by XIV Corps, which, combined with that of XVIII Corps, formed the 
northern defensive flank, was undertaken in more favourable conditions than those 
shaping the brigade operations of II Corps. These conditions were  attributable to 
various factors: the weakened strength of the German defences, a ‘systematic 
bombardment by HA of all Strong Points which may interfere with the crossing of the 
Steenbeek’, and efficient organisational planning within the back areas: ‘with many 
miles of new tram lines laid, so that nearly every battery had a line running to within a 
hundred yards of the gun positions and a large number of ammunition dumps 
formed’.105 Great emphasis was placed on the gathering of intelligence and  the 
divisions of both corps were satisfied that the enemy trenches ‘were badly enfiladed 
by our artillery fire and seriously weakened as a defensive line’.106 Whilst significant 
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casualties from enemy shellfire were sustained during the days preceding the attack, 
before zero hour, ‘destructive and counter-battery shoots carried out continuously’ and 
German batteries were neutralised.107 This was achieved, despite rain and poor 
visibility, by ‘artillery moving forward for their new tasks’ assisted by the construction 
of roads, tracks and a light railway.108  
The work accomplished during this period was extensive as demonstrated by 
the brigades of 20th Division. With little work having been done when they relieved 38th 
(Welsh) Division, better weather ‘enabled [the division] to push on [with] 
communications and prepare new battery positions whilst extending the… [Light] 
Railway’. With 59 Brigade holding the line, both 60 and 61 Brigades furnished large 
working parties daily, on an average of two battalions and one battalion, 
respectively.109 Great emphasis was placed upon the establishment of 
communications. With the assistance of the Divisional Signal Company, forward of 
brigade headquarters one main route on each brigade front was laid. In 61 Brigade on 
the day prior to the attack ‘a party of linemen went forward at dawn and laid 2 lines 
between BHQ and the Brigade Forward Station… with lateral communication 
established with Brigades on the Right and Left’. These lines were supplemented ‘by 
visual wireless and amplifiers, so arranged to form alternate routes as necessity arose, 
with breakdown parties placed at intervals along all routes’.110 Brigade staff ensured 
that there were opportunities for ‘battalion LOs [Liaison Officers] to meet their 
counterparts in flank battalions’.111 These measures ensured that  communications 
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were ‘maintained for the whole time between Brigade Headquarters and Brigade 
Forward Station’, although contact with the Provisional Forward Station ‘required the 
concentration of all linesmen available on this stretch’.112 
29th Division’s attack benefited from similar advantages. Unlike on 20th 
Division’s front, working parties were kept to a minimum as the ground for the division’s 
attack did not require lengthy preparatory measures. This allowed two brigades to 
remain at rest simultaneously, leaving troops fresh for the attack.113 There was ample 
time for rigorous training programmes. 88 Brigade for example, identified weaknesses 
in the training of company commanders who unable to ‘deal with simple situations’, 
and in the organisational ability of platoon and section commanders. As ‘the way in 
which [practice attacks] were carried out were not satisfactory they were done 
again’.114 Evidently, the training proved successful as 
the most satisfactory feature of the day’s operation was the manner in which 
the lessons taught in training were applied by all ranks without hesitation and 
with the greatest intelligence. The action of the Right Companies… [providing] 
the best example when junior Company Commanders on the spot took the 
responsibility of working outside their own limits to help the advance of the 
Brigade on the right.115 
 
In the attack formation, brigade staff ensured that ‘each battalion on the right of the 
Right brigade… [had] a “liaison detachment” consisting of half a company and two 
machine guns echeloned in the rear of their right flanks to fill any gaps that occur on 
the right flanks’.116 This emphasis on unit cohesion was reflected in the close 
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cooperation with the 2nd French Division ‘made by General Lucas [GOC 87 Brigade] 
and Colonel Welch [CO 1/K.O.S.B.] and was rewarded with excellent results’.117  
 A sustainable and efficient infrastructure was created in XIV Corps’ back area 
prior to the attack. Although hampered by deteriorating ground conditions, the 
suppression of the enemy artillery enabled work to continue ‘the silence of the guns 
being a great contrast to the continual shelling of 1916’.118 The operational and logistic 
benefits to brigade operations were manifold. Equally, the benefits of efficient staff 
work were evident, revealing a growing confidence in leadership and initiative. The 
organisation by brigade staff in concentrating the units of 60 and 61 Brigades on the 
east bank of the Steenbeek, under intermittent artillery and machine gun fire, was 
considered by Major-General W. Douglas Smith, GOC 20th Division ‘a most difficult 
manoeuvre that reflects the greatest credit on Brigadiers and COs’. At divisional 
headquarters where administration was carefully arranged and every Staff Officer was 
assigned an understudy, the work proceeded ‘with no hitches…  and no accumulation 
of work’.119   
The situation described is important in relation to the development of brigade 
command. Efficient administrative and operational procedures reduced the amount of 
staff work for future operations and encouraged greater responsibility at brigade level. 
Thus, it was laid down that ‘in order to avoid unnecessary repetition it is proposed in 
the future operations to adhere to the following Instructions which have already been 
issued in connection with the operations which concluded on 16 August’. With 
instructions issued from time to time, as details became known ‘it became incumbent 
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upon ‘B.Gs.C and other commanders to issue such parts of these as are necessary to 
their units as and when they are received’.120 
Douglas Smith concluded ‘this period may be summed up as follows: all 
preliminary preparations were made and the way paved for the attack by the 60th and 
61st Infantry Brigades [and] by the forcing of the Steenbeek by the 59th Infantry 
Brigade’. The attack was supported by thorough artillery support, the barrage proving 
‘accurate and beautifully timed [falling] like a curtain’.121 Notwithstanding the difficult 
ground, this proved beneficial to the brigade attacks. Well-drilled infantry was able to 
bring to bear their Stokes mortars and Lewis guns where appropriate and all objectives 
were taken. 
As ever, good communications enabled brigadiers to deploy their reserves 
swiftly in response to specific threats. For example, having received a message 
through 61 Brigade HQ that a contact aircraft had reported a concentration of enemy 
units, GOC 60 Brigade was able to deploy a section of his machine gun company and 
enough reserves to form a defensive flank.122  Thanks to the excellent  work of the 
F.O.O.s, ‘the S.O.S. was sent in at once and [the] guns responded immediately’.123 
Similarly, Brigadier-General W.E. Banbury, GOC 61 Brigade was able to deploy his 
reserves and a battalion of 38th (Welsh) Division placed at his disposal to implement 
a counter-attack to regain lost ground. Communication forward of brigade 
headquarters was maintained and through close liaison ‘the Left flank was in touch 
with the Brigade on the Left [29th Division’s 88 Brigade]’. Similarly, ‘O.C. [sic] 
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7/Somerset Light Infantry… personally reported his observations of the movements of 
the battalions of 60 Brigade on the Right’.124  
The operations of XIV Corps’ brigades underlined the benefits of thorough 
preparation, sufficient logistic support, the suppression of enemy fire and the 
maintenance of communication. These were preconditions for success, and the 
means for brigadiers to exercise tactical influence. Heavy losses were incurred but 
given that the attacks were delivered over appalling ground, against an area heavily 
fortified in great depth, the success achieved by the brigades of XIV Corps was 
remarkable.  
5.7: Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to compare brigade operations during two phases 
of Third Ypres. The case studies focused upon operations by different corps to 
establish whether the preconditions that shaped brigade operational performance 
were constant. Where operations were thoroughly prepared, had effective logistic 
support, and where enemy fire was supressed, brigades’ performed well. Conversely, 
where the preparations, methods of attack and logistic support were not 
commensurate with the scale of the objectives, operations faltered after the initial 
advance. In all operations the ability of the brigade commander to control his formation 
rested upon the establishment of a secure and rapid system of communications up 
and down the chain of command. However, whilst the BEF’s communication system 
benefited from a variety of sophisticated technological developments, its ability to 
support large scale objectives remained limited. Given this constraint, the scope for 
 




effective tactical control at brigade level relied on the incremental development of 
signal communication.  
 Whilst the shape and outcome of operations were influenced by these factors, 
the evolution of brigade command was also driven by its capability for flexibility and 
adaptation. Despite the transformation and expansion of its role, brigade staff were 
still able to learn, adapt and remain focused on defeating the enemy. This reflected 
the broader learning process experienced of the BEF and was manifested in several 
ways at brigade level. In adapting to the conditions of modern warfare, the role of the 
brigade staff was transformed. To acquire a detailed knowledge of the battlefront 
required personal reconnaissance and innovative methods of intelligence gathering. 
Close liaison and mutual support between brigades generated the transfer and 
assimilation of knowledge and experience.  Moreover, as confidence grew at the 
tactical level, commanders and staff played a key role in training and the dissemination 
of new methods of attack. Based upon his brigade’s capability in adapting to German 
in-depth defences, the brigadier’s operational analysis proved a vital contribution to 
the BEF’s tactical evolution. 
 The evolution of brigade command throughout 1917 was broadly defined by 
two fundamental factors: the BEF’s capability to adapt to modern warfare and the 
meritocratic promotion of experienced and courageous brigade staff. The battles of 
Arras, Messines, Third Ypres and Cambrai demonstrated that the BEF had learnt from 
the Somme offensive and had applied those lessons to tactics. Whilst this progression 
was far from smooth, where operations had favourable preconditions, success was 
achievable. Success demanded a high degree of flexibility, knowledge and efficiency 
at all levels of command. The appointment of staff tempered by combat experience 




brigade development. As opportunities arose for officers to move up the career ladder, 
the administrative and operational efficiency of brigade staff was transformed. Teams 
of experienced and proficient brigade staff were created, although these teams could 
be just as easily dismantled through casualties or the transfer of officers. The next 
chapter will examine the progression of brigade development in 1918 in the context of 












The aim of this chapter is to examine the development of brigade command 
during the BEF’s offensive operations of 1918. Two research questions were posed. 
First, to what degree did brigade command benefit from Fourth Army’s superior 
material, and from effective logistic support and combined arms tactics?1 Second, to 
what extent did the transition from static to mobile operations affect the tactical role of 
brigade command? As in previous chapters, this piece examines key operations 
undertaken by Fourth and Second Armies. 
 The broad factors that shaped brigade operations during the Battle of Amiens 
in August 1918 may be summarised as follows. First, the impressive efforts of the 
munitions industries enabled the replacement of equipment lost during the German 
advances earlier in 1918.  Indeed, British infantry brigades now deployed more 
firepower than before, as portable machine guns, rifle grenades and trench mortars 
were available in unprecedented numbers. Moreover the British infantry were 
supported by a battalion of  Mark V tanks, which were far more reliable than 1916 
models.2 Six corps squadrons of the 15th Wing, Royal Air Force were deployed to 
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2 A.A. Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battle of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 
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provide air support and ‘to keep the formations with which they were working supplied 
with information regarding the progress of the attack’.3 The accuracy of artillery fire 
was greatly improved, as the techniques of sound ranging and flash spotting were able 
to plot precisely the position of German batteries.4 All guns were taken out of the line 
prior to the attack, tested for wear and adjusted accordingly to ensure that barrages 
proceeded accurately and at the designated rate. These methods of artillery location 
obviated the necessity for lengthy preliminary bombardments, thus enabling the crucial 
element of surprise to return to the battlefield. The deployment of multiple arms and 
auxiliary support during the Hundred Days, constituted a combined arms system 
where each weapon supported the other. 
 Different schools of thought exist about the BEF’s ability to employ all its arms 
evenly in 1918. Jonathan Bailey argued for the ‘the birth of [the] “modern style of 
warfare”: the advent of three-dimensional conflict, including air support, with artillery 
indirect fire as the foundation of planning at a tactical, operational and strategic level 
of war’.5 Prior and Wilson, on the other hand, argued that a coherent all-arms approach  
remained susceptible to a breakdown in any of its key elements – for example when 
tanks broke down or poor visibility limited the effectiveness of air support.6 For 
example, the difficulty of sustaining tank operations is illustrated by  figures compiled 
by the Tank Corps, where from 430 tanks deployed on 8 August, only 38 remained 
functioning on 11 August. As Paul Harris contended, this decline was only partly due 
to enemy action with ‘considerable parts of total tank strength… being temporarily lost 
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through mechanical breakdown and crew sickness’.7  A third point of view, followed 
here, holds that ‘different combinations of arms had to be used to meet rapidly 
changing circumstances’ and that the sophistication and flexibility of the British army 
was able to meet ever evolving challenges.8 As the rate of the infantry advance 
increased, the army’s ability to bring forward artillery in sufficient numbers ‘choose a 
new position against time and “shoot themselves in”’ proved difficult.9 However, an  
emphasis upon fire and movement was reflected  in the sophistication and flexibility of 
the BEF’s  combined-arms tactics. A  careful use of terrain, combined with the 
deployment of Lewis guns, rifle grenades and concentrated rifle fire,  enabled ‘many 
strong points and machine-gun nests to be dealt with at slight expense’.10 Certainly, 
where Fourth Army was concerned, tanks were ‘only used in very small numbers, just 
when the Germans put up a stout resistance’, whilst no tanks were used in Second 
Army.11 In summary, where sufficient arms were employed, the benefit to brigade 
operations was substantial. It was the brigadier’s responsibility to ensure that the arms 
available were employed to the maximum tactical advantage.      
The second broad factor benefiting brigade operations at Amiens was the 
BEF’s doctrine, which was based on the lessons of 1916-17. Underpinned by 
sustainability and the maintenance of tempo, the problem of tactical penetration was 
resolved through the implementation of limited set-piece attacks, concentrated against 
narrow sectors of the front line rather than dissipating them along a broad front. 
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Preparations for the offensive went ‘smoothly and with a remarkable degree of secrecy 
in an exercise of logistical and administrative complexity’.12 By these measures the 
freedom of the enemy reserves was limited and the attackers’ tempo maintained, 
although as frequently occurred on the second day of an offensive, Fourth Army was 
slow in renewing its attack. Nevertheless, Fourth Army’s tactics ‘unlocked the static 
front at Amiens and made the possibility of conducting mobile operations a reality’.13 
As the advance progressed, whilst Fourth Army continued to set general objectives 
the detail was left ‘to be filled in by subordinate formations and units’.14 This marked 
the advent of semi-mobile and mobile operations. Before evaluating the brigade 
operations of this period, it is necessary to establish the definition of these terms.  
As opposed to static warfare, the ability to conduct mobile operations rested 
upon the promotion of operational tempo. Tempo incorporates ‘the capacity of a force 
to transition from one operational posture to another’.15 The side with the higher tempo 
is better able to react to changing circumstances and maintain an increasing rate of 
pressure on the enemy. Tempo in modern military jargon is determined by the 
combination of seven elements: 
. physical mobility 
. tactical rate of advance 
. reliability of information 
. command control and communication 
. time to complete moves 
 
12 Harris, Douglas Haig, p.489. 
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. pattern of combat support 
. pattern of service (logistic) support16 
 The rate of tempo, or advance of the forward units, depends upon the degree to which 
these criteria are met and implemented in the form of semi-mobile or mobile operations 
(open warfare). As Boff has contended, the maintenance of momentum on the 
Western Front ‘required working around the logistical constraints of a modern army 
[and] the command difficulties caused by poor battlefield communications’.17 In 
accordance with the devolved style of command practiced within Fourth Army, 
subordinate commanders were left to find solutions to these problems.18 
The quantitative advantages, in the form of manpower and material resources 
provided to the BEF, combined with its doctrinal appraisal, were two broad factors that 
shaped the course of operations and ultimately the evolution of brigade command. A 
third influential factor reflected the reconstruction of the British army command. By 
August 1918, brigade commanders who had proved themselves unable to embrace 
fresh battlefield tactics and run large-scale operations had been replaced by a new 
generation of commanders. This exchange was achieved through a robust process of 
meritocratic promotion. The criterion for advancement rested upon an officer’s 
capability to adapt and cope with the complexities of modern operations whilst 
achieving parity in performance. This chapter examines the extent to which brigade 
commanders rose to these challenges. 
6.2: The Battle of Amiens: 8-12 August 1918  
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Brigade operations at the Battle of Amiens benefited from two preconditions 
necessary for operational success. First, the available firepower doubled to close on 
2,000 tubes prior to the opening of the offensive. This equated to a field gun or howitzer 
every 29 yards of the front, which far surpassed the 530 German pieces identified by 
the British.19 The magnitude of the artillery’s firepower was matched by its accuracy, 
and convenient artillery barrage lines were designed to conform to the infantry start 
lines.  Drawing upon previous lessons, the absence of a preliminary bombardment 
helped to achieve operational surprise, which complemented by the weight of fire 
generated.  
Second, Fourth Army had an overwhelming advantage in manpower of some 
441,000 troops. Of these, the Canadian divisions were much stronger than the British 
or Australian.20 Fourth Army’s intelligence initially established that it confronted six 
German divisions of 37,000 men defending weak and relatively vulnerable positions. 
However, the Germans still had substantial reserves available and it was believed that 
they would be able to destroy at least eight further divisions by the evening of 11 
August.21 This figure proved to be an underestimate. Although the BEF of 1918 is often 
assumed as a ‘conscript army’, evidence indicates that 40% of the British divisions 
consisted of men who had enlisted before the introduction of compulsion.22  
The third precondition for operational success was reliable communications. 
The transition from static to semi-mobile warfare raised a host of problems. No single 
technological fix was available to solve the problems of communication during mobile 
 
19 Royal Artillery Institution Woolwich, Major-General C.E.D. Budworth, MGRA Fourth Army 1916-1918, 
Budworth Papers, ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, August 8, 1918’, section 1. 
20 For the total strength of Fourth Army see OH 1918, Vol.4, p.22 and Statistics of the Military Effort of the 
British Empire During the Great War 1914-1920 (London: HMSO, 1922). 
21 Montgomery, Fourth Army, pp.16-17. 
22 A. Hines, Refilling Haig’s Armies: The Replacement of Casualties of British Infantry Casualties on the Western 




operations. One solution, as Hall has argued, was that the BEF was able to reduce 
the impact of a breakdown of communications ‘through the much more effective 
approach of limited objective, set-piece attacks’ instead of attempting a decisive 
breakthrough.23 It was envisaged that these measures, would reduce the distance 
between command posts and so the tempo of operations could be maintained.   
The provision of sufficient logistic and combat support at Amiens undoubtedly 
provided brigade command with the means to sustain an initial advance. However, the 
increased distances between command posts aggravated the problems posed by poor 
communications. This had serious implications for brigade command’s ability to control 
its formation. Further, the exposure of brigade staff in advanced positions should not 
be underestimated. For example, Brigadier-General L.W. De V. Sadleir-Jackson, GOC 
54 Brigade ‘was wounded… having pushed into the front line, the better to control the 
situation’.24  Casualty figures for the Hundred Days show an attrition rate of 14.9% 
amongst brigadiers from First, Second, Third and Fourth Armies, of which four were 
killed and sixteen wounded. In comparison, during the German Spring offensive of 
1918 the attrition rate equalled 16.1%, with seven brigadiers killed and ten wounded.25 
These losses confirm the necessity for brigade staff to be sufficiently forward to 
ascertain the position in the front line and to act upon their own initiative.   
6.3: III Corps: Brigade Operations 
An analysis of operations conducted by the brigades of Lieutenant-General Sir 
R.H.K. Butler’s III Corps serves a two-fold purpose.26 First, to examine the extent to 
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which brigade benefited from Fourth Army’s operational arrangements. Second, to 
evaluate the tactical response of brigade command to an initial disruption to the 
operational timetable and to stout enemy resistance. The operations of 18th (Eastern) 
Division’s 54 Brigade, 12th (Eastern) Division’s 36 Brigade and those of 58th (2/1 
London) Division have been chosen to explore these factors. 
Overall, the superiority of well-trained Dominion troops over the German 
resistance and the dominance of artillery support benefited the advance of the 
Australian and Canadian Corps on 8 August. The attack of III Corps north of the 
Somme, designed to provide flank protection for the Australian Corps south of the 
river, was less successful. Initially disrupted by a German attack on 6 August, the 
casualties inflicted on 54 Brigade resulted in it being replaced by 36 Brigade. Despite  
short notice and a lack of reconnaissance, 36 Brigade’s attack over unknown ground 
proved a success, ‘the Brigade [before relief’ being ascertained… to have held all its 
objectives’.27 In relation to this success and in accordance with the compression of 
battle procedures, Brigadier-General C.S. Owen considered that the operation 
demonstrated that ‘it was possible to carry out a successful attack at very short notice 
and with very short instructions from Divisional and Brigade Commanders’.28 From an 
organisational perspective, the success reflects the efficiency of the brigade staff and 
their response to the increased tempo of operations and the short timeframe in which 
to make suitable arrangements. From the perspective of command and control, the 
operation underlined the extent to which responsibility was devolved down to the most 
appropriate level in response to the increased tempo. Both of these factors reflected 
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the transformation of brigade command through their ability to adapt to flexible 
operations.   
  The foremost advantage enjoyed by 58th Division’s attack was a sophisticated 
artillery scheme, with barrage lines shaped according to the configuration of brigade 
frontages and intermediate objectives. For example, 174 Brigade’s frontage was 
described as ‘typical of the Somme area with gentle slopes cut by fairly deep Ravines 
running obliquely to the line of advance with numerous copses … known to be full of 
Machine Guns’.29 Thus, the bottom of the valleys which could not be reached by the 
18-pdrs ‘were dealt with by a Howitzer barrage moving from Valley to Valley to 
harmonise with the Creeping Barrage’. Predicted fire was the order of the day. The 
complete artillery surprise was largely due to the proper use of survey techniques and 
accurate maps in providing the line of fire to the batteries. The work of flash-spotters 
and sound-rangers of the Field Survey Battalions were indispensable to the 
implementation of the creeping barrages.30 The  attack was delivered with no artillery 
support, in an attempt to achieve an element of surprise, coordinated with Stokes 
Mortar Batteries and machine gun sections attached to each battalion, with two other 
sections remaining under GOC Brigade.31 Although the two sections of tanks detailed 
for the attack failed to arrive at zero-hour, their eventual assistance proved valuable in 
destroying machine gun nests.32 The impact of these measures provided 174 Brigade 
with the flexibility and support to sustain the initial tempo of its attack. 
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 Whilst the combination of arms proved beneficial for battalions, the influence 
exercised by brigade command was limited. This was due to the heavy mist and smoke 
that blanketed the battlefield and prevented the use of visual methods in the absence 
of telegraphic and telephonic communications. As Brigadier-General A. Maxwell, GOC 
174 Brigade wrote ‘it cannot be precisely stated at what time the objectives were 
reached’ only that leadership and initiative was displayed ‘by the Officers and NCOs 
dealt with the unexpected situations’.33 These observations give weight to the view 
that the brigadier’s influence was dependent on the maintenance of communications 
during protracted advances and on local conditions on the battlefield.    
Despite the technological benefits offered by more flexible and sophisticated 
communication systems, the onset of semi-mobile operations raised the problem of 
how to bridge the gap between front-line troops and their commanders at the rear. 
This problem was exacerbated by the increased distances between command posts 
and imposed vastly different demands on commanders. For example, having 
established a principal trunk route forward from its battle headquarters to a distant 
Advanced Brigade Exchange, 174 Brigade’s communications were limited to ‘a single 
line and was very slow’.34 Similarly, the staff of 175 Brigade found it ‘extremely difficult 
to keep line communication through the constant change of Headquarters and 
breakage caused by tanks’. These difficulties were compounded by ‘the broken nature 
of the country [which] did not always lend itself to Visual Signalling’.35 As for the lack 
of wireless sets, Brigadier-General H.W. Cobham, GOC 175 Brigade considered that, 
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despite the constraints of the battlefield that reduced their efficiency ‘in future all 
brigades should be supplied with sets’ from the beginning of operations.36 
 The difficulties of communication were significantly eased by carefully chosen 
command headquarters and by close liaison. In 18th Division’s 55 Brigade, touch was 
maintained by the establishment of adjacent command posts comprising ‘Brigade, all 
battalions and the Trench Mortar Battery… so that all COs concerned were constantly 
in touch with the situation’.37 These measures proved valuable as the commanders of 
35 and 53 Brigades, having been informed of their heavy losses, were able to offer 
assistance to ‘the battle-worn 55 Brigade’.38 Additionally, Brigade Observation Posts 
were placed as far forward as possible and with adequate protection which ‘proved… 
invaluable… particularly during the attack of 58th and 12th Divisions on the 9th’. From 
these positions, the FOOs were able to draw down artillery fire ‘upon parties of the 
enemy as they “trundled” down into the valley’.39  
The measures taken by Fourth Army reflected the attempt to bridge the 
communication gap and enhance the tactical influence of subordinate commanders. 
The brigades were instructed to ‘move as close together as possible and along a 
prearranged route so that Signals only have to maintain one forward route’.40 The 
progressive advance of brigade headquarters, the establishment of forward 
observation posts and the close liaison with flank brigades reflected a compliance with 
these instructions. Similar measures were implemented in Second Army. For example, 
the brigade headquarters of 30th Division were instructed ‘to follow a definite route 
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each day’ so that they were ‘more or less forecasting the probable route’ on a daily 
basis.41  
In terms of tactically innovative attacks, the capture of Chipilly on 9 August 
highlights the mutual cooperation that existed between the brigades of Fourth Army. 
Despite an initial disruption to III Corps’ operational schedule caused by the German 
attack on 6 August, the efficient brigade staff work of 58th Division’s 173 and 175 
Brigades, in close co-operation with 12th Division and 131st American Regiment 
resulted in the capture of the village. The objective, a heavily defended spur extending 
into an acute southern bend of the Somme, was protected by two lines of machine 
gun emplacements below its western edge.42 The capture of these positions involved 
a complex attack that encircled the village; this entailed the assembly and movement 
of six battalions of 175 Brigade with two detached from 174 Brigade and 12th Division. 
Despite the brigadier relinquishing his command due to illness, the battalions were at 
the assembly positions within three hours before ‘moving up to the starting off-line’.43  
Similar arrangements were implemented by the brigade staff of 173 Brigade. 
Here the difficult manoeuvre of “side-slipping” to establish the forming up line, whilst 
withdrawing the fighting patrols was accomplished successfully. The initial attack of 
173 Brigade was held up by heavy machine gun fire but was carried forward ‘just in 
the nick of time’ by the arrival of the 131st American Regiment. Significantly, in relation 
to the tactics of encirclement, the success was ‘greatly assisted by the action of the 
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10/Londons (175 Brigade) who pushed round the South and East of Chipilly and got 
on to the flank of the enemy machine guns’.44 
 The initial attack of III Corps demonstrated the benefits of a sophisticated 
combined-arms approach. In relation to command and control, the establishment of 
carefully positioned brigade forward observation posts, combined with close liaison, 
illustrated the benefits of mutual support. Despite an initial failure to reach their second 
objective on 9 August, the attack by 173 and 175 Brigades demonstrated their tactical 
capability in adapting to the disposition of the enemy defences. The rapid assembly of 
the brigades was testament to the efficiency of brigade and battalion staffs alike in 
proving that it was possible to carry out a successful attack at short notice. The 
implementation of these measures highlighted the confidence and professionalism of 
the brigade staffs and reflected the organisational and tactical transformation of 
brigade command. 
6.4: III Corps: Brigade Operations at Albert, 20-26 August 1918 
The higher tempo of operations undertaken during this phase of the offensive 
was reflected in the flexibility and adaptation exercised by brigade command. First, the 
planning and execution of operations in a short time span necessitated a compression 
of standard battle procedures. Second, in accordance with the pre-war principles of 
FSR1, command was devolved to the lowest appropriate level, and the onus was on 
local commanders to respond swiftly. This necessitated sound judgement and 
thorough awareness of the situation. Third, where tactical lessons were learnt, they 
needed to be quickly disseminated and incorporated into brigade training. These 
 




measures were successfully accomplished by brigades during III Corps’s operations 
at Albert. 
 As shown above, a brigadier’s awareness of and response to the situation on 
his brigade sector was fundamental to operational success: in the case of defensive 
operations, they were critical to the brigade’s very survival. As the pace of 
technological innovation progressed, this role was aided by reference to topographical 
maps and air reconnaissance in addition to the gathering of fresh intelligence by 
patrols. Prior to 18th Division’s attack on 22 August, the staff of 55 Brigade, having 
collated all available information covering the enemy, issued ‘a separate Instruction in 
the form of a tracing… as of 12 noon 20 August’ with reference to ‘Corps 
Topographical Sheets of 14.8.18 and 19.8.18’.45 From this information Brigadier-
General E.A. Wood was able to plan for an attack on Albert whilst making specific 
arrangements to repulse threatened counterattacks. Thus, he considered 
that any hostile attacks of a magnitude involving the use of the Brigade Reserve 
may owing to the present topographical considerations be expected to come 
from a South East direction. As very few bridges at present exist over the Ancre 
and they are being watched continuously, the counterattack troops may expect 
to receive fair warning of any hostile attempts to advance and also early 
information of the attack. The high ground in E. 2 and 7 is the most probable 
first objective for an enemy attack on the Brigade front.46   
 
Based upon these assumptions all officers of the counterattack battalion were 
instructed ‘to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the ground and the gaps 
in the wire’ with the OC being instructed to ‘exercise his troops in forming up for an 
imaginary counterattack to regain the high ground’.47 
 
45 TNA, WO 95/2048, 55 Brigade WD, appendix 17, 55 Infantry Brigade Instruction No.1 and Instruction No.2, 
20 August. 





 The attack also reflected the value placed upon liaison between arms, with the 
headquarters of 47th Division’s 235 and 236 Brigades R.F.A. being attached to 55 
Brigade HQ.48 This arrangement enabled Wood to direct artillery on ‘any enemy 
problem [on his front] holding up the advance of the 7/Buffs and direct[ing] fire onto 
any good target afforded’.49 The brigade staff ‘work[ed] at a very high speed’ on 
operational orders, with the first conference held at 6pm on 19 August and the last at 
10am on 21 August, by which time ‘the Brigade Commander’s plan of action was 
absolutely settled’. After moving his headquarters forward during the evening, Wood 
was then able to watch the progress of events and direct operations… whilst in close 
touch with the battalions’.50 
 By contrast, the circumstances shaping the attack of 47th Division’s 142 Brigade 
were less favourable. As the divisional history states, the attack was delivered under 
the false assumption that ‘the enemy’s resistance would not be severe and that his 
reserves were dissipated’.51 However, in the face of a determined counter-attack and 
rapidly changing circumstances, the brigade was left with insufficient artillery support. 
Initially, the line held by 142 Brigade contravened the directive laid down by III Corps 
in regard to the manpower required to hold a brigade front. This stated that ‘where 
troops have to maintain pressure it is advisable to reduce the brigade frontage to 2,000 
yards – the maximum a brigade staff can control’.52 However, the 142 Brigade ‘held a 
line of 3,600 yards with 600 exhausted men’.53  
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Other factors contributing to the brigade’s difficulties stemmed from the 
unreliability of the tanks detailed for the attack and logistic problems caused by the 
transition to semi-mobile operations. Although in demand, the tank’s lack of 
mechanical reliability meant that they were by no means a panacea for success.  In 
this case the six machines detailed for the attack needed mechanical maintenance, 
leaving only one supply tank to replenish the brigade’s forward S.A.A. dumps.  
Doubtful of 142 Brigade’s capacity to repel an expected counterattack, Brigadier-
General R. McDouall requested a further artillery barrage. This was denied because 
‘the targets already given to the Divisional Artillery’ had consumed all available 
ammunition, highlighting the problems encountered in sustaining an adequate level of 
logistical support.54 With the failure to suppress the enemy fire, the brigade 
headquarters was then ‘incessantly shelled making contact by telephone for more than 
a few minutes at a time either forward or backward impossible’.55 The experiences of 
142 Brigade demonstrate that the key components of the BEF’s combined arms 
system of warfare, the infantry, artillery and auxiliary arms, were not infallible.   
 Correcting the errors that contravened the principles of open warfare, exposed 
in the transformation from static operations, was a pivotal role for the brigadiers. 
Brigadier-General C.E. Corkran wrote extensively upon these problems in 173 
Brigade’s war diaries.56 His observations were related to his assertion that the 
principles of open warfare had been neglected at Billon Wood during operations on 25 
August. His comments drew upon the principles laid down in FSR1 and the tactical 
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pamphlet stated that ‘in [the present] warfare it is neither possible for Divisions and 
Brigades to carry out their functions with the facilities and the deliberation which have 
come to be looked upon as trench warfare’.57 Corkran’s principal concern was ‘the lack 
of application of the principles of protection… where whole platoons were observed to 
advance into the open in “lumps” against close range M.G. and rifle fire (300 yards) 
and to suffer accordingly’. This he blamed upon the inexperience of platoon and 
section commanders. The solution was to impress upon them the necessity ‘for every 
body of troops being preceded by ground scouts to reconnoitre ahead and to the flanks 
to avoid a surprise attack’.58 Immediate arrangements were made to address this 
weakness with specific company and platoon training concentrated upon the 
employment of patrols and the exercise of ‘fire and movement’ with the support of 
Lewis Guns.  Regular lectures to junior officers reinforced these principles, with an 
emphasis upon communication drill, reconnaissance and liaison.  
 While the artillery counter-battery support on 25 August had proved 
satisfactory, Corkran considered that ‘the liaison with the Heavy Artillery left much to 
be desired’. As regular calls for artillery support had been wanting in accuracy, he 
suggested ‘that at least one Heavy Artillery officer could be spared to assist the forward 
infantry in the identification’ of enemy positions and the calibre of their guns. To 
establish a secure line of communication, he also suggested that 
as in the present type of fighting the main bulk of the enemy fire is directed… 
on to the forward troops… our communications rearward from about 1,000 
yards from the front line are seldom interfered with. This fact should enable an 
artillery line could be maintained as far as Battalion Headquarters while it could 
be maintained up to Brigade Advanced Command Post which, whenever 
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possible is selected at a point where the greater part of the Brigade Front can 
be observed.59 
  
These recommendations were an attempt to maintain operational tempo, as was 
Corkran’s argument for placing the guns under Corps control to provide ‘perfect liaison 
[with the] command of a weapon so essential to the fighting infantry… [being] 
decentralised’.60 
While, as John Bourne has contended, Corkran’s appointment to a second-line 
TF brigade may be considered as ‘something as a come down for a Guards officer’, 
his extensive combat experience was important in informing the training of 
inexperienced junior officers in the tactics of open warfare.61 Corkran was not alone in 
bringing tactical proficiency to a TF formation. For example, Brigadier-General  H.W. 
Cobham’s 175 Brigade provided the nucleus of 58th Division’s advanced guard at 
Peronne on 30 August, the organisation and adoption of a mobile, combined-arms 
attack reflecting his experience and professionalism.62 As Simkins has argued, ‘the 
apparent ease with which a second-line Territorial infantry division could adapt’ to the 
conditions of open warfare ‘is indicative of the greater degree of sophistication 
possessed by most front-line units’.63 Despite having served only a brief period with 
their respective brigades, Corkran and Cobham established their leadership 
credentials very rapidly, instilling into their new formations the confidence, 
 
59 Ibid, p.3. 
60 Ibid, p.11. 
61 www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/warstudies/research/projects/lionsdonkeys/b.aspx -retrieved 18 
February 2016. 
62 OH 1918, Vol.4, p.139; TNA, WO 95/3008, 175 Brigade WD.                 




professionalism and tactical flair acquired from their extensive front line and/or staff 
experience.     
 The role of brigade command during the offensive operations of August 1918 
can be viewed from two perspectives. The first is defined by the benefits provided by 
the BEF’s material strength:  firepower, supported sophisticated logistic infrastructure; 
combined arms and communications, which, although prone to significant difficulties, 
were far more robust and flexible than before. The second perspective highlights the 
leadership qualities, professionalism and efficiency of the brigade staff, expressed 
through decentralisation and flexibility which allowed brigadiers to adapt and respond 
to increased tempo. The establishment of progressively advanced brigade 
headquarters and report centres provided the local commander with the means to 
sustain tactical control. Clearly the massive firepower and efficient logistic support 
provided by Fourth Army was beneficial to brigade command. However, as the 
experiences of 142 Brigade demonstrated, these benefits were not consistent across 
all brigades. This suggests a continuing unevenness in the BEF’s learning process 
and the evolution of brigade command. 
6.5: IX Corps: Brigade Operations at Epehy, the St. Quentin Canal and the 
Beaurevoir Line, 18 September-10 October 1918  
  The renewal of operations on 18 September was designed to place Fourth 
Army within striking distance of the Main Hindenburg System.64 In brigades, as the 
tempo of operations gathered pace, command decisions devolved to the lowest 
appropriate level with the ‘fighting carried out chiefly by the junior officers of the 
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battalions’.65  These changes reflected the change from static to open warfare that had 
transformed the role of brigade staff. The compression of standard battle procedures, 
the use of verbal orders and increased distances between command headquarters 
required that staff be fully aware of the forward situation and ‘retain touch with units 
belonging to their own formations or with other units on their flanks’.66  Moreover, an 
emphasis on flexibility and the establishment of advanced brigade posts led to 
increased casualties amongst brigade staff. To evaluate the impact of enhanced 
tempo upon the role of brigade command, the advance of Fourth Army’s IX Corps 
towards the Hindenburg Line, its crossing of the St. Quentin Canal and the breach of 
the Beaurevoir Line have been examined.  
 Fourth Army’s attack on 18 September involved a total of eight divisions from 
III, IX, and Australian Corps. Of these divisions, five had been in action continuously 
since 8 August, with those of III and IX Corps being particularly weakened.67 In all 
probability, Fourth Army could muster 40,000 troops of whom 27,000 would have been 
initially deployed. If these figures are correct, ‘Fourth Army had a large manpower 
advantage on its front’.68 It was calculated that ‘the Fourth Army was opposed by 
seven divisions… and that the strength in rifles in the line probably did not exceed 
12,000’.69 The British firepower advantage exceeded even that of their superiority in 
manpower. This enabled two-thirds of the artillery to focus upon counter-battery work 
and points of resistance. These two factors were preconditions for operational 
success. However, as tanks were in short supply, only 20 were detailed to Fourth 
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Army: eight supported III Corps, four IX Corps, and eight the Australian Corps. They 
were to assist the infantry over a 20,000-yard front and not beyond the first objective. 
By compensation, machine gun barrages were employed by all corps, except in IX 
Corps ‘as no one at Fourth Army HQ [saw fit] to draw the corps commander’s attention 
to this tactic’.70 This omission can be ascribed to inconsistency in Fourth Army’s 
planning and a lack of uniformity in the implementation of combined arms.  The 
absence of a machine-gun barrage and the variable numbers of tanks available for 
each corps are indicative of some of the irregularities in the provision of brigade 
support. 
 The operations of 6th Division (IX Corps) began with a difficult assembly, 18 
Brigade having failed to secure the “jumping off” positions and 71 Brigade receiving 
no reports upon the disposition ‘of its units prior to zero hour’.71 These difficulties were 
compounded by the division’s 4,000-yard line of advance, devoid of cover and 
exposed to enfilade fire from both sides of a valley. With the four tanks detailed for the 
attack failing to arrive and in the absence of a machine-gun barrage, the advance 
stalled and 
by evening the different events of the day [and] the difficulty of keeping direction 
had completely mixed up the units of the 16th Brigade so much that immediate 
unravelling seemed almost impossible and the senior officers at various points 
had to collect the troops and take command of them. 72  
 
This situation highlights the difficulties experienced by brigade command during an 
extended advance as operations transitioned from static to mobile and responsibility 
was devolved to battalion, platoon and section levels. Brigadier-General H.A. Walker, 
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GOC 16 Brigade recognised that the attack was ‘a soldier’s battle’, and his 
responsibilities confined to ‘relieving tired troops, collecting reserves, issuing orders 
for consolidation and ascertaining the position of the troops on the flanks’.73 
The attack of 16 Brigade also highlighted the difficulties associated with the 
compression of standard battle procedures. As Major-General T.S. Lambert, GOC 
32nd Division laid down, to maintain the tempo of successive attacks ‘where orders 
arrive late… on no account must the issue be delayed’.74 Consequently, staff officers 
attending divisional conferences were expected ‘to be in possession of a full 
knowledge of their local situation’. Furthermore, it was stressed that ‘owing to the great 
distances separating units and formations and the shortness of time it [was] very rarely 
that decisions once made at conference could be altered’.75 Nevertheless, as Walker 
stressed, from the perspective of the brigadier, the issue of a warning order was crucial 
to avoid the 
regrettable results [that occurred] on the 19th [where] on the other hand a 
warning order for a minor operation with 3 Infantry Brigade on the 24th allowed 
of the attack being delivered to time although troops only learnt of zero hour 
some 10 minutes before the advance.76 
 
In contrast to 16 Brigade’s attack, the assembly of 1st Division’s 2 Brigade on 
24 September was accomplished without difficulty. This was attributable to thorough 
reconnaissance which had pinpointed the batteries ‘from which the enemy were 
inclined to keep up harassing fire’ and which were ‘kept quiet by the Artillery throughout 
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the night’.77 With sufficient knowledge of the brigade frontage, Brigadier-General G.C. 
Kelly was able to place his reserve battalion so as to take maximum advantage of the 
ground ‘in taking over successive tactical points as they were gained… and to remain 
ready to re-act [sic] should a counter-attack be delivered’. The movements of brigade 
and artillery headquarters were an object lesson in liaison. Immediately upon 2 
Brigade taking the first objective, the 39 Field Artillery Brigade HQ moved forward with 
their guns to establish a satisfactory ‘liaison between the Infantry and the Artillery 
Brigades and the battalions’; so satisfactory in fact ‘that a counter-attack was stopped 
almost before it had developed’.78  
From the contrasting experiences of 2 and 16 Brigades it is evident that the 
transition from static to mobile operations was far from smooth. The potential for 
success depended upon sufficient logistic support, whilst the variable configuration of 
brigade frontages shaped operations. The higher tempo of operations necessitated 
the compression of battle procedures, in contrast to the complex operational orders of 
earlier campaigns.  The ability of brigade command to respond to rapidly changing 
circumstances depended upon the competence of the individual brigadier and the 
collective experience and tactical proficiency of its staff. This entailed the 
implementation of sophisticated tactics and the establishment of close liaison between 
all arms. However, in maintaining touch, the forward movement of brigade 
headquarters proved increasingly dangerous. All three brigadiers of 1st Division 
became casualties in the space of 14 days. Brigadier-General W.B. Thornton, GOC 1 
Brigade was wounded on 22 September and Brigadier-General G.C. Kelly, GOC 2 
Brigade having ‘handled his brigade under heavy fire’ and repulsed several 
 





counterattacks was wounded by shellfire on 26 September.79 GOC 3 Brigade was 
killed alongside his brigade major on 4 October whilst reconnoitring a new position, 
whilst Walker of 16 Brigade was wounded on 16 October. In total, four brigadiers were 
killed and eighteen either wounded or gassed within the five Armies during the 
Hundred Days. 
 As Fourth Army’s advance continued, lessons were drawn from operations to 
form the basis of brigade field exercises. For example, the staff of 2 Brigade, 
accompanied by officers of the R.F.A., conducted an exercise in open countryside in 
mid-October; riding over recently captured ground, ‘the appropriate lessons were 
deduced from their experiences’. This was a return to the pre-war practice of staff rides 
designed to train officers in the tactical and strategic significance of terrain, and 
contingency planning.80 
The crossing of the St. Quentin Canal and operations against the Beaurevoir 
Line by IX Corps were notable for the level of responsibility devolved upon brigade 
command. The operations were designed to compensate for the loss of 
communications, virtually inevitable in semi-mobile operations, and maintain the 
tempo of the attack through flexibility and decentralised command. The relative speed 
of the advance meant that it was possible to provide only a limited system of telegraph 
and telephone lines, so commanders were forced to resort to alternative methods. 
However, of these ‘the environment that lay beyond Brigade Headquarters was still 
not conducive to the widespread and effective use of wireless technology’ while the 
use of visual communication was invariably impaired by poor visibility.81    
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  Major-General G.F. Boyd’s plan for 46th (North Midland) Division’s crossing of 
the canal was specifically designed to compensate for the loss of communication by 
enhancing the responsibility devolved to his brigade and battalion commanders. 
Boyd’s instructions were clear, that he retained the right to commit 138 and 139 
Brigades in the event of an unsuccessful attack by 137 Brigade. In the event of a loss 
of communication with his subordinates, brigade and battalion commanders holding 
back would be deemed to be in flagrant breach of orders. It was therefore impressed 
upon 138 and 139 Brigades that they must have their headquarters placed to allow 
direct observation and that 
should it appear at any time that the 137 Brigade having crossed the CANAL 
are being outfought through lack of support, these battalions on their own 
initiative and without waiting for orders will advance across the CANAL to 
reinforce [137 Brigade] [original emphases].82  
 
 The company commanders of 138 Brigade, detailed to provide protection from the 
western bank, were therefore instructed to provide regular reports to battalion 
headquarters from which an officer ‘provided with a horse’ liaised with brigade 
headquarters.83 Ultimately, in a rapid response to 137 Brigade’s success, the 
5/Lincolnshire and 5/Leicestershire of 138 Brigade moved forward within three hours 
of notification. Within four hours, with the first objective taken, company commanders 
were able to ‘make arrangements with their respective section of Tanks for an attack 
on the final objective’.84 46th Division’s measures proved successful in mitigating the 
loss of communications and ensuring that the tempo of operations was sustained. In 
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the event, no visual contact was possible due to the fog and smoke and 
‘communication with the Battalions was impossible owing to incessant cutting of 
lines’.85  
After the initial assault and having passed through 46th Division, the brigades 
of 32nd Division benefited from the progressive movement of brigade headquarters. As 
the advance progressed, an Advanced Brigade Report Centre (ABRC), acting as a 
Transmitting Station, ‘moved forward to a pre-arranged position [with] each successive 
bound made in a similar manner’. With telephone communication established, the 
brigade staff were also able to call upon the use of a wireless loop set, although in 
compliance with the compression of battle procedure were restricted ‘to no more than 
12 words’.86 A junior brigade officer was detailed to maintain contact between ‘”C” 
Company, 32 Bn. M.G. Corps and 97 T.M. Battery’.87 To sustaining the tempo of the 
attack, neither ‘Tanks nor Infantry should wait for one another… until the situation 
[approximated] to Open Warfare’: this approximation was soon to be realised.88  
 The subsequent operations of 16 Brigade against the Beaurevoir Line on 8 
October were considered by Walker ‘more in the nature of open warfare than any 
operations… since 1914’.89 In response to the difficulties in accommodating the 
battalions of 16 and 71 Brigades upon a restricted frontage Walker devised a plan ‘to 
reduce the distance which 1/Buffs would have to side slip after relief and left a greater 
strength for forming a defensive flank’.90 This plan conformed to the line of the brigade 
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front and reflected the necessity of maintaining the tempo of operations. In the event, 
with the attack postponed for 24 hours, minor modifications were made in response to 
the arrival of ‘two companies from a battalion of 18 Brigade, assisted by three Whippet 
Tanks to mop up centres of resistance’ and ‘troops of 139 Brigade co-operating to the 
extent of trying to capture a certain nest of machine guns’. Having altered his plan 
accordingly, Walker later recorded that ‘the difficulties to be expected… were 
considerably lessened’. 91  
46th Division’s operations represented a significant progression in the 
organisational and tactical evolution of brigade command during the Hundred Days. 
Careful preparation, mutual support and the implementation of a cohesive combined-
arms attack contributed to operational success. An emphasis upon devolved 
command, ameliorating   loss of communications and reinforced by the principles of 
FSR1, provided brigadiers with enhanced tactical flexibility. Moreover, as Walker’s 
experiences demonstrate, brigadiers were able to respond confidently to the various 
difficulties posed by the transition from static to mobile operations.   
6.6: Second Army: II, X and XIX Corps: Brigade Operations, 28 September-25 
October 1918 
The opening of the Flanders offensive on 28 September, on a 16-mile front 
running from Ypres to the River Lys, marked the Second Army’s first major 
engagement of the Hundred Days. In comparison to Fourth Army, its four corps were 
not generously equipped, lacking  tanks and limited to 444 heavy guns and eight Field 
Artillery brigades.92 As Harris contended, ‘only the weakness of the German forces to 
 
91 Ibid. 





Second Army’s front made this seem adequate’, although the five understrength 
divisions of the German Fourth Army possessed excellent observation over the entire 
Second Army area.93 In addition much had been done to organise the enemy defences 
and ‘utilise for defence in depth the pill-boxes, dug-outs and wire of the earlier 
periods’.94 In its favour, the Second Army benefited from ‘Plumer’s penchant for 
teamwork and consultation that did much to foster… devolved command’.95 To 
evaluate brigade operations on Second Army’s northern front, those conducted by II, 
X and XIX Corps have been examined with a focus upon the preconditions for 
operational success: the establishment of communications, sufficient artillery support 
and flexibility. The brigadiers’s role in training and his contribution to the tactical debate 
have also been assessed to gauge brigade command’s administrative and operational 
development. 
 That Second Army’s reputation for meticulous planning was not unfounded is 
evident in the arrangements for the opening of the offensive. Capitalizing upon their 
knowledge of the area, brigade, battalion and company commanders, in groups of 60 
‘were taken each day to Cassel [Second Army HQ] by [GOC 35th Division] and with 
the help of MGGS Second Army and GSO3 explained the ground on a large-scale 
model which all these officers knew by previous experience’. All officers were then 
able to discuss their mutual cooperation and 
practically played out a war game of their participation in the attack [it being] 
certain that this was responsible in a great degree for the smoothness with 
which the operations were subsequently carried out.96 
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Second Army had some experienced brigadiers: Brigadier-General J.W. 
Sandilands, GOC 104 Brigade and Brigadier-General J.H.W. Pollard, GOC 106 
Brigade, 35th Division (XIX Corps) had served on Second Army’s front for 27 and 16 
months, respectively.97 This level of experience proved a valuable asset in providing 
a comprehensive knowledge of the front line. Conversely, 21 brigades were allocated 
new brigadiers from January-October 1918. Of these, nine appointments were made 
during the Hundred Days including that of Brigadier-General J.L. Jack whose 28 
Brigade, 9th Division, was formed on 11 September 1918. Most brigadiers were 
predominately men who had been Regular officers in August 1914 and reflected the 
profile of the experienced pre-war army officer imbued with determination and 
courage. For example, upon receiving a Bar to his D.S.O., Brigadier-General Hon. 
A.G.A. Hore-Ruthven V.C. GOC 26 Brigade, 9th Division, was considered to have  
commanded his brigade with conspicuous gallantry and judgement through the 
operations east of Ypres from 28 September-27 October 1918… On 20 October 
he went forward among the attacking troops at a critical juncture and inspired 
them to the final effort, whereby the high ground of great tactical value was 
captured.98 
 
Few brigadiers originated from a civilian background. On 29 September, when the 
BEF broke through the Hindenburg Line, from 189 brigade commanders, only six 
originated from the TF. Where officers were from a civilian background however, such 
as Brigadier-General B. Freyberg V.C. GOC 88 Brigade, 29th Division, they 
demonstrated that they were equally ‘capable of transferring their own professional 
talents into a military context’.99 A notable feature of the September 1918 British 
brigadiers was their age. As the attrition of officers took its toll and older commanders 
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were replaced by younger battle-hardened veterans, the average age of 120 
brigadiers equated to an average of 42 years.100  
 Maintenance of tempo during brigade operations was determined by two 
factors: first, the ability of the artillery to move forward in successive bounds, following 
the infantry: and second, the ability of the brigadier to retain a substantial degree of 
tactical control. The arrangements for 9th (Scottish) Division’s (II Corps) attack on 28 
September satisfied both these criteria. Initially, ‘the issuing of “Instructions” previous 
to a battle of this description where much care in detail was essential…  proved 
invaluable’.101 The divisional fire-plan was designed to support assaults on four 
successive objectives and combined a creeping barrage of 18-pdrs joining up with a 
standing barrage put down by II Corps H.A. Each bound was marked by a three minute 
pause and ‘at dawn two thirds of the guns [resorted] to using smoke shells’.102 To 
assist brigade staff in maintaining communication, a telegraph route forward of brigade 
headquarters to an ‘earmarked’ ABRC was supplemented by visual and wireless 
apparatus.103 In maintaining close cooperation between flank formations, an 
“International” platoon was formed of members of the 8/Black Watch and the 17th 
Belgian Regiment on the left.104  
 Throughout the attack communications worked, with valuable information from 
contact aircraft being transmitted down the chain of command from II Corps HQ., whilst 
a telephone cable ‘enabled [28 Brigade] to maintain communication at each 
progressive point with Divisional HQ and to some extent with the battalions’.105 Thus, 
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Brigadier-General J.L. Jack, GOC 28 Brigade was able to report that ‘I have just seen 
the Camerons supported by the Black Watch and the Seaforths leave for their second 
objective. All in very good heart. Casualties slight’.106 Then, having considered that he 
was ‘much too far back for keeping touch with one’s command’ and having sought 
permission from the divisional commander, he moved his headquarters forward to 
within 350 yards of the front line. Thus, through successive moves he had a hold on 
operations, while overseeing the renewed advance of his battalions on the following 
morning.107 Inevitably the progressive advance of brigade headquarters exposed its 
staff to increased danger. Moving forward with his battalions, Brigadier-General 
G.R.H. Cheape, GOC 86 Brigade, 29th Division, and Captain McFee his Assistant 
Brigade Major, were caught in their own barrage. Nevertheless, they succeeded in 
capturing 16 prisoners and the brigadier ‘shot down an enemy aeroplane with his 
rifle’.108 As their experiences demonstrate, open warfare provided ample opportunities 
for brigade staff to participate in an attack. 
 Throughout the attack of 9th (Scottish) and 35th Division’s, operational orders 
remained brief and subject to alteration according to circumstances. As Sandilands 
explained  
should the enemy… become demoralised and in full retreat it may be necessary 
to push forward at once in pursuit… achieved by the initiative of the man on the 
spot [and] the lifts off the area being shot over by the Heavy Artillery  permit[ting] 
of this being done.109  
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Similarly, Brigadier-General R.L. Adlercron, GOC 124 Brigade, 41st Division, with his 
brigade held at an hour’s notice, stated that  
the Operations in which the Brigade had recently taken part were in spite of the 
short notice… satisfactory. He proceeded to point out that in the future short 
notice of all operations must be expected and all training must be made with 
this end in view.110   
 
Consequently, the brigade’s scheme of training reflected flexibility and that ‘for the 
probable kind of fighting in which the Brigade could be engaged… [being] at very short 
notice and on any one of 4 or 5 different positions’. If it became impossible to issue 
written orders it was decided that ‘skeleton orders… would be framed comprising the 
boundaries, bounds and objectives’ and shown to the battalion commanders by ‘the 
Brigadier Commander and the Staff on the ground’.111  
 To reinforce the tactics adopted for the advance, a training exercise was carried 
out by the 11/Queens of 123 Brigade at XIX Corps School. This comprised a practice 
attack on a strongpoint and was observed by the brigade staff and COs of 124 Brigade. 
It was then arranged ‘that units of 124 Brigade would carry out in succession a similar 
exercise over the same ground as the Brigade Operation of the 19th inst.’.112 This 
exercise reflects the army’s drive for uniformity in training based upon SS152 and 
reflected two beliefs: that training in a unit was the commanding officer’s responsibility, 
and that special instructors were to be employed at dedicated corps schools. The 
exchange of experience and knowledge between the two staffs illustrated the search 
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for uniformity and that brigade commanders were willing to ask for advice from those 
with recognised experience. 113 
The benefits of brigade training were reflected in the operations of 29th Division 
(II Corps) where, on 28 September, troops of Brigadier-General G.R.H. Cheape’s 86 
Brigade “’dribbled” forward under cover of Trench Mortars, Lewis Guns, Rifle 
Grenades and rifle fire, outflanking the centres of resistance’.114  In 86 Brigade, section 
officers of the Machine Gun Corps were ‘encouraged to use their own initiative’ whilst 
the Stokes Mortars proved invaluable in overcoming hostile points of resistance’. Here 
also the persistent problem of maintaining the direction of attack, given the 
inexperience of the troops ‘who had never advanced under a H.E. barrage before’ was 
solved by the Brigade Intelligence Officer. Advancing with several observers ‘on a 
compass bearing in the centre of the Brigade Front each with red patches on their 
backs and carrying a large red flag’, the momentum and direction of the attack was 
maintained.115  
Cheape considered that ‘an officer from the Divisional Staff should be with the 
Reserve Battalion so that control of the situation may be exercised from the Divisional 
point of view’. This suggestion was intended to save ‘valuable time on ascertaining the 
situation of the flank brigades and having to decide future action at field conferences’. 
It was also suggested that to conform with the rapid advance of Second Army, ‘the 
Staff of Corps and Divisions should keep in touch with the situation and not endeavour 
to function from many miles in the rear’.116 These arrangements, in response to the 
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transition to open warfare, reflected brigade command’s adaptability and contribution 
to the tactical debate.    
 Whilst a pre-condition for operational success, Second Army’s provision of 
brigade artillery support was inconsistent. This was attributable to two factors. First, 
the number of artillery batteries and field brigades available for infantry support varied. 
Second, with the advance outpacing the range of the artillery, problems were 
encountered in getting guns forward. These factors merit further consideration. Three 
consecutive operations conducted by the brigades of 35th Division during October 
were shaped by the variable provision of artillery support. For example, the swift attack 
of 104 Brigade on 28 September faltered in the face of fierce resistance when 
‘17/Lancashire were left out of the range of the Field Guns’.117  The batteries were 
delayed and 
hastening forward to support the second advance of the 106th Brigade were 
unable to do so except by bursts of [indiscriminate] fire… so that the 17/Royal 
Scots and the 19/Highland L.I. made good their objectives… with practically no 
artillery support.118 
 
 According to the 35th Division’s historian, the difficulties of making headway were also 
attributable to ‘the battery commander [being] unable to arrange any reliable system 
of communication… the pill boxes and isolated houses [having] to be assaulted without 
effective covering fire’.119 Nevertheless, the brigade advanced eight miles. 
 In contrast, 104 Brigade’s attack on 14 October benefited from ‘a proportion of 
the Field Artillery covering the Brigade front moving forward with rapidity’. To 
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compensate for the brigade attacking obliquely to the general line of advance, two field 
gun batteries, accompanied by howitzers, moved forward at zero-hour, to be joined 
later by the remainder of the field artillery. Thus:  
as the barrage started the two detached batteries and the howitzers moved 
forward with the infantry to carry on the barrage beyond the line reached by the 
119th A.F.A. Brigade. The remainder of the artillery advanced as soon as the 
limit of range was reached. In this way the barrage was continuous… As soon 
as the original barrage was finished the remainder of the batteries limbered up 
and between 8.15 and 10am were in action.120 
 
Aided by these arrangements, 17/Lancashire Fusiliers was able to reach its objective 
4,500 yards distant and upon the resumption of operations the following morning ‘all 
objectives were gained at an early hour’.121 On 20 October difficulties were again 
encountered in bringing forward the heavy artillery, the operation being supported by 
sections of field guns attached to each battalion.122 This situation was rectified on 31 
October when ‘6-inch Howitzers were brought up to within 1,500 yards of the enemy 
machine-guns’.123  
 In assessing the value of devolved responsibility, the existence of sufficient 
artillery support determined whether brigadiers chose to exploit the advance or 
consolidate their positions. In setting his brigade’s objectives for 14 October, GOC 9th 
(Scottish) Division laid down that ‘the method of advance would depend upon the 
tactical situation’. Thus, his orders stated that 
if GOC 28 Brigade considers that a further advance can be made without the 
artillery being moved forward, he will continue the advance and 26 Brigade will 
continue to be responsible for his left flank. If he considers it cannot be made, 
he will consolidate. The Divisional Commander will then decide if the advance 
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is to be continued after sufficient artillery has been forwarded and if so by which 
Brigade.124    
 
Having taken the decision to renew the attack, Jack’s brigade was subsequently 
‘checked by the enemy’s strong resistance’ but resumed next morning.125 
 Flexibility and decentralisation were at the core of brigade command. This was 
conveyed in the instructions issued by 34th Division (X Corps) for the deployment of 
artillery. Thus:  
the attachment of Brigades of Field Artillery… in each Infantry Brigade Group 
[are provided] for close and immediate Artillery Support for the advancing 
Infantry and to prevent checks… under the command of GOC Brigade 
[accompanied] by an Artillery Brigade Commander to act as his adviser.126 
 
Divisional command gave guidance to assist brigadiers in the employment of field 
guns. This stated that ‘sections can be pushed forward with the Battalions to cover the 
advance against any particular locality or to take advantage of fleeting opportunities’. 
Whilst it was advised that ‘guns should engage any hostile guns located’ it was 
stressed that ‘their locality should be immediately sent to Divisional Headquarters to 
enable the HA to engage’. Any call upon artillery support made by battalions or 
companies through brigade headquarters ‘were to be supplemented by sending an 
officer or NCO to the nearest guns in action’. The attention of the brigade staff was 
also drawn to Training Leaflet No.5, ‘the present form of warfare giving splendid 
opportunities for practicing the very excellent methods laid down in this pamphlet’.127  
 What effect did the tempo of operations during the Hundred Days have on a 
brigadier’s tactical influence? To some degree it dwindled, as the advance outpaced 
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communications. In other respects, the ability to call on a wide range of assets, 
including heavy artillery, the field artillery brigades and Trench Mortar Batteries 
reinforced the firepower at a brigadier’s disposal. The role of the field commander was 
reassessed in the light of the move to mobile operations, with the attention of officers 
‘down to Section and fire-unit commanders’ drawn to the enduring pre-war principles 
of FSR1.128  
Initially, as Simpson has demonstrated, ‘during set piece operations corps took 
greater control than during open warfare, when as much as possible was delegated to 
divisions’.129 This demonstrated the flexibility of the BEF’s command structure, as well 
as the value placed upon the ‘man on the spot’ by which the tempo of operations was 
sustained. The situation was summarised by Major-General C.L. Nicholson, GOC 34th 
Division, who stated that 
the transition to mobile warfare necessitates a certain re-arrangement of ideas 
on the part of all commanders. FSR1 is still the true guide for all troops leading 
and it is essential that all commanders down to Section and line-unit 
commanders should study it.130 
 
The position of command headquarters was critical. 34th Division’s GOC drew 
attention to FSR1 which stated that ‘subordinate commanders should take up positions 
[depending upon the size of the force he commands] where they can obtain a good 
view of the area in which their commands are operating and which admit of easy 
communication with their immediate superior’.131  Accordingly, Nicholson laid down 
that   
the Headquarters of Infantry and Artillery Brigades should be further forward 
than is the case in trench warfare… located with reference to the troops 
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engaged and the position of the reserves so that he can influence the progress 
and action of the fight by the use of his reserves and auxiliary weapons. Only 
by this means can a Commander ensure that the effective co-operation of the 
different arms at his disposal and retain control… and impress his own 
personality upon the course of events.132  
 
  By stressing the need for flexibility, FSR1 provided guidance to help 
commanders to adapt to circumstances. The premature move of brigade headquarters 
was deprecated: 
Headquarters must not move too frequently as this rendered Signal 
Communication impossible. Brigade Headquarters should wait longer in one 
position and make one big bound rather than to keep on moving short 
distances.133 
 
Any move required the establishment of an Advanced Report Centre and secure lines 
of communication. For example, after establishing its battle headquarters on 13 
October, 102 Brigade delayed its move forward until the capture of the final objective 
at 10.00am on 14 October. Having then established a forward headquarters, the 
brigadier was able to respond to the threat of an enemy counterattack on his right flank 
with ‘one Company of 1/1 Hertford passed to the control of OC 1/4 Cheshires… and 2 
Companies of the Battalion moved forward to occupy our original front line’. Despite 
this advanced position ‘the thick mist and smoke… greatly hampered the task of 
getting back accurate information… while the length of the signal communication 
likewise delayed the sending of information to the rear and communicating with the 
flank brigades’.134 This problem was alleviated in part by the attachment of Liaison 
Officers to the battalions and to the flank brigade headquarters. With reference to 
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FSR1, divisional orders also stressed that ‘GOC Brigade and the Brigade Major or CO 
and Adjutant must not be absent from their HQ together’.135  
As this thesis has demonstrated, the optimum position for brigade headquarters 
was debated throughout the war on the Western Front. The benefits of a forward 
position were neutralised by poor communications and increased exposure. These 
problems were never entirely overcome. However, in general the measures adopted 
throughout the Hundred Days were testament to the lessons of previous offensives, 
with commanders maximising the use of the communications technology available to 
them.  
The final advance of the brigades of Second Army was characterised by 
improvisation and flexibility.  This was evident in the preparations undertaken by 31st 
Division’s 91 Brigade (XV Corps) where Brigadier-General S.C. Taylor personally 
‘reconnoitred and selected alternative positions in case the Brigade was called upon 
to support either forward Brigade’.136 This information was later used in the 
sophisticated arrangements for capturing Soyers Farm on 18 September. The attack 
entailed the brigade working in close cooperation with GOC 31st Division HA who 
provided ‘a barrage pivoted on the Farm… moving fanwise and thus ensuring that the 
Farm and Enclosures remained under fire until the attacking forces had reached a 
position well in the rear of it’.137 All arrangements and orders, having been verbally 
established at a brigade conference 36 hours before the attack, reached battalion 
headquarters 12 hours before zero. The benefits to brigade operations were two-fold. 
The first was the support provided by one of the two divisional artillery brigades which 
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advanced with the assault to allow closer all-arms protection. The second benefit 
reflected the compression of battle procedure that necessitated verbal or concise 
written orders in response to the rapid tempo of operations. As evidence of the 
heightened risk to brigadiers in forward positions, Taylor was fatally wounded on 1 
October.  
A similar degree of flexibility was evident in the advance of 9th Division’s 28 
Brigade (II Corps) on the Steenen-Stampkot Ridge. The position of the brigade on 14 
October was summed up by Brigadier-General J.L. Jack: 
Beyond this crest the field artillery barrage, now at the limit of its range, can 
support us no further; and although an advance battery or tow can gallop up 
almost immediately, a long pause in the operations is necessary to prepare the 
next attack…138  
 
To compensate for this delay, divisional orders stated that the method of advance 
would depend upon the tactical situation with responsibility devolved upon the 
brigadier: 
[If] GOC 28 Brigade considers that a further advance can be made without 
further artillery to be moved forward, he will continue and 26 Brigade will 
continue to be responsible for his left flank. If he considers an advance cannot 
be made, he will consolidate his position.139 
 
 If, after careful reconnaissance, he believed, that the situation did not warrant a further 
advance, the responsibility would then pass back to the divisional commander who 
‘would decide if the advance can be continued after sufficient artillery had been moved 
forward and if so by which Brigade’.140 In the event, Jack ‘cantered forward’ to 
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encourage his companies who he considered as ‘showing too little vigour… and even 
seized a Lewis gun [himself] to shoot, although the range was rather long’. The arrival 
of the 50th and 51st Field Artillery Brigades enabled him to continue his attack and 
secure all objectives before the enemy were reinforced, forcing the halting of the 
advance.141 As evidence of the importance of brigadiers moving forward with their 
battalions, 9th Division’s historian recorded that ‘Brigadier-Generals Hore-Ruthven, 
Croft and Jack were never far away from the hottest encounters and the ready 
judgement of these experienced officers was of the utmost value to the GOC’.142   
  Flexibility was equally prevalent in X Corps’s adaption to open warfare. 34th 
Division’s written operational orders laid down that ‘under certain circumstances’ it 
would be necessary for either one or two brigades to take over the line ‘as soon as 
the situation permits as early as tomorrow morning 2 October’ with 101 Brigade and 
34th Battalion MGC ‘positioned ready to move at an hour’s notice’. In the event 
verbal orders were given from the GOC Division to G.Os.C commanding [sic]. 
Infantry Brigades and C.R.A. at the Divisional Report Centre for brigades to be 
prepared either to advance through 35th and 41st Divisions or to relieve them.143 
 
Flexibility was evident too in barrage arrangements: ‘the exact timings of … lifts [being] 
liable to change and… would only be notified when fully settled’.144 Brigade 
commanders were also provided with a Field Artillery Brigade for the express purpose 
of ‘providing close and immediate Artillery Support and prevent checks’ with attention 
drawn to Training Leaflet No.5: The Action of Artillery in CLOSE Support of Assaulting 
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Battalions’ [original emphasis]. All measures complied with the principles of FSR1 
which was considered by the divisional commander as ‘still the true guide’ and that 
one all commanders down to platoon and fire-units were advised to study.145 The 
divisional guidance focused upon the positioning of Brigade and Artillery HQs further 
forward to provide the commander ‘with control over the movement of all his units’ and 
located where ‘he could influence the progress and action of the fight by use of 
reserves and auxiliary arms’.146 
Evidently the flexibility embodied within divisional instructions proved 
successful as demonstrated by the attack of 101 Brigade where upon being informed 
of an enemy counterattack, the brigadier was able despatch his reserves swiftly and 
effectively.147 Similarly, the tempo of operations was assisted by the close cooperation 
between brigades. On 24 October, having attended a divisional conference at 
10.00am, Brigadier-General W.J. Woodcock, GOC 101 Brigade issued an order 
arranging for the cooperation of 102 Brigade in assisting with the attack of 41st 
Division’s 123 Brigade. Consequently, all arrangements, the issue of operational 
orders and the assembly of the reserves were completed by 11pm.148   
Enhanced flexibility was evident too in 30th Division where ‘it… appeared that 
the intention of the Higher Commanders was to give [the division] a more free hand in 
the pace of the advance, it was considered expedient to form 3 brigade groups’. 149 
Each brigade group was a mobile and cohesive fighting unit. Thus, Brigadier-General 
G.A. Stevens’ 90 Brigade (Stevens’ Group) was comprised of ‘Brigade Headquarters, 
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3 Infantry Battalions, 1 L.T.M.B., 1 Brigade R.F.A. with 6th Newton T.M. Battery, two 
companies of Machine Guns, 1 Section R.E., 1 Cable Laying Signal Section R.E., I 
Field Ambulance, 1 Train Company and Cyclists’.150 Close cooperation between arms 
was facilitated by the COs of 90th T.M.B. and the Field Artillery Group being attached 
to Advanced Brigade Headquarters. 
 30th Division’s advance reflected what its commander, Major-General W. De L. 
Williams, considered was ‘the correct interpretation of the old maxim of “fire and 
movement”’ or the ‘simple principle of war’.151 The operations of 90 Brigade between 
16-20 October, were shaped by ‘the detailing of the day’s advance into a series of 
well-marked objectives [which were] found to work well and thus laid down in Brigade 
orders were found to be just about right in distance’.152 Given achievable objectives 
(including the crossing of the River Lys), sufficient fire-power and adequate logistic 
support, operational tempo could be maintained. Crucially, the Divisional and Brigade 
Signal Companies provided a secure forward line of communication ‘with all Infantry 
Brigade Headquarters established along a cable route… in spite of many changes in 
Divisional Headquarters’.153, The six progressive movements of Stevens’ brigade 
headquarters, over a period of four days, allowed it to respond rapidly to a fluid 
situation. This was illustrated by the timely issue of warning orders in response to three 
changes in divisional orders in the space of three and a half hours. Again, on 19 
October, following a divisional warning order stating that ‘Goodman’s [21st] Brigade 
Group was detailed to pass through [90 Brigade] next morning’ Stevens was able to 
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organise a further attack ‘to reach the objective for the day and hand over a clear 
situation’.154 
 From the perspective of divisional HQ, however, the brigades’s progress was 
too slow. The excessive caution demonstrated by the battalions was criticised as ‘a 
relic of trench warfare’155 with units showing ‘a reluctance on their part to make use of 
their weapons to give the necessary volume of fire to carry them along’.156 This may 
have been because of the emphasis on consolidation of ground won, rather than the 
exploitation of success, which was characteristic of trench warfare. Or, as the 
battalions were experienced, up to strength and had good morale, the problem may 
simply have been that the officers and men were tired. As Stevens explained, 90 
Brigade had ‘been in action practically continuously since August 15… fighting almost 
the whole time.157  
 The operations conducted by the brigades of Second Army during the final 
advance were characterised by semi- and ultimately open warfare. They benefited 
from the army’s sophisticated logistic infrastructure and the implementation of an all-
arms approach. Brigade command’s response in the transition to open warfare 
reflected the army’s aptitude for institutional and operational change. At brigade level, 
this transformation was enabled by the tactical and organisational skills of a new 
generation of brigade staff which had emerged through a meritocratic approach to 
promotion.  
     
 
154 TNA, WO 95/2338, 90 Brigade WD, 19 October 1918 and 90 Brigade OO No.208 and OO No.209, 19 October 
1918. 
155 Ibid, ‘Report on Operations of 19 October’.            
156 TNA, WO 95/2314, 30th Div. WD, 20 October 1918. 





  The organisational, tactical and technological developments within the BEF 
during 1918 represented the culmination of a learning process. However, whilst some 
areas of the BEF had become highly sophisticated, inconsistencies remained in the 
provision of sufficient firepower, the use of combined-arms tactics and the 
maintenance of tempo through devolved command. The lack of consistent training and 
variable approaches to command suggests that the British army faced significant 
obstacles to coherent learning. This diversity was reflected in brigade operations 
conducted by Fourth and Second Armies. 
Three factors shaped the development of brigade command during the 
Hundred Days. The first, at an operational level, applied to tempo. Rather than 
anticipating a breakthrough operation, attacks consisted of successive steps on 
selected intermediate objectives. These attacks were delivered on multiple axes 
across a wide front forcing the Germans to disperse their resources.  Where sufficient 
artillery support was available, the attacks were carried out within artillery range ‘as 
quickly as possible one after the other [and] as fast as the guns [could] get there’.158  
This support varied in strength within the brigades of Fourth and Second Armies.  
Second, a range of external constraints shaped brigade’s operational 
performance: these included the terrain, weather, the strength of German resistance 
and the availability of logistic support. Difficulties were encountered in maintaining 
protracted advances, with communications and the provision of artillery support 
affected. These problems required different solutions and a flexible approach in 
accordance with British army culture.   
 




The third factor was the emergence of new generation of brigade staff imbued 
with professionalism, combat experience and organisational abilities. Their pragmatic 
approach to problem-solving enabled them to adapt to different circumstances, 
provided that certain pre-conditions were present. Primarily, this involved 
decentralisation, which allowed brigade commanders to adapt to rapidly changing 
circumstances. Where possible, sufficient artillery support and a secure 
communication network ensured that brigade staffs were able to exercise sufficient 
tactical influence during the German withdrawal. This thesis has examined in detail 
the training, planning, timing and the execution of brigade operations during 1916-
1917. These elements came to fruition in the Hundred Days as the role of the brigade 
staff expanded in response to the increased tempo of operations.  
The random nature of the transference of knowledge or innovation was an 
acute problem for the army. As Fox has argued, ‘the failure to capture and disseminate 
knowledge was nothing new but in the case of a mass army, such loss could proliferate 
exponentially’.159 In the opening months of the war, the army pursued an ad hoc 
approach to learning before recognising the need for a structured process of 
evaluation and a central repository for knowledge. This process was diverse 
constituting institutional and individual methods, both systematic and incidental. As 
part of this process, it was recognised that learning and innovation would benefit from 
the contributions of subordinate commanders. Brigade commanders provided a 
consistent and valuable contribution to operational and tactical debates.  This process 
was manifested through an analysis of brigade operations and enriched by brigade 
 




commanders’ thorough knowledge of the topographical, logistic and tactical factors 
relevant to their sectors. 
The contribution of brigade command to the learning process within the British 
armies was rooted in the establishment of a new generation of brigade staff imbued 
with tactical proficiency and management skills. However, the rate of progression and 
the integration of new tactics and weapons was inconsistent. For example, as Paddy 
Griffith argued, the integration of new weapons was impeded by ‘the institutional and 
technical problems that were surely inevitable when a whole clutch of new 
technologies was being invented overnight and then instantly promoted to highest 
priorities’.160 In sum, the argument that emerges from this study, with regard to tactical 
reform, suggests that the development of brigade command, in common with the wider 
BEF, was a long and painful process of trial and error. Nevertheless, by 1918 brigade 
command had assimilated and embraced a combination of new tactics and innovative 
technology in the pursuit of operational success.   










This thesis has explored the evolution of the infantry brigade command of the 
British armies on the Western Front between 1916 and 1918. Two primary research 
questions were posed. First, to what degree did brigade command’s response to static 
warfare and its transition to mobile warfare reflect the British army’s approach to 
learning and adaptation? Second, to what extent were these responses conditioned 
by the style of command of the corps under which a brigade served? The questions 
were designed to challenge the orthodox interpretation that the role and influence of 
the brigadier and his staff was unduly narrow. Instead, it has been demonstrated that 
their role was far broader and encompassed a range of activities that contributed to 
operational success (or failure). In this respect brigade command was a significant 
catalyst for organisational and tactical change within the BEF. 
 The thesis first established the universal factors that shaped operations and 
over which commanders had little or no influence. There were two broad constraints. 
The first was a consequence of the British army’s need to support French strategy. 
This resulted in the BEF’s operations being largely offensive, at a time when the 
defender consistently had a significant advantage. Operations were affected by 
irregular brigade frontages, the provision (or otherwise) of accurate artillery 
observation and varying degrees of hostile fire. A second, logistic constraint, was the 
product of the British government’s unpreparedness for a continental war and lack of 
consideration for the social and economic implications of such a conflict. This was 
manifested in the inadequacy of the BEF’s material resources and the shortage of 
trained manpower. By 1915, therefore, the parameters in which the BEF were to 




operationally, the BEF was unable to turn the enemy’s flanks, so it had to conduct 
frontal assaults. Third the BEF suffered from shortages of materiel. Finally, the 
challenges of static warfare forced the BEF to determine how much of its pre-war 
approach to combat remained relevant and how much required revision.    
 In relation to the first research question, given the broad parameters in which 
brigade command operated, the response to trench warfare reflected the British 
army’s capacity for flexibility and innovation, and willingness to reappraise pre-war 
concepts. The framework for organisational and tactical reappraisal was largely 
attributable to the enduring ethos of the Edwardian British army that produced officers 
that were capable of instigating significant changes. This ethos was perpetuated 
throughout the army by Regular officers who continued to dominate command 
positions. To impress upon citizen soldiers the enduring values of initiative and 
deference to ‘the man on the spot’, the army recalibrated its approach to learning and 
knowledge creation. The extent to which brigade command embraced this approach 
speaks volumes about the flexible nature of the British army.    
The measures implemented by brigade staff in response to trench warfare 
substantiates their role as agents of organisational and tactical change. This process 
was manifested through various spheres of activity. Crucially, as ‘the man on the spot’ 
responsible for deciding which course of action to take, a brigadier required thorough 
knowledge of his sector in relation to his designated objectives. Therefore, the stress 
on reconnaissance and the capture and interpretation of information proved 
invaluable. The benefits of these procedures were manifold, translating into actions 
designed to mitigate the irregularity of brigade frontages and the disposition of the 
enemy defences. In accordance with the promotion of mutual support and shared 




progressive increase in the transfer of information between brigades both within 
division and from without. 
The fallibility of communications on the Western Front placed profound 
restrictions on the ability of commanders to sustain effective command and control 
during operations. Attempts to develop a reliable system of communications, the life 
blood of command and control, were neither constant nor incremental.  This was as 
true at brigade level as at other levels. The maintenance of tactical control forward of 
BHQ remained a consistent problem in static warfare, which was exacerbated to some 
degree by the more mobile operations of 1918. The optimum position for BHQ 
therefore remained problematic. Whilst it was eventually accepted that brigadiers 
should move forward in response to the changing conditions of battle, this meant that 
staff and commanders were more vulnerable to hostile fire. A wide range of solutions 
were implemented to resolve the problem. Of these, the grouping of brigade 
headquarters close to each other in order to expedite shared information proved 
successful. Other measures adopted, in accordance with the increased tempo of 
operations, was the establishment of ABHQ’s aligned upon a central axis of 
communications. With the expansion of brigade staff, a system of Brigade Intelligence 
and Liaison Officers was introduced to supplement the work of Divisional and Brigade 
Signals Companies. The adoption of these measures combined with a wide range of 
telegraphic, telephonic and visual equipment demonstrated the willingness of brigade 
command to embrace new and alternative forms of technology to bridge the 
communications gap.  
The organisation and monitoring of brigade training schemes was one of the 
many multi-faceted roles of the brigade commander. A systematic approach to training 




Appropriate exercises were devised to ensure that officers and ORs had individual 
skills and were suitably conversant with tactical principles. Lessons were disseminated 
and acted upon accordingly. Similarly, where an appropriate supportive culture 
existed, brigade questionnaires were issued to COs and NCOs to elicit their views on 
operations. These responses were then discussed at brigade, divisional and corps 
conferences; this reflected a proactive approach to learning within the corps and a 
pragmatic method of problem-solving and adaptation to the diverse nature of the 
battlefield. In this respect, it can be argued that the lessons derived from combat at 
brigade level were a valuable contribution to the British army’s tactical development 
This process of learning and adaptation, although it varied in its rate of development 
from brigade to brigade, reflected the ethos of the British army and the value of 
flexibility, innovation and collaboration. 
As the pre-war concepts of warfare were reshaped or modified to reflect the 
conditions of static warfare, weak and ineffective or just older brigadiers were replaced 
by experienced men promoted from battalion command who were willing and able to 
run large scale operations under combat conditions. The process of meritocratic 
promotion also created brigade staffs which were capable of running large-scale 
operations and undertaking multiple roles that demanded teamwork and efficiency. 
Sustaining a stable and efficient staff at brigade level, like all levels of command in the 
BEF, proved challenging. The significant rate of ‘churn’ amongst experienced officers 
was due to several factors. The presence of brigade officers in the front line contributed 
to attrition through death and injury. Equally, the transfer of staff to fill the vacuum of 
experienced officers and commanders throughout the BEF was detrimental to brigade 
efficiency and unit cohesion. Nevertheless, a pattern of renewal ensured that a fresh 




to successfully embrace the BEF’s tactical reappraisal and implement appropriate 
tactics.   
Turning to the second research question, the organisational and tactical 
development of brigades differed significantly depending on the corps that it served in 
at any given time. This reflected three principal factors. First, the establishment of a 
stable staff structure at corps, divisional and brigade levels provided unit cohesion and 
organisational uniformity. This for example, was reflected in the qualities of XIII Corps’ 
command staff, which was imbued with combat experience and managerial skills 
which provided a platform for a uniform rate of organisational and tactical 
development. 
 The second factor concerned the scale of an attack. Fundamentally, a corps’s 
position on an Army front governed the extent to which the necessary pre-conditions 
for operational success were met. This factor was manifested in various ways: the 
ability to establish efficient infrastructure, the width of the corps frontage, opportunities 
for artillery registration and the disposition of the enemy defences. These issues 
determined the scope for preparation and reconnaissance, the ability to suppress the 
enemy batteries and the effectiveness of communications. Where the preparations, 
methods of attack and logistic support were inadequate, operations were jeopardised.  
This is illustrated by the varying levels of success achieved by the brigades of Fourth 
Army’s XIII Corps on 1 and 23 July 1916 and of Fifth Army’s XVIII and II Corps on 31 
July and 16 August 1917  
 A third factor that shaped the course of brigade operations concerned 
command culture, specifically the degree of flexibility allowed to brigade commanders. 




brigadier’s local knowledge and tactical acumen was appreciated, and he was 
included in higher planning. For example, during II Corps’s operations on the Ancre in 
1916, recognising the irregularity of his front, GOC 118 Brigade had considerable 
freedom in deploying reserves. In other corps, the culture was different, and the local 
knowledge of the brigadier was side-lined. With few opportunities for tactical control, 
his role was chiefly confined to stabilising vulnerable situations and coping with the 
difficulties created by poor preparation and operational mismanagement. 
By 1917, where pre-conditions for operational success were in place, a culture 
of flexibility gave brigade command more opportunity to exercise tactical control. This 
was evident in Second Army’s operations on the Menin Road where planning and 
preparation was consistent across X and IX Corps. Brigades were given ample time 
to prepare and benefited from the recent experience of Fifth Army divisions. Greater 
flexibility was reflected in corps arrangements designed to cope with depth defences. 
Devolution of responsibility capitalised on initiative at brigade level and gave flexibility 
to deployment reserves rapidly in response counterattacks. These arrangements 
demonstrated the importance of devolved command and foreshadowed the mobile 
brigade operations of 1918. 
The lack of uniformity in the battlefield performance of brigades, which reflected 
the corps in which brigades served, is illustrated by the operations of Fifth Army at 
Langemark on 16 August 1917. In XIV Corps, all the pre-conditions for success 
operations were met despite many difficulties. The prominent role of the brigade staffs 
helped to ensure that preparations were thorough and the training was appropriate. 
To keep up the tempo of the attack, battle procedure was compressed, and liaison 
both within and between adjacent brigades was emphasised. All this reflected the 




In contrast, II Corps took a quite different approach. The arrangements for the 
attack were woefully inadequate, and brigades suffered from insufficient artillery and 
logistic support, poor communications, unrealistic objectives and an acute man-power 
shortage. Gough’s intervention and a late change of plans contravened the principles 
of FSR1 by side-lining the brigadiers, despite their local knowledge of the tactical 
situation. With their tactical influence significantly diminished, brigadiers were limited 
to ameliorating the difficulties caused by operational mismanagement, by timely 
deployment of reserves or by their personal intervention in vulnerable situations. It is 
evident that as late as 1917 brigade command was significantly influenced by a range 
of broad factors over which commanders had little influence.   
 The response of brigade command to the semi-mobile and mobile offensive 
operations in 1918 was the peak of its development.  Operations were affected by 
three principal factors that influenced brigade battlefield performance. First, the British 
army’s doctrinal reappraisal stressed the implementation of set-piece attacks on 
narrow fronts. The second factor concerned the provision of effective logistics, 
overwhelming firepower and a sophisticated infrastructure. However, difficulties were 
encountered in bringing guns forward, with subsequent effect on brigade operations.  
Third, a robust process of meritocratic promotion created a corps of brigade officers 
able to handle the complexities of modern operations. In this respect, the response of 
brigade command to the transition to open warfare reflected the British army’s aptitude 
for institutional and operational change.    
 In accordance with pre-war principles, the devolution of command to the lowest 
appropriate level was at the core of tactical development. This was based on the 
lessons of previous offensives. At brigade level, three principal factors were key.  First, 




changing circumstances and continue the advance. The method of advance was 
devolved upon the brigade commander by division. Brigades used various methods, 
including establishing autonomous brigade groups. 
A second factor facilitating tactical control was the progressive movement 
forward of brigade headquarters, maximising use of the communications technology. 
Whilst to some degree tactical control diminished as the advance outpaced 
communications, brigade staff used whatever communications were available. 
Forward movement of BHQ was monitored by division with ABHQs established on a 
secure forward line of communication. A third contributory factor that gave a significant 
degree of flexibility at brigade level was the availability of firepower. This was reflected 
in barrage arrangements designed to conform with the irregularity of brigade frontages 
and in accordance with the strength of enemy resistance. The implementation of these 
measures, providing flexibility and control at a local level, demonstrated the tactical 
progression of brigade command, and was in accord with FSR1 which stressed the 
value of devolved command.  
The organisational and tactical evolution of infantry brigade command on the 
Western Front was, as that of the wider BEF, inconsistent and occasionally regressive. 
What brigades could do was limited, and they had little control over the broad 
parameters in which they operated. However, this thesis has demonstrated that with 
the establishment of the organisational, operational and logistic pre-conditions for 
success, brigade command was able and willing to respond to the challenges of static 
warfare and the transition to mobile operations. This process reflected the ethos of the 
pre-war British army officer class and its capacity for learning, adaptation and 
flexibility. These values were sustained and applied to effect through the creation of a 




control large-scale operations. This process was a lasting testament to their 
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